" (See, also, 44 Harvard Law Review, 439.) In People ex rel. Solomon v. Brotherhood of Painters ( 218 N.Y. 115, 119), SEABURY, J., speaking for the Court of Appeals, laid down the following proposition: "When a foreign corporation accepts a license to do business in this state * * * it may be treated as a domestic corporation to the extent of rendering it subject to the writ of mandamus." And in that very opinion Matter of Rappleye is cited as supporting this statement of the law.

A plaintiff "cannot, in any case, maintain such an action against the officer, unless the debt, which he seeks to recover, is one upon which he could maintain an action against all the associates by reason of their liability therefor, either jointly or severally" wrote this court in McCabe v. Goodfellow (p. 92), the leading case, and the line of consistent decisions to that effect has been unbroken from McCabe v. Goodfellow to Glauber v. Patof ( 294 N.Y. 583). The line includes not only contract but tort cases ( Schouten v. Alpine, supra; People ex rel. Solomon v. Brotherhood of Painters, 218 N.Y. 115, 123; Havens v. King, 221 App. Div. 475, affd. sub nom. Havens v. Dodge, 250 N.Y. 617). Indeed, this court cited McCabe v. Goodfellow, a contract case, as its authority for holding, in one of those tort cases, that the claim had to be one "for which an action might be maintained against the thirty thousand members of the United Association" ( Schouten v. Alpine, 215 N.Y. 225, 232, supra).

In Elizabeth Hospital, Inc. v. Richardson (W.D.Ark. 1958) 167 F. Supp. 155, affd. 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. den. (1959) 361 U.S. 884 [4 L.Ed.2d 120, 80 S.Ct. 155], a national medical association headquartered in Illinois was held not amenable to suit in Arkansas even though it had a local member association in that state. In People v. Brotherhood of Painters, etc. (1916) 218 N.Y. 115 [ 112 N.E. 752], it was held that an international union organized as an unincorporated association and headquartered in Indiana was not amenable to suit in New York even though a local union which was a member of the international union was located in New York. It is correct that recent cases have expanded the concepts of personal jurisdiction.

atter of Gray v Canisius Coll. of Buffalo, 76 A.D.2d 30, 33 [4th Dept 1980], quoting Matter of Weidenfeld v Keppler, 84 A.D. 235, 237 [1st Dept 1903], affd 176 NY 562 [1903] ["a writ of mandamus has been made applicable to corporations, both public and private, because these institutions are creations of the government and 'a supervisory or visitorial power is always impliedly reserved to see that corporations act agreeably to the end of their institution, that they keep within the limits of their lawful powers, and to correct and punish abuses of their franchises'"]; see also Siegel, NY Prac § 558 at 1069 [6th ed 2018]). Thus, "[w]hen a foreign corporation accepts a license to do business in this state or does some act which subjects itself to the jurisdiction of this state, it may be treated as a domestic corporation to the extent of rendering it subject to the writ of mandamus" (People ex rel. Solomon v Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators &Paperhangers of Am., 218 NY 115, 119 [1916]; see also Matter of Gray, 76 A.D.2d at 33 [article 78 proceeding an appropriate vehicle to ensure that a corporation fulfills the obligations imposed on it by statute and by its internal rules]).

The court also held, however, that the international could not be held liable in damages for mere affirmance of unlawful discipline where the international performs its appellate function in good faith and in the absence of fraud. Id. at 1129; see also People ex rel. Solomon v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America, 218 N.Y. 115, 112 N.E. 752, 754 (1916). IBEW was based on violations of the NLRA rather than the LMRDA.

[The International Union's] only action in the case was the exercise of its function to hear the appeal[s] and review the action[s] of the local body, * * * [The International Union] could not be held liable in damages to the [disciplined supervisor/members] because it affirmed [Local 134's actions,] in the absence of fraud or bad faith. People ex rel. Solomon v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America, 218 N.Y. 115, 112 N.E. 752, 754 (1916).See section 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).

We leave the decision of this question to the time when a case may arrive which makes it necessary to decide it. Compare the following cases, cited by the Local: First Congregational Church v. Evangelical R. Ch., S.D.N.Y., 1958, 160 F. Supp. 651, 663; B.K. Bruce Lodge, Inc. v. Subcommittee of Management of Grand United Order of Odd Fellows, 1924, 208 App. Div. 100, 203 N.Y.S. 149; State v. Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 1925, 117 Kan. 564, 232 P. 254, 37 A.L.R. 1267, appeal dismissed, 1927, 273 U.S. 664, 47 S.Ct. 453, 71 L.Ed. 829; Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Commonwealth, 1924, 138 Va. 500, 122 S.E. 122, with cases cited by the National, Elizabeth Hospital, Inc. v. Richardson, W.D.Ark., 1958, 167 F. Supp. 155, 158; People ex rel. Solomon v. Brotherhood of Painters, 1916, 218 N.Y. 115, 112 N.E. 752. Here, there were additional activities by the National, namely, its sponsorship of a rival association, not merely by mail or telegraphic communication with the Local's members in California, but also by personal visits to California by National officers, by the release of publicity in California, by the incorporation of a proposed new affiliate in California, and by the holding of a meeting in California for that purpose.

"I am of the opinion, and so report, that Underwriting Syndicates Nos. 670 and 671 were not, in 1924 and 1925, unincorporated associations, within the meaning of section 13 of the General Associations Law of the state of New York. "This section was taken from section 1919 of the old Code of Civil Procedure of the state of New York, and it has been uniformly held, in the construction of that section, that, in order to maintain an action against an officer of an unincorporated association, the cause of action must be one which the plaintiff can maintain against all of the members of the association, either jointly or severally. McCabe v. Goodfellow, 133 N.Y. 89, 92, 30 N.E. 728, 17 L.R.A. 204; Schouten v. Alpine, 215 N.Y. 225, 109 N.E. 244; People ex rel. Solomon v. Brotherhood, 218 N.Y. 115, 112 N.E. 752. "In McCabe v. Goodfellow, supra, Judge Maynard, writing for a unanimous court, stated at pages 92 and 93 of the opinion (30 N.E. 729): `But the plaintiff cannot, in any case, maintain such an action against the officer, unless the debt, which he seeks to recover, is one upon which he could maintain an action against all the associates by reason of their liability therefor, either jointly or severally. This, therefore, is the test to be applied in the present case.

against the members themselves, to reach their separate assets, ‘as if the first action had not been brought’ " (Martin, 303 N.Y. at 282, 101 N.E.2d 683, quoting General Associations Law § 16; see General Associations Law § 15). The limitation of the Martin rule to claims seeking damages is also supported by the precedent upon which this Court relied in concluding that the libel action could not be maintained (see e.g. Glauber v. Patof 294 N.Y. 583, 584, 63 N.E.2d 181 [1945] [in the absence of 492proof that the general membership knew or approved of the irregularity "the court was without power to award a recovery of damages as against an unincorporated association" (emphasis added)]; Browne v. Hibbets, 290 N.Y. 459, 467, 49 N.E.2d 713 [1943] ["plaintiff’s right to recover damages depends upon proof of facts rendering all the members of the association liable for the sum claimed" (emphasis added)]; People ex rel. Solomon v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers of Am., 218 N.Y. 115, 123, 112 N.E. 752 [1916] ["It is well established that in a proceeding or action against a voluntary, unincorporated association, to recover damages, facts must be alleged and proved which render all the members of such association liable for the sum claimed" (emphasis added)]; Schouten v. Alpine, 215 N.Y. 225, 232, 109 N.E. 244 [1915] [observing that, in the event of recovery, "satisfaction is to be made … out of personal property belonging to the association, or owned jointly, or in common, by all the members thereof" (emphasis added)]; McCabe, 133 N.Y. at 92-93, 30 N.E. 728

The limitation of the Martin rule to claims seeking damages is also supported by the precedent upon which this Court relied in concluding that the libel action could not be maintained (see e.g. Glauber v Patof, 294 NY 583, 584 [1945] [in the absence of proof that the general membership knew or approved of the irregularity "the court was without power to award a recovery of damages as against an unincorporated association" (emphasis added)]; Browne v Hibbets, 290 NY 459, 467 [1943] ["plaintiff's right to recover damages depends upon proof of facts rendering all the members of the association liable for the sum claimed" (emphasis added)]; People ex rel. Solomon v Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers of Am., 218 NY 115, 123 [1916] ["It is well established that in a proceeding or action against a voluntary, unincorporated association, to recover damages, facts must be alleged and proved which render all the members of such association liable for the sum claimed" (emphasis added)];