Opinion
J-A31029-16 No. 857 EDA 2016
05-03-2017
PENNY MAC CORP. Appellee v. HAQNAWAZ CHUGHTAI AND SALEEMA CHUGHTAI Appellants
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered March 9, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Civil Division at No(s): 2013-06809 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MOULTON, J., and FITZGERALD, J. MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
Haqnawaz Chughtai and Saleema Chughtai ("the Chughtais") appeal from the March 9, 2016 order of the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas granting Penny Mac Corporation's ("Penny Mac") motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
The Chughtais initially appealed a February 18, 2016 order, which the trial court amended on March 9, 2016 at the request of Penny Mac to reflect an error in calculation.
The well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Brian T. McGuffin set forth the detailed factual and procedural history underlying this appeal, which we adopt and incorporate herein. See Opinion, 5/5/16, at 1-3 ("1925(a) Op.").
On appeal, the Chughtais raise the following issue: "Did the trial court commit an error of law in granting foreclosing lender's Motion for Summary Judgment when [Penny Mac]'s motion was founded upon an inadmissible testimonial affidavit?" Chughtais' Br. at 8.
It is well-established that "summary judgment is appropriate only in those cases where the record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Truax v. Roulhac , 126 A.3d 991, 996 (Pa.Super.) (quoting Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club , Inc., 812 A.2d 1218, 1221 (Pa. 2002)), app. denied, 129 A.3d 1244 (Pa. 2015). The moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Stimmler v. Chestnut Hill Hosp., 981 A.2d 145, 159 (Pa. 2009). "[T]he trial court must take all facts of record and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. In so doing, the trial court must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party . . . ." Truax , 126 A.3d at 996 (internal citation omitted).
We have explained our standard of review as follows:
[A]n appellate court may reverse a grant of summary judgment if there has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion. But the issue as to whether there are no genuine issues as to any material fact presents a question of law, and therefore, on that question our standard of review is de novo. This means we need not defer to the determinations made by the lower tribunals.Id. (quoting Weaver v. Lancaster Newspapers , Inc., 926 A.2d 899, 902-03 (Pa. 2007)).
The Chughtais claim that the trial court should have denied Penny Mac's motion for summary judgment because the motion was solely supported by an inadmissible affidavit, and because their general denials to the complaint should not have been treated as a deemed admission that a properly negotiated note existed through the chain of loan title.
The Chughtais waived their further contention that Penny Mac failed to establish a properly endorsed note through the chain of loan title by not raising it in their response to Penny Mac's motion for summary judgment. See Devine v. Hutt , 863 A.2d 1160, 1169 (Pa.Super. 2004) ("[A]rguments not raised initially before the trial court in opposition to summary judgment cannot be raised for the first time on appeal[.]").
In its opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant law, addressed the Chughtais' claim, and properly determined that summary judgment was appropriate. See 1925(a) Op. at 4-8. In their answer to the complaint, the Chughtais made general denials, which constitute admissions. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Gibson , 102 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa.Super. 2014). This fact, coupled with the affidavit provided by Penny Mac, the Act 6 notice, and proof of the mortgage assignments, shows that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that Penny Mac was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. After reviewing the briefs, the record, and the relevant law, we affirm based on the trial court's cogent reasoning. See 1925(a) Op. at 4-8.
See 41 P.S. § 403 (providing that a residential mortgage lender must give the residential mortgage debtor notice of its intention to "accelerate the maturity of any residential mortgage obligation, commence any legal action including mortgage foreclosure to recover under such obligation, or take possession of any security of the residential mortgage debtor for such residential mortgage obligation" at least 30 days in advance). --------
Because the Chughtais failed to set forth a genuine issue of material fact, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit an error of law in granting Penny Mac's motion for summary judgment.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 5/3/2017
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