People ex Rel. Thorpe v. Clark

15 Citing cases

  1. Matter of Jack T

    98 Misc. 2d 16 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978)   Cited 2 times

    MARTHA GIBBELL, J. In an appeal from a Supreme Court judgment denying writs of habeas corpus involving petitions of three individuals in unrelated acts of delinquency, all three respondents having been found (1) mentally incompetent to stand trial and (2) dangerous to themselves and to the community and all of whom had been committed under CPL article 730 by four Judges of the Family Court, the Appellate Division reversed and remanded the matter to the Family Court for further proceedings, directing that the juveniles remain in the custody of the Kings County Hospital pending the outcome of the hearing. (People ex rel. Thorpe v Clark, 62 A.D.2d 216.) In the within matter, which pertains to one of the respondents three juvenile delinquency petitions had been filed against Jack T. for three separate incidents.

  2. Matter of Lorie C

    49 N.Y.2d 161 (N.Y. 1980)   Cited 79 times
    In Lorie C., supra, the court reversed a Family Court order that would have separated the responsibilities for custody and for supervision of certain delinquent children.

    We have considered the section only twice since its 1972 amendment, once in Matter of Antonio P. ( 40 N.Y.2d 960) in affirming a holding that it did not authorize an order requiring expungement of police records, and once in Matter of Ellery C. ( 32 N.Y.2d 588, 591) in a passing reference to the third sentence of the section as supporting the conclusion that confinement of a PINS child in a training school is not permissible. It has, however, been considered a number of times by both Appellate Division and Trial Judges, with varying results. The order sought or made was held not authorized by the section in People ex rel. Thorpe v Clark ( 62 A.D.2d 216, 227 [since the section does not expand the court's legal authority, commitment of a retarded delinquent can only be decreed under the procedures established by the Mental Hygiene Law]); New York City Housing Auth. v Miller ( 60 A.D.2d 823, affg on opn below 89 Misc.2d 141 [section does not authorize an order requiring the housing authority, an independent public corporation, to provide immediate housing, since such an order is not one for "information, assistance or cooperation"]); Matter of Currier v Honig ( 50 A.D.2d 632 [section does not authorize an ex parte order requiring the county to appoint an additional Assistant County Attorney, which can only be done when authorized by the county legislature]); Matter of Carpenter ( 94 Misc.2d 908 [section does not authorize order requiring Social Services to pay support for period antedating application]); Matter of Dennis M. ( 82 Misc.2d 802 [section does not authorize order requiring Commissioner of Social Services to reorganize unit respon

  3. In re Two Minor Children

    95 Nev. 225 (Nev. 1979)   Cited 12 times
    Holding juveniles have due process right to competency hearing

    In the meantime, the procedures here outlined adequately provide for the protection of the juveniles' rights while upholding the jurisdiction of the Family Court to adequately deal with these circumstances. People ex rel. Thorpe, etc. v. Clark, 403 N.Y.S.2d 910, 918 (N.Y.A.D. 1978). Likewise, it is hoped that our Nevada Legislature will respond to the problem.

  4. Matter of Baby Boy O

    298 A.D.2d 677 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 2 times

    . However, Family Ct Act ยง 255 does not expand Family Court's legal authority (see Matter of Lorie C., 49 N.Y.2d 161, 167;Matter of D. Children, 90 A.D.2d 348, 352-353, affd 60 N.Y.2d 838; People ex rel. Thorpe v. Clark, 62 A.D.2d 216, 227), and the Family Ct Act sets forth no procedures for appointing and compensating a guardian ad litem (see Family Ct Act ยง 165 [a]).

  5. Matter of D. Children

    90 A.D.2d 348 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)   Cited 7 times

    This section, however, "is only effective within the scope of the court's legal authority." ( People ex rel. Thorpe v. Clark, 62 A.D.2d 216, 227; see Matter of Lorie C., 49 N.Y.2d 161, 167, supra.) As noted before, the court's legal authority in this proceeding terminated when it approved the instrument of voluntary transfer.

  6. Metropolitan Assn. v. Koch

    89 A.D.2d 317 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)   Cited 28 times

    In any regard, Local Law No. 30 is solely revenue producing while section 101-b Alco. Bev. Cont. of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law is purely regulatory. Such statutes are to be harmonized whenever possible ( Cimo v. State of New York, 306 N.Y. 143), and section 445 Tax of the Tax Law and Local Law No. 30, enacted long after section 101-b Alco. Bev. Cont. of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law should prevail ( People ex rel. Thorpe v. Clark, 62 A.D.2d 216; see McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, ยงยง 391, 398). The technical violation of section 39 of the New York City Charter, which requires approval at a public referendum of any enactment transferring powers vested in a municipal agency to a nonmunicipal agency, does not void the local law.

  7. Matter of Harvey v. Finnick

    88 A.D.2d 40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)   Cited 9 times
    In Harvey v. Finnick, 88 AD2d 40, 43 (4th Dept 1982) a companion case to and affirmed with Kelley, a unanimous Appellate Division endorsed a simple and succinctly written statement: "No one disputes that the State has a significant interest in maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of district attorneys."

    Special Term recognized that "section 201 County of the County Law, which places the authority to establish the District Attorney's salary in the county, and section 183-a Jud. of the Judiciary Law, wherein the Legislature establishes the District Attorney's salary, are in conflict." ( Matter of Harvey v. Finnick, 111 Misc.2d 197, 200, supra.) When confronted with such an irreconcilable conflict between two statutes, the subsequent statutory provision prevails over a pre-existing and irreconcilably conflicting provision which is not expressly repealed ( People ex rel. Thorpe v. Clark, 62 A.D.2d 216, 224; McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, ยงยง 391, 398).

  8. Matter of Montpelier v. Montpelier

    83 A.D.2d 683 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)   Cited 1 times

    In our view, termination of the order appealed from deprives the Department of Social Services of its aggrieved status and renders this appeal moot (see Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714; Matter of Keelin E. [Greer-Woodycrest Children's Servs.], 65 A.D.2d 736), and we, therefore, conclude that it should be dismissed. It should be noted that were we not to dismiss, appropriate determination would require us to hold that the order which is the subject of this appeal was in excess of statutory authority and improperly made. Neither section 255 FCT of the Family Court Act nor any provision of article 8 of that statute authorizes an order of family supervision directed to the Department of Social Services by the Family Court (cf. Matter of Lorie C., 49 N.Y.2d 161, 167; People ex rel. Thorpe v. Clark, 62 A.D.2d 216; Matter of Currier v. Honig, 50 A.D.2d 632, supra). Appeal dismissed, without costs.

  9. Matter of Michelle

    76 A.D.2d 784 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)   Cited 2 times

    Because of the variables, the question of whether this power should be exercised in a given situation is quite difficult * * *' (Matter of Weberlist, 79 Misc.2d 753, 756.) It is apparent that the court has the inherent power to fashion an adequate remedy in effectuating this policy" (People ex rel. Thorpe v. Clark, 62 A.D.2d 216, 228-229). Similarly, the female minor's need to be protected, guided and supported must be balanced against her right to be free from interference, if such protection, guidance and support would, in fact, be in her best interest.

  10. In the Matter of State v. Doe, 2009 NY Slip Op 29519 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 12/23/2009)

    2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 29519 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009)

    ); In re Jeffrey C., 81 Misc 2d 651 (Family Court, City of New York, 1975) (Juvenile entitled to all formalities available to adult in determining competency to stand trial.); People ex rel Thorpe v. Clark, 62 AD2d 216 (2d Dep't 1978) (commitment of incapacitated juvenile must be made under Mental Hygiene Law and not Criminal Procedure Law due to inability to participate in adjudicatory hearing.). There is nothing in Article 10 that can be said to distinguish it from a criminal prosecution or juvenile delinquency proceeding in the need to find one responsible for a criminal act and the mandate that full due process rights must be afforded to a person sought to be confined or supervised.