Opinion
E067191
02-22-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BUDDIE LEE ABLES, Defendant and Appellant.
Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Randall D. Einhorn, Peter Quon, Jr., and Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION; AND DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
The petition for rehearing filed by appellant on March 8, 2018, is denied. The opinion filed in this matter on February 22, 2018, is modified as follows:
The entire "DISCUSSION" section starting on page 4 is replaced with the following:
(")DISCUSSION
A. REASONABLE SUSPICION
1. CONTENTION
Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence because Deputy Olivas did not have a reasonable suspicion the law had been violated. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.)
2. STANDARD OF REVIEW
" ' "An appellate court's review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] 'The [trial] court's resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review.' [Citations.] [¶] The court's resolution of the first inquiry, which involves questions of fact, is reviewed under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. [Citations.] Its decision on the second, which is a pure question of law, is scrutinized under the standard of independent review. [Citations.] Finally, its ruling on the third, which is a mixed fact-law question that is however predominantly one of law, . . . is also subject to independent review." ' " (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1140.)
3. LAW
"[A]n officer may stop and detain a motorist on reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the law. [Citations.] The guiding principle in determining the propriety of an investigatory detention is 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.' [Citations.] In making our determination, we examine 'the totality of the circumstances' in each case." (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1082-1083.)
Vehicle Code section 26708.5 provides, "No person shall place, install, affix, or apply any transparent material upon the windshield, or side or rear windows, of any motor vehicle if the material alters the color or reduces the light transmittance of the windshield or side or rear windows, except as provided in subdivision (b), (c), or (d) of [Vehicle Code s]ection 26708."
Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision (b), provides, "This section does not apply to any of the following: [¶] . . . Side windows that are to the rear of the driver. [¶] [And t]he rear window or windows," if the vehicle has side view mirrors. (Veh. Code, § 26708, subd. (b)(4)&(8).) Thus, a car's front windshield and front side windows cannot be tinted.
The stolen car had an Arizona license plate. Arizona's window tinting law (A.R.S. § 28-959.01(A)(6)&(10) & (C)) is similar to California's law. (See generally People v. Reyes (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 856, 858 [officer stopped a car due to having only one license plate; the car was registered in Florida, which permits a single license plate; the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the car on the belief that a single license plate was a violation of California law].)
4. HISTORICAL FACTS
a. Analysis
Defendant contends the trial court's factual finding that the windows were tinted is not supported by substantial evidence. We apply the substantial evidence standard to the trial court's findings of fact. (People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1140.) Under the substantial evidence standard, the testimony of a single witness will ordinarily suffice to uphold a judgment "even if it is contradicted by other evidence, inconsistent or false as to other portions." (In re Fredrick G. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 353, 366.)
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Deputy Olivas, "When you say the windows were tinted, which windows were tinted?" Olivas responded, "The rear windshield, the rear passenger, and the front passenger." Olivas stated the Honda was traveling southbound, while she was traveling northbound. Defense counsel asked Olivas, "Was his car moving?" Olivas responded, "It was turning to move, yes." Olivas's statement can be understood as Olivas having seen defendant turn the car. Given that Olivas saw the passenger side windows, it can be inferred that defendant turned left, giving her a view of the passenger side of the car. When Olivas followed behind defendant, she would have seen that the rear window was also tinted. Olivas's testimony provides substantial evidence that the rear and passenger side windows were tinted.
Defendant asserts there is not substantial evidence because Deputy Olivas's testimony was contradictory and lacked clarity. We do not find defendant's argument to be persuasive because, despite any contradictions, Olivas's testimony that the "front passenger" window was tinted constitutes substantial evidence that the front passenger side window was tinted. (See People v. Cortes (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 73-74 [appellate court resolves any contradictions in favor of the trial court's findings].) In particular, on cross-examination, defense counsel asked Deputy Olivas, "When you say the windows were tinted, which windows were tinted?" Olivas responded, "The rear windshield, the rear passenger, and the front passenger." The foregoing is substantial evidence reflecting the front passenger window was tinted.
Defendant asserts the evidence is insufficient because there is no evidence of Deputy Olivas's experience with tinted windows. {AOB 13} "If an officer forms an opinion in a common-sense examination of a vehicle that there is a film placed upon the vehicle's windows in an unauthorized place or that light is obstructed in the fashion contemplated by the statute, such evidence will be sufficient to support conviction under section 26708(a) if the trial court believes the officer; no further evidence or scientific testimony need be presented." (People v. Niebauer (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1278, 1292.)
Deputy Olivas testified that she was on patrol at the time she saw the Honda. {RT 3} Deputy Olivas was on patrol in a car. {RT 14} Thus, from the evidence that Deputy Olivas was driving, it can be inferred that Deputy Olivas has experience with cars. Deputy Olivas saw tint on the front passenger window of the Honda. Deputy Olivas's common-sense and experience with cars would inform her of whether of a window appeared tinted. Thus, Deputy Olivas's opinion that the Honda's front passenger window appeared tinted is supported by her common sense and experience with cars. In sum, there is substantial evidence reflecting the front passenger window was tinted.
b. Factual Finding
i. Procedural History
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Deputy Olivas, "When you say the windows were tinted, which windows were tinted?" Olivas responded, "The rear windshield, the rear passenger, and the front passenger."
At the suppression hearing, defense counsel asserted Deputy Olivas was mistaken in her belief that the law prohibited all automotive window tinting. The trial court explained, "The fact that somebody had a mistaken idea, if indeed Deputy Olivas was mistaken, is not the point. You still cannot tint your rear window. [¶] She was of the opinion the rear window was illegally tinted. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] And I believe [the] officer, and that's the way I'm ruling."
After the court denied the motion to suppress, defense counsel said the trial court misunderstood her argument. Defense counsel said, "The defense's argument is that the law allows for a certain level of tint. It has not been shown in this evidentiary hearing that his tint rose above that level. Therefore the initial stop is unlawful." Defense counsel continued, "We have no evidence before us that [defendant's] windows were beyond the acceptable level of tint that is allowed for under the law."
The trial court said, "The deputy testified that in her opinion the rear windshield was tinted in an illegal manner and a violation of the law which gave her probable cause. I don't think she was mistaken in her interpretation of the law. Even though she may have said something about the side windows, that was an incorrect statement of the law, which I'm not finding. I'm just finding she had reasonable cause to stop the car. If you need to clarify, I'm here."
ii. Analysis
Defendant asserts the trial court did not make an explicit finding that the front passenger side window was tinted because the trial court relied on the tinting of the rear window when denying the motion, and therefore, this court is improperly making a finding of fact by relying on the tinting of the front passenger window.
The trial court said it believed Deputy Olivas. The trial court concluded Olivas made "an incorrect statement of law" concerning the side windows. It can reasonably be inferred from the trial court's statements that it believed Olivas's testimony that the front passenger side window was tinted, but that Olivas was incorrect in her understanding of the law concerning tinting side windows.
In sum, we are relying on an implicit finding of fact based upon the trial court's statement, "I believe the officer." The trial court's explicit finding that Deputy Olivas's testimony was believable implies a finding that the front passenger side window was tinted, as testified to by Olivas. (See People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1175, superseded by statute on another ground [relying on a determination "[i]mplict in the [trial] court's finding and remarks"].)
5. APPLYING FACTS TO THE LAW
We apply the de novo standard of review when examining whether the trial court erred by concluding there was reasonable suspicion. (People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1140.)
As set forth ante, there is substantial evidence reflecting the Honda's front passenger window was tinted. It is a violation of the law to have a tinted front passenger window. (Veh. Code, § 26708.5.) Because the front passenger window was tinted, it was reasonable for Olivas to suspect that the vehicle was in violation of Vehicle Code section 26708.5. We conclude the trial court did not err.
When responding to defense counsel toward the end of the hearing, the trial court said, "You still cannot tint your rear window." We review the trial court's ruling, not its reasoning, and we affirm if the ruling is correct on any ground. (People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1295, fn. 12.)
Defendant asserts front passenger windows can lawfully be tinted pursuant to Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision (d), and therefore it was not reasonable to suspect the law had been violated. Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision (d) provides, "Notwithstanding subdivision (a), clear, colorless, and transparent material may be installed, affixed, or applied to the front side windows, located to the immediate left and right of the front seat if the following conditions are met: [¶] (1) The material has a minimum visible light transmittance of 88 percent. . . . (3) The material is designed and manufactured to enhance the ability of the existing window glass to block the sun's harmful ultraviolet A rays." (Italics added.)
The material discussed in subdivision (d) must be colorless. Accordingly, subdivision (d) does not authorize window tinting on a car's front side windows. Rather, the subdivision authorizes the use of colorless filters for protection from ultraviolet (UV) light, and that clear UV filtering agent, whether it reflects UV rays or absorbs them, must permit at least 88 percent of the light to come through the window. Therefore, we find defendant's argument to be unpersuasive.
B. MISTAKE OF LAW
1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
During cross-examination, defendant's trial counsel asked Deputy Olivas, "Do you believe that if the rear passenger window is tinted, that that's a violation of Vehicle Code Section 26708.5?" Olivas responded, "Not just that window." Later, the following exchange took place:
"[Defense Counsel]: We will go window by window. We can discuss all of them if that is easier for clarification purposes, but if one of those windows is tinted, it's a violation of that Vehicle Code Section in your opinion, correct?
"[Deputy Olivas]: Yes, ma'am.
"[Defense Counsel]: And it doesn't matter in your opinion how tinted the window is. If it's tinted in some way, you can see that the color has been altered, that's a violation?
"[Deputy Olivas]: Are we talking about all windows?
"[Defense Counsel]: Correct.
"[Deputy Olivas]: Yes, ma'am."
2. ANALYSIS
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion because Deputy Olivas was mistaken about the law when she stopped defendant.
An officer's mistake of law does not support reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. (People v. Reyes (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 856, 863.) Deputy Olivas's understanding of the law is not entirely clear from the record. To the extent Olivas believes it is illegal to have any vehicle window tinted, she is partially incorrect. As explained ante, rear windows can be tinted, front windows cannot. (Veh. Code, §§ 26708, subd. (b)(4)&(8) & 26708.5, subd. (a).)
Although Deputy Olivas was not entirely correct, she was accurate in believing it is illegal to have tinted front windows (front windshield and front side windows). Therefore, as set forth ante, it was reasonable for Olivas to stop defendant because the Honda had an illegally tinted front passenger side window. In other words, Olivas's possible partial mistake of law concerning the rear windows does not equate with a lack of reasonable suspicion.
C. TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred as a matter of law by concluding rear window tinting is unlawful. At the hearing, the trial court said, "You still cannot tint your rear window." We review the trial court's ruling, not its reasoning, and we affirm if the ruling is correct on any ground. (People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1295, fn. 12.) Further, we have provided no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions in performing our review of this matter. Accordingly, we can provide defendant no relief by discussing this comment by the trial court. Therefore, we deem this issue to be moot. (People v. Travis (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1271, 1280.)
D. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant asserts that if this court concludes he forfeited a portion of his argument by failing to raise it below, then his trial counsel was ineffective. We do not address the substance of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim because none of our conclusions in this case are based upon forfeiture.(")
Except for these modifications, the opinion remains unchanged. The modifications do not effect a change in the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
J. We concur: McKINSTER
Acting. P. J. FIELDS
J.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. 16CR023076) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. John M. Tomberlin, Judge. Affirmed. Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Randall D. Einhorn, Peter Quon, Jr., and Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Buddie Lee Ables entered a plea of no contest to the charge of receiving a stolen vehicle. (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced defendant to county prison for a term of three years, suspended 18 months of the sentence, and granted 18 months of mandatory supervision. Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.) We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.) In the motion, defendant explained that San Bernardino County Sheriff Deputy Olivas stopped defendant, while defendant was driving, due to the car allegedly having illegally tinted windows. (Veh. Code, § 26708.5.) Defendant asserted the traffic stop was unlawful. Defendant sought suppression of the officer's observations during the stop, any statements made by defendant as a result of the stop, and any evidence seized during the stop.
B. OPPOSITION
The prosecutor opposed defendant's motion. The prosecutor alleged that at 5:03 a.m. on May 30, 2016, Deputy Olivas was driving on patrol when she saw a green Honda "with tinted front driver and passenger side windows, in violation of Vehicle Code section 26708.5(a)." Defendant did not have a driver's license, registration, or proof of insurance to show Olivas. Defendant consented to a search of his person and the vehicle. Olivas found a shaved key in the car and an eight-inch metal file on defendant's person.
A records check revealed the car belonged to the victim. The victim had not given anyone permission to take her vehicle; the victim did not realize the car was stolen until contacted by deputies. Defendant was arrested. Defendant admitted he did not have permission to possess the vehicle.
In the written opposition, the prosecutor argued, "[Deputy] Olivas observed a vehicle with window tinting on the front driver and passenger windows, which is a violation of California Vehicle Code section 26708.5(a) which makes it illegal to 'place, install, affix, or apply any transparent material upon the windshield, or side or rear windows, of any motor vehicle if the material alters the color or reduces the light transmittance of the windshield or side or rear windows.' Based on Deputy Olivas' observations of tinted front windows, she had reasonable suspicion to believe that a criminal offense was occurring in her presence. Therefore, the traffic stop of the Defendant was justified and the Defendant's motion to suppress evidence on this ground should be denied."
C. HEARING
The trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress. Deputy Olivas testified at the hearing. On May 30, 2016, at approximately 5:00 a.m., Olivas was on patrol, driving northbound, when she saw a green Honda with tinted windows. Olivas was approximately one car length away from the Honda when she observed the Honda, which was traveling southbound, make a turn. Olivas saw the car had window tinting on the rear windshield and both passenger side windows (front and rear). Olivas concluded the window tinting violated Vehicle Code section 26708.5, subdivision (a). Olivas turned around, drove behind defendant, and then stopped defendant.
At the hearing, Deputy Olivas was asked about her understanding of the window tinting law. Olivas's explanation is unclear. However, one manner of interpreting her answers is that she believes it is illegal to have any window tinting on a vehicle.
The prosecutor argued that Vehicle Code section 26708.5 prohibits window tinting on "any window" and therefore "the deputy was justified in conducting the traffic stop." During a discussion of Vehicle Code section 26708, the prosecutor clarified, "I do not believe it applies to the rear windshield. It's only specific to the front, left and right."
Defense counsel argued that window tinting is permitted if it does not obstruct the driver's vision. Defense counsel asserted there was no evidence concerning the darkness of the window tinting and whether it obstructed defendant's view. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress. Toward the end of the hearing, when responding to defense counsel, the trial court said, "You still cannot tint your rear window."
DISCUSSION
A. REASONABLE SUSPICION
Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence because Deputy Olivas did not have a reasonable suspicion the law had been violated. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.)
We apply the de novo standard of review to the trial court's conclusion that the officer had reasonable suspicion. (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1140.) "[A]n officer may stop and detain a motorist on reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the law. [Citations.] The guiding principle in determining the propriety of an investigatory detention is 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.' [Citations.] In making our determination, we examine 'the totality of the circumstances' in each case." (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1082-1083.)
Vehicle Code section 26708.5 provides, "No person shall place, install, affix, or apply any transparent material upon the windshield, or side or rear windows, of any motor vehicle if the material alters the color or reduces the light transmittance of the windshield or side or rear windows, except as provided in subdivision (b), (c), or (d) of [Vehicle Code s]ection 26708."
Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision (b), provides, "This section does not apply to any of the following: [¶] . . . Side windows that are to the rear of the driver. [¶] [And t]he rear window or windows," if the vehicle has side view mirrors. (Veh. Code, § 26708, subd. (b)(4)&(8).) Thus, a car's front windshield and front side windows cannot be tinted.
The stolen car had an Arizona license plate. Arizona's window tinting law (A.R.S. § 28-959.01(A)(6)&(10) & (C)) is similar to California's law. (See generally People v. Reyes (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 856, 858 [officer stopped a car due to having only one license plate; the car was registered in Florida, which permits a single license plate; the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the car on the belief that a single license plate was a violation of California law].)
Deputy Olivas saw the front passenger side window of the Honda was tinted. Because the front passenger side window was tinted, it was reasonable for Olivas to suspect that the vehicle was in violation of Vehicle Code section 26708.5. In sum, the evidence reflects a reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. We conclude the trial court did not err.
When responding to defense counsel toward the end of the hearing, the trial court said, "You still cannot tint your rear window." We review the trial court's ruling, not its reasoning, and we affirm if the ruling is correct on any ground. (People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1295, fn. 12.) --------
Defendant asserts front passenger windows can lawfully be tinted pursuant to Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision (d), which provides, "Notwithstanding subdivision (a), clear, colorless, and transparent material may be installed, affixed, or applied to the front side windows, located to the immediate left and right of the front seat if the following conditions are met: [¶] (1) The material has a minimum visible light transmittance of 88 percent. . . . (3) The material is designed and manufactured to enhance the ability of the existing window glass to block the sun's harmful ultraviolet A rays." (Italics added.)
The material discussed in subdivision (d) must be colorless. Accordingly, subdivision (d) does not authorize window tinting on a car's front side windows. Rather, the subdivision authorizes the use of colorless filters for protection from ultraviolet (UV) light, and that clear UV filtering agent, whether it reflects UV rays or absorbs them, must permit at least 88 percent of the light to come through the window.
B. MISTAKE OF LAW
1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
During cross-examination, defendant's trial counsel asked Deputy Olivas, "Do you believe that if the rear passenger window is tinted, that that's a violation of Vehicle Code Section 26708.5?" Olivas responded, "Not just that window." Later, the following exchange took place:
"[Defense Counsel]: We will go window by window. We can discuss all of them if that is easier for clarification purposes, but if one of those windows is tinted, it's a violation of that Vehicle Code Section in your opinion, correct?
"[Deputy Olivas]: Yes, ma'am.
"[Defense Counsel]: And it doesn't matter in your opinion how tinted the window is. If it's tinted in some way, you can see that the color has been altered, that's a violation?
"[Deputy Olivas]: Are we talking about all windows?
"[Defense Counsel]: Correct.
"[Deputy Olivas]: Yes, ma'am."
2. ANALYSIS
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion because Deputy Olivas was mistaken about the law when she stopped defendant.
An officer's mistake of law does not support reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. (People v. Reyes (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 856, 863.) Deputy Olivas's understanding of the law is not entirely clear from the record. To the extent Olivas believes it is illegal to have any vehicle window tinted, she is partially incorrect. As explained ante, rear windows can be tinted, front windows cannot. (Veh. Code, §§ 26708, subd. (b)(4)&(8) & 26708.5, subd. (a).)
Although Deputy Olivas was not entirely correct, she was accurate in believing it is illegal to have tinted front windows (front windshield and front side windows). Therefore, as set forth ante, it was reasonable for Olivas to stop defendant because the Honda had an illegally tinted front passenger side window. In other words, Olivas's possible partial mistake of law concerning the rear windows does not equate with a lack of reasonable suspicion.
C. FACTUAL FINDING
1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Deputy Olivas, "When you say the windows were tinted, which windows were tinted?" Olivas responded, "The rear windshield, the rear passenger, and the front passenger."
At the suppression hearing, defense counsel asserted Deputy Olivas was mistaken in her belief that the law prohibited all automotive window tinting. The trial court explained, "The fact that somebody had a mistaken idea, if indeed Deputy Olivas was mistaken, is not the point. You still cannot tint your rear window. [¶] She was of the opinion the rear window was illegally tinted. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] And I believe [the] officer, and that's the way I'm ruling."
After the court denied the motion to suppress, defense counsel said the trial court misunderstood her argument. Defense counsel said, "The defense's argument is that the law allows for a certain level of tint. It has not been shown in this evidentiary hearing that his tint rose above that level. Therefore the initial stop is unlawful." Defense counsel continued, "We have no evidence before us that [defendant's] windows were beyond the acceptable level of tint that is allowed for under the law."
The trial court said, "The deputy testified that in her opinion the rear windshield was tinted in an illegal manner and a violation of the law which gave her probable cause. I don't think she was mistaken in her interpretation of the law. Even though she may have said something about the side windows, that was an incorrect statement of the law, which I'm not finding. I'm just finding she had reasonable cause to stop the car. If you need to clarify, I'm here."
2. ANALYSIS
Defendant asserts the trial court did not make an explicit finding that the front passenger side window was tinted because the trial court relied on the tinting of the rear window when denying the motion, and therefore, this court is improperly making a finding of fact by relying on the tinting of the front passenger window.
The trial court said it believed Deputy Olivas. The trial court concluded Olivas made "an incorrect statement of law" concerning the side windows. It can reasonably be inferred from the trial court's statements that it believed Olivas's testimony that the front passenger side window was tinted, but that Olivas was incorrect in her understanding of the law concerning tinting side windows.
In sum, we are relying on an implicit finding of fact based upon the trial court's statement, "I believe the officer." The trial court's explicit finding that Deputy Olivas's testimony was believable implies a finding that the front passenger side window was tinted, as testified to by Olivas. (See People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1175, superseded by statute on another ground [relying on a determination "[i]mplict in the [trial] court's finding and remarks"].)
D. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Defendant contends the trial court's factual finding that the windows were tinted is not supported by substantial evidence. We apply the substantial evidence standard to the trial court's findings of fact. (People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1140.) Under the substantial evidence standard, the testimony of a single witness will ordinarily suffice to uphold a judgment "even if it is contradicted by other evidence, inconsistent or false as to other portions." (In re Fredrick G. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 353, 366.)
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Deputy Olivas, "When you say the windows were tinted, which windows were tinted?" Olivas responded, "The rear windshield, the rear passenger, and the front passenger." Olivas stated the Honda was traveling southbound, while she was traveling northbound. Defense counsel asked Olivas, "Was his car moving?" Olivas responded, "It was turning to move, yes." Olivas's statement can be understood as Olivas having seen defendant turn the car. Given that Olivas saw the passenger side windows, it can be inferred that defendant turned left, giving her a view of the passenger side of the car. When Olivas followed behind defendant, she would have seen that the rear window was also tinted. Olivas's testimony provides substantial evidence that the rear and passenger side windows were tinted.
Defendant asserts there is not substantial evidence because Deputy Olivas's testimony was contradictory and lacked clarity. We do not find defendant's argument to be persuasive because, despite any contradictions, Olivas's testimony that the "front passenger" window was tinted constitutes substantial evidence that the front passenger side window was tinted. (See People v. Cortes (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 73-74 [appellate court resolves any contradictions in favor of the trial court's findings].)
E. TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred as a matter of law by concluding rear window tinting is unlawful. At the hearing, the trial court said, "You still cannot tint your rear window." We review the trial court's ruling, not its reasoning, and we affirm if the ruling is correct on any ground. (People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1295, fn. 12.) Further, we have provided no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions in performing our review of this matter. Accordingly, we can provide defendant no relief by discussing this comment by the trial court. Therefore, we deem this issue to be moot. (People v. Travis (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1271, 1280.)
F. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant asserts that if this court concludes he forfeited a portion of his argument by failing to raise it below, then his trial counsel was ineffective. We do not address the substance of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim because none of our conclusions in this case are based upon forfeiture.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
J. We concur: McKINSTER
Acting P. J. FIELDS
J.