Summary
In Dauer, the Court held that a Clerk of Court's certification that the criminal conviction was one in which a motor vehicle was essentially involved is prima facie evidence that the criminal court made such a finding but, however, this may be rebutted by other evidence which shows that the judge did not, in fact, make such an affirmative finding.
Summary of this case from Southerland v. Com., Dept. of TranspOpinion
April 23, 1986.
Motor vehicles — Revocation of motor vehicle operator's license — Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C. S. § 1532 — Certification of required findings — Essential involvement of motor vehicle in commission of felony.
1. A revocation of a motor vehicle operator's license under provisions of the Vehicle Code, 75 C. S. § 1532, can occur when the Department of Transportation receives a certified record that a court has determined that the licensee was convicted of a felony essentially involving a motor vehicle, and a revocation order is properly overturned when the licensee establishes that the criminal court judge never made the essential affirmative finding of the essential involvement of a vehicle in the crime for which the licensee was convicted. [543-4]
Submitted on briefs March 3, 1986, to Judges CRAIG and PALLADINO, and Senior Judge BARBIERI, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeals, Nos. 3502 C.D. 1984 and 3503 C.D. 1984, from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Gerard J. Dauer, No. SA 495 of 1984 and No. SA 496 of 1984.
Revocations of license issued against motor vehicle operator by Department of Transportation. Licensee appealed revocations to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Appeals sustained. NARICK, J. Department appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Orders affirmed.
Harold H. Cramer, Assistant Counsel, with him, Spencer A. Manthorpe, Chief Counsel, and Jay C. Waldman, General Counsel, for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County which set aside the department's revocation of Gerard J. Dauer's vehicle operating privileges for two consecutive periods of one year under section 1532(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code. We affirm that order.
Section 1532(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code, Act of June 17, 1976, P.L. 162, as amended, 75 Pa. C. S. § 1532(a)(1).
In July of 1983, the driver pleaded guilty to two criminal charges, theft by unlawful taking or disposition and receiving stolen property. The property involved in the criminal proceeding was a truck. On April 5, 1984, the department notified the driver that, as a result of his two convictions, the department was revoking his operating privileges for two consecutive one-year periods under section 1532(a) which mandates revocation for a felony conviction "in the commission of which a court determines that a vehicle was essentially involved."
Section 3921(a) of the Crimes Code, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, as amended, 18 Pa. C. S. § 3921(a).
Section 3925 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C. S. § 3925.
The department asserts that it properly revoked the driver's privileges because it received a certified record from the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County on a Butler County form with a heading indicating that the driver's conviction was for a crime in the commission of which a vehicle was essentially involved. The department further asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law because the driver failed to rebut the presumption that the clerk of courts was performing in accordance with the law and following his official duties in reporting the convictions to the department upon such a form. Dadey v. Bureau of Security, 70 Pa. Commw. 513, 453 A.2d 702 (1982).
This court's scope of review in license revocation cases includes determining whether or not the trial court has committed an error of law. Appeal of Finkelstein, 73 Pa. Commw. 417, 458 A.2d 326 (1983).
Because section 1532(a) mandates the one-year revocation whenever the department receives a certified record that a court has determined that the conviction was of a crime essentially involving a vehicle, the issue is whether the trial court erred in finding that the department's record contained no adequate certification of such a determination by the criminal court itself.
The criminal court judge had sentenced the driver to two years of probation with the Butler County Adult Probation Service, imposed a fine and restitution costs, and suggested that the driver's probation be transferred to Maryland, his state of residence.
To rebut the presumption that the clerk of courts acted according to his lawful duties, the driver asserted that the criminal court judge did not make the required affirmative finding. In support of that assertion, the driver noted that the judge's order only indicated that "[t]he clerk of courts is directed to certify this to Harrisburg." After noting that the criminal court order contained no actual determination that a vehicle was essentially involved, the trial judge in this case referred to the direction to "certify this to Harrisburg," and stated that:
This could have also been a reference to Harrisburg referring to either the Correctional Department or probation aspect of it or some other agency that may be in Harrisburg . . . . the Court determines, not the Clerk, that the vehicle was essentially involved . . . . there is no evidence to suggest that a Court determined that a vehicle was essentially involved.
Because the trial judge was correct in concluding that the driver successfully demonstrated that the criminal court judge never made the essential affirmative finding, we must affirm the order to set aside the revocation.
ORDER IN 3502 C.D. 1984
NOW, April 23, 1986, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, No. SA 495-1984, dated October 25, 1984, is affirmed.
ORDER IN 3503 C.D. 1984
NOW, April 23, 1986, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, No. SA 496-1984, dated October 25, 1984, is affirmed.