Opinion
August 22, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Washington County (Berke, J.).
Petitioner's only contention on appeal is that his due process rights were violated because the determination that he violated the conditions of his parole was not made within the 90-day period of Executive Law § 259-i (3) (f) (i). However, the statute does not require that a decision be rendered within the 90-day period, only that the hearing be held within said 90 days. As petitioner's final revocation hearing was held within 90 days of his probable cause determination, a fact which petitioner admits, there has been compliance with the statute (see, People ex rel. Haskins v Waters, 87 A.D.2d 657). In addition, petitioner's notification of the revocation decision within two weeks of the hearing satisfied the "[a]s soon as practicable" standard of 9 NYCRR 8005.20 (f) (see, People ex rel. White v Dillon, 81 A.D.2d 1037, affd 55 N.Y.2d 672; cf., People ex rel. Knowles v Smith, 54 N.Y.2d 259).
Casey, J.P., Weiss, Yesawich Jr., Mercure and Harvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.