Opinion
2012-04-17
Steven Banks, The Legal Aid Society, New York (David Crow of counsel), and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, New York (Christopher Terranova of counsel), for appellant. Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Clara H. Salzberg of counsel), for respondent.
Steven Banks, The Legal Aid Society, New York (David Crow of counsel), and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, New York (Christopher Terranova of counsel), for appellant. Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Clara H. Salzberg of counsel), for respondent.
TOM, J.P., CATTERSON, RICHTER, ABDUS–SALAAM, ROMÁN, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Steven L. Barrett, J.), rendered January 7, 2008, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of disorderly conduct, and sentencing him to a conditional discharge, unanimously affirmed.
The accusatory instrument was not jurisdictionally defective. The misdemeanor information included the deposition of the arresting officer, which alleged that for approximately 10 minutes, defendant stood immediately next to a table on which t-shirts were “spread out,” and that defendant was “arranging and handling said merchandise.” The table was “in the vicinity” of a given private address and was “open to public view.” When approached, defendant stated that he did not need a license because he “work[ed] at the store.”
Giving these facts “a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading” ( People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354, 360, 717 N.Y.S.2d 88, 740 N.E.2d 233 [2000] ), we find that the accusatory instrument sufficiently alleged unlicensed general vending (Administrative Code of City of New York § 20–453). “[A]s a matter of common sense and reasonable pleading” ( People v. Davis, 13 N.Y.3d 17, 31, 884 N.Y.S.2d 665, 912 N.E.2d 1044 [2009] ), the information adequately alleged that defendant engaged in the conduct required for acting as a general vendor ( see Administrative Code § 20–452[b] ). The alleged conduct, taken together with defendant's statement to the officer, negated any noncommercial explanation ( see People v. Sylla, 154 Misc.2d 112, 115–116, 584 N.Y.S.2d 985 [Crim. Ct., N.Y. County 1992]; People v. Diouf, 153 Misc.2d 887, 889–890, 583 N.Y.S.2d 746 [Crim. Ct., N.Y. County 1992] ). Likewise, the information, read as a whole, supported the inference that defendant was acting in a “public space” ( see Administrative Code § 20–452 [d] ).