Opinion
D078559
03-21-2022
THE PEOPLE ex rel. SAN DIEGO MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO AND ITS CITY COUNCIL, Defendants and Respondents; APRIL BOLING et al., Intervenors and Respondents; CALIFORNIA TAXPAYERS ACTION NETWORK, Movant and Appellant.
Briggs Law Corporation, Cory J. Briggs, and Janna M. Ferraro for Movant and Appellant California Taxpayers Action Network. Smith Steiner Vanderpool and Ann M. Smith for Plaintiff and Respondent San Diego Municipal Employees Association. Smith Steiner Vanderpool and Fenn M. Steiner for Plaintiff and Respondent San Diego Firefighters Local 145, IAFF, AFL-CIO. Rothner, Segall and Greenstone, and Hannah Weinstein for Plaintiff and Respondent AFSCME Local 127, AFL-CIO. Law Offices of James J. Cunningham and James J. Cunningham for Plaintiff and Respondent Deputy City Attorneys Association of San Diego. Mara W. Elliott, City Attorney, James S. McNeill, Assistant City Attorney, and M. Travis Phelps, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents City of San Diego and San Diego City Council. Lounsbery Ferguson Altona & Peak and Kenneth H. Lounsbery for Intervenors and Respondents April Boling, T.J. Zane, and Stephen B. Williams.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. 37-2019-00051308-CU-MC-CTL Richard E. L. Strauss, Judge. Affirmed.
Briggs Law Corporation, Cory J. Briggs, and Janna M. Ferraro for Movant and Appellant California Taxpayers Action Network.
Smith Steiner Vanderpool and Ann M. Smith for Plaintiff and Respondent San Diego Municipal Employees Association.
Smith Steiner Vanderpool and Fenn M. Steiner for Plaintiff and Respondent San Diego Firefighters Local 145, IAFF, AFL-CIO.
Rothner, Segall and Greenstone, and Hannah Weinstein for Plaintiff and Respondent AFSCME Local 127, AFL-CIO.
Law Offices of James J. Cunningham and James J. Cunningham for Plaintiff and Respondent Deputy City Attorneys Association of San Diego.
Mara W. Elliott, City Attorney, James S. McNeill, Assistant City Attorney, and M. Travis Phelps, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents City of San Diego and San Diego City Council.
Lounsbery Ferguson Altona & Peak and Kenneth H. Lounsbery for Intervenors and Respondents April Boling, T.J. Zane, and Stephen B. Williams.
McCONNELL, P. J.
I INTRODUCTION
This is the latest chapter in a decade-old saga concerning the validity of the Citizens' Pension Reform Initiative (hereafter, the Initiative), a voter-approved measure that eliminated defined-pension benefits for most new City of San Diego employees and replaced them with defined-contribution 401(k)-style plans. In a prior case, the Supreme Court concluded San Diego Mayor Jerry Sanders violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (the Act; Gov. Code, § 3500 et seq.) by sponsoring the Initiative and failing to meet and confer with the unions that represent city employees affected by the Initiative. (Boling v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 898 (Boling I).)
In this quo warranto proceeding, the city employee unions (hereafter, the Unions) sued the city and its city council (together, the City) to invalidate the Initiative based on Sanders's violation of the Act. The trial court allowed the Initiative's official proponents-April Boling, T.J. Zane, and Stephen Williams (collectively, the Proponents)-to intervene and defend the Initiative. However, it denied a motion to intervene filed by California Taxpayers Action Network (CTAN), a self-described "non-partisan taxpayer organization." CTAN sought to defend the Initiative-and keep the defined-contribution system in place-for non-unionized city employees. After the court denied CTAN's motion to intervene, it held a bench trial and rendered a judgment invalidating the Initiative.
The Unions include the San Diego Municipal Employees Association; the San Diego City Firefighters Local 145, IAFF, AFL-CIO; the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Local 127, AFL-CIO; and the Deputy City Attorneys Association of San Diego.
CTAN appeals the order denying its motion to intervene, claiming it was eligible for both mandatory and permissive intervention. We conclude CTAN failed to establish it was entitled to either form of intervention. Therefore, we affirm the challenged order.
II BACKGROUND
A
The Initiative
In November 2010, San Diego Mayor Jerry Sanders declared his intention to develop a citizens' initiative to eliminate defined-benefit pensions for most new city employees, with the exception of new hires in the police and fire departments, and to replace them with 401(k)-style plans. (Boling I, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 904.) According to Sanders, pension reform was needed to" 'eliminate [the city's] structural budget deficit.'" (Id. at p. 906.) Sanders developed the pension reform plan and publicized it through press releases and press conferences. (Id. at pp. 905-906.) He also formed a campaign committee to raise money for the proposed initiative. (Id. at p. 906.)
As of March 2011, certain local organizations supported a competing pension reform plan proposed by a member of the city council. (Boling I, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 907.) The alternative proposal included a cap on pensionable pay and eliminated defined-benefit pensions for all new city employees. (Ibid.) Negotiations ensued between Sanders and supporters of the competing proposals. (Ibid.) They produced a compromise plan, which replaced defined-benefit pensions for all new employees except police officers. (Ibid.) It had no payroll cap, but it instituted a freeze on pensionable pay that could be overridden by a two-thirds majority of the city council. (Ibid.) A law firm was retained to draft the initiative. (Ibid.)
In April 2011, a notice of intent to circulate the initiative petition was filed. (Boling I, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 907.) The Proponents were Catherine Boling, T.J. Zane, and Stephen Williams. (Ibid.) Boling was treasurer of a local organization called San Diegans for Pension Reform. (Ibid.) Zane and Williams were leaders of a local organization called the Lincoln Club. (Ibid.) The Proponents gathered sufficient signatures, the registrar of voters certified the measure, and the city council passed a resolution of intent to place the Initiative on the June 2012 election ballot. (Id. at p. 908.)
Meanwhile, the San Diego Municipal Employees Association (hereafter, MEA), wrote letters to Sanders contending the Act imposed a duty on the city to meet and confer about the Initiative. (Boling I, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 908.) Sanders and other city officials rebuffed MEA's demands, asserting the city council had not made any determination of policy or course of action that would trigger the city's meet-and-confer obligations under the Act. (Ibid.)
In relevant part, the Act provides as follows: "The governing body of a public agency, or such boards, commissions, administrative officers or other representatives as may be properly designated by law or by such governing body, shall meet and confer in good faith regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with representatives of such recognized employee organizations ... and shall consider fully such presentations as are made by the employee organization on behalf of its members prior to arriving at a determination of policy or course of action." (Gov. Code, § 3505.)
B The PERB Action
In January 2012, MEA filed an unfair practice charge against the city with Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) based on the city's refusal to meet and confer. (Boling I, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 908.) In February 2012, PERB issued a complaint against the city alleging its failure to meet and confer violated the Act and constituted an unfair practice. (Ibid.) PERB consolidated several unfair practice claims and appointed an administrative law judge (ALJ) to hold a hearing. (Ibid.) PERB also filed an action in the superior court to enjoin presentation of the Initiative on the ballot. (Id. at p. 909.) The court declined to impose the injunction. (Ibid.) The Initiative appeared on the June 2012 ballot, and was approved by the voters. (Ibid.)
In July 2012, the ALJ held a hearing and issued a proposed decision finding Sanders's conduct during the citizens' initiative process amounted to a policy determination on a negotiable matter. (Boling I, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 909.) The ALJ found Sanders-and his principal, the city-had a meet-and-confer duty under the Act. (Ibid.) Because Sanders did not meet and confer as required, the ALJ proposed vacatur of the election results. (Ibid.)
With PERB's permission, the Proponents opposed the proposed ALJ decision. However, PERB largely affirmed the proposed ALJ decision. (Boling I, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 909.) PERB found the city violated the Act by deciding to place the Initiative on the ballot and assenting to Sanders's rejection of MEAs meet-and-confer demands. (Ibid.) Invoking its "make-whole" and "restoration" powers, PERB modified the ALJ's proposed remedy and directed the city to "pay its employees 'for all lost compensation, including but not limited to the value of the lost pension benefits ... offset by the value of new benefits required from the City under [the Initiative].' These payments were to continue for as long as the Initiative was in effect, or until the parties mutually agreed otherwise." (Id. at p. 910.)
The Proponents and the city petitioned for writ review, and the Supreme Court affirmed PERB's central holding that Sanders violated the Act by failing to meet and confer during the citizens' initiative process. (Boling I, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 913-920.) The Supreme Court concluded Sanders had a duty to meet and confer-even though the city's governing body (the city council) did not formally propose the charter amendments at issue-because Sanders "pursued pension reform as a matter of policy while acting as the city's chief executive officer." (Id. at p. 919.) In particular, the Supreme Court emphasized that Sanders recommended the 401(k)-style pension reform plan during his state of the city address, was "deeply involved in developing the proposal's terms," monitored the initiative campaign, assisted in signature gathering, and promoted the Initiative. (Ibid.) After determining that Sanders violated the Act, the Supreme Court directed this court to "address the appropriate judicial remedy" on remand. (Id. at p. 920.)
On remand, our court modified PERB's compensatory remedy. (Boling v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 376 (Boling II).) We ordered the city "to meet and confer over the effects of the Initiative and to pay the affected current and former employees represented by the Unions the difference, plus 7 percent annual interest, between the compensation ... the employees would have received before the Initiative became effective and the compensation the employees received after the Initiative became effective." (Id. at pp. 382-383.) But, unlike PERB, we determined the city's obligation to comply with PERB's compensatory remedy extended only "until completion of the bargaining process, including the exhaustion of impasse procedures, if an impasse occurs." (Id. at p. 382; see id. at pp. 388-389.)
In addition to modifying PERB's compensatory remedy, we declined a request from the Unions seeking invalidation of the Initiative as a judicial remedy. (Boling II, supra, 33 Cal.App.5that pp. 384-386.) We reasoned" [t]he remedy of quo warranto is available to challenge 'purported irregularities in the legislative process of a charter amendment which has taken effect.'" (Id. at p. 384.)" [W]hen the remedy of quo warranto is available, the remedy is exclusive absent contrary constitutional or statutory authority." (Ibid.) Because the Initiative was already in effect, we concluded "the Initiative's procedural regularity may only be challenged in a quo warranto proceeding." (Ibid.; see id. at p. 381.)
" 'An action in the nature of quo warranto is derived from the common law writ used in England by the King's Attorney General to test the validity of franchises or claims asserted by subjects of the crown. [Citations.] Today, relief traditionally granted by the writ, such as a challenge based on purported irregularities in the legislative process of a charter amendment which has taken effect, must be accomplished through the command of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 803.'" (City of Palo Alto v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1271, 1316-1317.)"' "Although the Attorney General occasionally brings a quo warranto action on the initiative of that office, or at the direction of the Governor, usually the action is filed and prosecuted by a private party who has obtained the consent of the Attorney General, for 'leave to sue in quo warranto.'..." [Citations.]'" (People ex rel. Lacey v. Robles (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 804, 816, italics omitted.)
Further, we observed there were especially persuasive reasons to decide the validity of the Initiative in a quo warranto proceeding. (Boling II, supra, 33 Cal.App.5that p. 385.) We opined the Initiative's validity was a "novel" and "complex" question, the resolution of which could "depend on whether... the Act wholly or partially preempts citizens' initiatives on matters within the Act's scope of bargaining." (Id. at p. 386.) PERB's decision "did not decide this question," so the question fell "beyond the scope of our review of PERB's decision." (Ibid.) Additionally, we opined "there may be interested persons, including the Attorney General and unrepresented employees subject to the Initiative, who may wish to address the question, but who are not parties to this review proceeding." (Ibid.) Finally, we noted the "Proponents may also wish to present evidence on the question, which they did not have an opportunity to do in [the PERB] proceeding." (Ibid.)
C The Quo Warran to Action
The Unions sought and obtained leave from the Attorney General to challenge the Initiative in a quo warranto proceeding. Thereafter, on September 27, 2019, they filed a quo warranto suit against the City in the superior court, requesting that the court strike down the Initiative and declare it invalid based on Sanders's violation of the Act.
The City declined to defend the Initiative. It filed an answer admitting the Unions were entitled to a declaration that the city charter amendments effectuated by the Initiative were invalid and without legal effect.
On October 22, 2019, upon the stipulation of the parties, the trial court permitted the Proponents to intervene and defend the Initiative. The Proponents answered the complaint and denied the Unions were entitled to relief.
Over the ensuing months, litigation proceeded apace. The parties litigated the scope of their pleadings. For instance, the Unions moved to strike portions of the Proponents' answer-a motion the trial court denied. The parties also took oral depositions of witnesses, and propounded and responded to written discovery requests.
D CTAN's Efforts to Intervene Ex Parte and Relate Cases
On July 29, 2020, CTAN filed an ex parte application for permission to intervene and defend the Initiative, at least insofar as the Initiative applied to city employees not represented by unions-e.g., elected officials, political staff, and upper management. CTAN described itself as a "non-partisan taxpayer organization" that had "filed multiple lawsuits against public entities to ensure that public and private actors comply with laws designed to protect taxpayers." According to CTAN, at least one of its members was a registered voter who voted in favor of the Initiative.
The following day, the court denied CTAN's ex parte application and ordered CTAN to "proceed via a noticed motion" if it intended to pursue intervention. The court did not disclose the rationale for its ruling in its minute order.
Instead of filing a noticed motion to intervene, CTAN filed a separate lawsuit against the city, the city's employee retirement system, and the city attorney, on August 24, 2020. (California Taxpayers Action Network v. City of San Diego, et al. (Super. Ct. San Diego County, 37-2020-00029599-CU-MC-CTL).) In that action (hereafter, the CTAN case), CTAN sought to enforce the Initiative insofar as it applies to one category of employees-elected public officials. CTAN sought, among other remedies, a declaratory judgment "that no elected official who assumed office after [the Initiative] took effect may participate in a [City]-funded defined-benefit pension system."
On August 25, 2020, CTAN attempted to relate the CTAN case with the quo warranto proceeding. The trial court denied CTAN's request without elaboration.
A few months later, CTAN again moved to relate the CTAN case with the quo warranto proceeding. The court denied this relation request as well, reasoning "the 2019 quo warranto case [sought] to invalidate the [Initiative] amendments while the 2020 CTAN case [sought] to enforce the [Initiative] amendments against elected officials. The cases [did] not arise from substantially similar transactions, incidents or events and [did] not involve the same legal issues other than the fact that the City and [the Initiative were] involved in both." Further, the court found it was unlikely there would "be substantial duplication of judicial resources if heard by different judges. In fact, it seem[ed] more efficient to keep them separate." The court noted the quo warranto proceeding was at a more advanced stage of litigation than the CTAN case and, furthermore, the CTAN case "may be moot" after the quo warranto proceeding.
E The Summary Judgment Motions
On October 2, 2020, the Proponents, on the one hand, and the Unions and City, on the other hand, filed competing motions for summary judgment in the quo warranto proceeding.
The Proponents raised several arguments concerning why they were entitled to summary judgment declaring the Initiative valid. Of relevance here, they argued the Act's meet-and-confer requirements did not apply to all of the city's employees because the requirements applied only to union-represented employees, and some of the city's employees were not represented by unions. According to the Proponents, the Initiative was necessarily valid as applied to those unrepresented employees, "and therefore [the Initiative was] valid as a whole."
On December 18, 2020, the trial court denied the motions for summary judgment. It reasoned that in a quo warranto proceeding, the common law rule that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof is reversed, meaning the defendant has the burden to establish the lawfulness of its conduct. However, the parties' summary judgment briefs did not "explain how to resolve the relevant burdens" on summary judgment in a quo warranto proceeding. Because there was a "lack of clarity on how to proceed via summary judgment motion," the court denied the motions, without prejudice, and instructed the parties it would consider their moving papers as their trial briefs.
F CTAN's Motion to Intervene
On November 13, 2020, while the motions for summary judgment were pending, CTAN filed a motion to intervene and defend the Initiative as applied to unrepresented city employees. CTAN argued it was entitled to both mandatory and permissive intervention under Code of Civil Procedure section 387. According to CTAN, it had an interest in the quo warranto proceeding because it hoped to "vigorously defend[] [the Initiative] from the standpoint of taxpayers ...." CTAN argued it also had an interest because the resolution of the quo warranto proceeding could potentially moot the CTAN case. CTAN described the Proponents in passing as "political operatives" with "anti-union sentiments," but CTAN did not argue the Proponents were inadequate representatives of its interests.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Together with the motion to intervene, CTAN filed a proposed answer in intervention. The proposed answer in intervention largely denied the allegations of the complaint. It also set forth affirmative defenses, including allegations that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, the Unions lacked standing to maintain the lawsuit, the commencement or maintenance of the lawsuit was an ultra vires act, and the action was barred by laches, unclean hands, and the applicable statute of limitations.
The Unions and City opposed CTAN's motion to intervene on several grounds. First, they argued the motion was untimely because CTAN filed it more than three months after the court denied CTAN's ex parte application to intervene. Second, they argued CTAN failed to submit competent evidence showing that any of its members voted for the Initiative. Third, they argued CTAN would merely have a generalized and non-cognizable "political or philosophical interest" in the case, even if it had submitted competent evidence that any of its members voted for the Initiative. Fourth, they argued the Proponents-who had defended the Initiative since the PERB proceedings-adequately represented CTAN's interests. Finally, they argued that all parties opposed intervention, which would enlarge the scope of the case. In particular, they claimed intervention would inject the following issues into the case: whether CTAN's members voted for the Initiative, CTAN's affirmative defenses, and the prospect of a partial invalidation of the Initiative. The Proponents joined the Unions and City's opposition brief.
CTAN filed a reply in support of its motion to intervene. CTAN argued, among other things, that it had an interest in the quo warranto proceeding because the proceeding could moot the CTAN case. Additionally, it argued that members of the public who voted in favor of the Initiative and benefitted from its application should have a right to defend it in court. CTAN did not address whether the Proponents adequately represented its interests. However, CTAN stated the Proponents had "failed in the California Supreme Court" (presumably referring to Boling I, supra, 5 Cal.5th 898), and the "voters who supported [the Initiative] deserve[d] more." Finally, CTAN argued intervention would result in no more than a 30-day delay, and CTAN's intervention would not inject new issues into the litigation.
On December 11, 2020, the court held a hearing and denied CTAN's motion to intervene. In its minute order, the court reasoned intervention was unwarranted because CTAN had "only an ancillary interest in the disputes in the current action, not a primary interest." The parties have not provided this court with a reporter's transcript from the hearing on the motion to intervene. According to the Unions and City, no reporter's transcript was prepared for the hearing because CTAN did not arrange for a court reporter to be present at the hearing.
G The Trial and Judgment
On January 5, 2021, the court held a one-day bench trial concerning the validity of the Initiative. The court entered judgment declaring the Initiative invalid and striking the offending provisions from the city charter. In doing so, the court impliedly rejected an argument from the Proponents that the Initiative was, at minimum, partially valid as to city employees who were not represented by unions.
III DISCUSSION
A
Intervention Standards
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether CTAN was entitled to intervene in the quo warranto proceeding pursuant to section 387.
Section 387 permits a nonparty to intervene in a case when certain criteria are satisfied. Under section 387, intervention may be mandatory or permissive. In either circumstance, the proposed intervenor must file the application for intervention in a "timely" manner. (§ 387, subd. (d)(1), (2); see Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1012.)
To obtain mandatory intervention, the proposed intervenor must establish that: (1) the proposed intervenor has "an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action," (2) the proposed intervenor "is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede [the proposed intervener's] ability to protect that interest," and (3) the proposed intervener's interest is not "adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties" to the litigation. (§ 387, subd. (d)(1)(B).)
Alternatively, permissive intervention may be warranted when the proposed intervenor "has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both." (§ 387, subd. (d)(2).) In general, permissive intervention is appropriate when" '(1) the proper procedures have been followed; (2) the nonparty has a direct and immediate interest in the action; (3) the intervention will not enlarge the issues in the litigation; and (4) the reasons for the intervention outweigh any opposition by the parties presently in the action.'" (Carlsbad Police Officers Association v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 135, 148.)
There is some uncertainty among California courts whether an appellate court should review a mandatory intervention ruling de novo, or if it should review such a ruling for abuse of discretion. (Edwards v. Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 725, 732 (Edwards), citing Siena Court Homeowners Association v. Green Valley Corp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1425 (Siena).) We need not decide the proper standard of review for mandatory intervention rulings because, as we will explain, the trial court correctly denied CTAN's request for mandatory intervention regardless of which standard of review applies.
We review the trial court's permissive intervention ruling for abuse of discretion. (Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th955, 976, review granted January 5, 2022, S271721; Edwards, supra, 29 Cal.App.5that p. 736.) "We presume the judgment is correct, affirm if it is correct on any theory, and reverse only if the appellant establishes the decision results in a miscarriage of justice or exceeds the bounds of reason." (South Coast Air Quality Management District v. City of Los Angeles (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 314, 320 (South Coast).)
B The Trial Court Properly Denied Mandatory Intervention
1
CTAN claims it was entitled to mandatory intervention because it had interests in the quo warranto proceeding, the disposition of the proceeding threatened those interests, and no existing parties-including the Proponents-adequately represented its interests. In particular, CTAN argues it had an interest, as a "taxpayer and voter" organization, in ensuring that "some of the [Initiative's] promised tax savings [were] realized." Alternatively, CTAN asserts it had an interest in the proceeding because it could moot or preclude relief in the CTAN case. According to CTAN, the Proponents did not represent its interests because they failed to argue that the Initiative could be validly applied to non-unionized city employees.
The Unions and City, in a brief joined by the Proponents, argue the trial court properly denied CTAN's motion to intervene because the motion was untimely, CTAN failed to establish a cognizable interest in the proceeding, and CTAN failed to show that the Proponents inadequately represented CTAN's interests in the proceeding.
We will assume for purposes of this appeal, without deciding, that CTAN filed its motion to intervene in a timely manner and, furthermore, that CTAN had at least some interest in defending the Initiative in the quo warranto proceeding. Even so, we conclude the trial court properly denied CTAN's request for mandatory intervention because CTAN did not establish that its interests were inadequately represented by the Proponents.
2
As an initial matter, CTAN did not raise any reasoned and legally-supported arguments in the trial court concerning the adequacy of the Proponents' representation. In the proceedings below, CTAN noted in passing, and without further explanation, that the voters who approved the Initiative "deserve[d] more" than the "anti-union" Proponents. However, CTAN never attempted to explain how its interests differed from the Proponents, or why the Proponents were unable to represent those interests in the quo warranto proceeding. Because CTAN failed to present any arguments in the trial court on these issues, CTAN has forfeited its appellate contentions concerning the adequacy of the Proponents' representation. (Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 591 [" '[I]t is fundamental that a reviewing court will ordinarily not consider claims made for the first time on appeal which could have been but were not presented to the trial court.'"]; Swain v. Laser Away Medical Group, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th59, 72 ["' "Even when our review on appeal 'is de novo, it is limited to issues which have been adequately raised and supported'"'" in a timely manner.].)
On this basis alone, the mandatory intervention ruling is affirmed.
3
Even if CTAN had preserved its arguments for appeal, it has not established that the Proponents were inadequate representatives of its interests." [intervention is permitted only when the intervener's participation is necessary to protect his or her interests. Of course, this makes sense. Intervention is not necessary or desirable when the intervener's interests are adequately represented, as it would serve only to complicate and delay the litigation for no good reason." (Ziani Homeowners Assn. v. Brookfield Ziani LLC (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th274, 282.)
CTAN sought intervention to defend the validity of the Initiative (at least in part). That is the same reason the Proponents intervened-to protect the Initiative against the Unions' claims of invalidity. The parties' overlapping litigation goals strongly suggest the Proponents adequately represented CTAN's claimed interests. (City of Malibu v. California Coastal Commission (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th897, 906 [affirming denial of motion to intervene because plaintiff and proposed intervenor had "identical interests in preventing members of the public from accessing areas adjacent to their properties"]; Coalition for Fair Rent v. Abdelnour (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d97, 116 [affirming denial of motion to intervene because there was "no difference in the positions" of the proposed intervenor and the respondent]; Green v. Community Redevelopment Agency (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d49l, 501 [mandatory intervention was unwarranted where "[t]he interests of [the proposed intervenor was] similar to that of the [plaintiffs] and the legal arguments of [the proposed intervenor] and the [plaintiffs would] be similar"].)
Further, the Proponents were well-suited to achieve those goals-both in the proceedings below, and at nearly every other stage of this lengthy dispute concerning the Initiative." [T]he official proponents of an initiative measure," such as the Proponents, "have a unique relationship to the voter-approved measure that makes them especially likely to be reliable and vigorous advocates for the measure and to be so viewed by those whose votes secured the initiative's enactment into law." (Perry v. Brown (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1116, 1152; see ibid, ["the official proponents are the most logical and appropriate choice to assert the state's interest in the validity of the initiative measure on behalf of the electors who voted in favor of the measure"].)
Indeed, the appellate record reveals the Proponents, for years on end, have been vigorous and reliable advocates for the Initiative. The Proponents have filed numerous trial and appellate briefs in support of the Initiative over the past decade-beginning as early as the initial PERB proceedings. Although the Supreme Court ultimately concluded Sanders's failure to meet and confer violated the Act-a determination that paved the way for the present quo warranto proceeding-the Proponents achieved notable successes before and after that Supreme Court decision. For example, they successfully obtained writ review of PERB's decision and, in Boling II, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th376, they persuaded this court to modify PERB's compensatory remedies. Further, in this quo warranto proceeding alone, they have zealously fought to defend the Initiative, including by filing briefs regarding the adequacy of their pleadings, propounding and responding to discovery, moving for summary judgment, opposing the motion for summary judgment filed by the Unions and City, and championing the Initiative at trial.
CTAN asserts the Proponents were inadequate representatives of its interests-and ineffectual defenders of the Initiative in general-because they "paid virtually no attention" to the fact that some city employees are not represented by the Unions and, therefore, those city employees fall outside the scope of the Act's meet-and-confer requirements. According to CTAN, the Proponents' alleged failure to present this argument to the trial court was problematic because the Initiative has a severability clause that could have saved the Initiative, at least as applied to non-unionized city employees.
We are not persuaded. The Proponents repeatedly raised a version of CTAN's argument in the proceedings below. In the Proponents' motion for summary judgment, they argued the Initiative was valid in its entirety because it could be legally applied to city employees who were not represented by unions. They reiterated this argument when opposing the Unions and City's motion for summary judgment. Even after the court announced its intention to invalidate the Initiative, the Proponents argued the court should preserve the Initiative, at minimum, as to unrepresented employees. Although the Proponents did not raise the precise severability argument CTAN has articulated here, the Proponents repeatedly argued the Initiative should be validated in whole, or at the very least in part, because it could be lawfully applied to unrepresented city employees.
We express no opinion on the merits of CTAN's arguments that the Initiative could be lawfully applied to non-unionized city employees and preserved, in part, because of its severability clause. Those issues are not presented in this appeal.
In sum, the record establishes that the Proponents shared CTAN's overarching litigation goal of defending the Initiative and, indeed, they vigorously defended the Initiative against attacks of invalidity. Therefore, CTAN's involvement in the proceeding would have been unnecessary and duplicative. For this independent reason, we affirm the trial court's order denying CTAN's mandatory intervention request.
C The Trial Court Properly Denied Permissive Intervention
In the alternative, CTAN contends it was entitled to permissive intervention. Even if we assume for purposes of this appeal that CTAN had a direct and immediate interest in the case, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's permissive intervention ruling. (See South Coast, supra, 71 Cal.App.5that p. 320 ["Even if the [proposed intervener's] interest is direct, denying permissive intervention ... is proper" if there are countervailing considerations.].) We reach this conclusion for three main reasons.
First, CTAN sought intervention for the purpose of defending the Initiative. But, as just discussed, the Proponents had the same litigation goal; they too sought to defend the Initiative against attacks from the Unions. These similarities in litigation goals, in conjunction with the Proponents' zealous advocacy, weigh against a finding that the trial court abused its discretion. (See South Coast, supra, 71 Cal.App.5that p. 321 [court properly denied permissive intervention motion because intervener's "participation would [have] be[en] largely cumulative" of existing parties].)
Second, intervention threatened to enlarge the issues of the case. As the Unions and City note, there were (and continue to be) disputes among the parties as to whether CTAN had members who were eligible to vote in the June 2012 election, and whether those members voted for the Initiative. Further, CTAN asserted numerous affirmative defenses in its proposed answer in intervention. In particular, it asserted the Unions lacked standing and failed to state a cause of action, the commencement or maintenance of the proceeding was an ultra vires act, and the case was barred by laches, unclean hands, and the applicable statute of limitations. Because CTAN failed to establish that its intervention would not enlarge the issues in the case, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying CTAN's request for permissive intervention. (See Siena, supra, 164 Cal.App.4that pp. 1429-1430 [court properly denied request for permissive intervention where intervention would have expanded issues in case].)
In the trial court, CTAN stated it would be "willing to waive" its affirmative defenses if necessary. However, CTAN never filed a proposed answer in intervention omitting these affirmative defenses.
Third, all the parties to the present case-including the Unions, the City, and the Proponents-opposed CTAN's motion to intervene. As the parties explained in their trial court filings, intervention at such a late stage in the proceeding could have delayed the long-awaited resolution of the case. By the time CTAN filed its motion to intervene, the parties had litigated the validity of the Initiative for roughly eight years. The quo warranto proceeding alone had been ongoing for fourteen months. The pleadings were finalized, discovery was completed, and potentially case-dispositive summary judgment motions were already pending before the court. Allowing a new party to enter this complex and drawn-out litigation at such a late stage undoubtedly would have presented a risk of delay and disruption.
Given the Proponents' vigorous defense of the Initiative, the prospect that intervention would delay resolution of the case, and the parties' united opposition to intervention, we conclude the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it denied CTAN's request for permissive intervention.
After briefing was complete, the Unions and the City filed a request for judicial notice of a trial court order denying CTAN's motion to vacate the judgment and certain legislative actions undertaken by the City subsequent to the judgment. We deny the request for judicial notice as irrelevant to the disposition of the appeal.
IV DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: HALLER, J., IRION, J.