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Pellegrini v. Kobus

United States District Court, D. Delaware
Dec 11, 2000
Civil Action No. 96-410-GMS (D. Del. Dec. 11, 2000)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 96-410-GMS

December 11, 2000


MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DISTRICT OF DELAWARE


At all times relevant to this case, the plaintiff, Steven Pellegrini ("Pellegrini"), was incarcerated at the Delaware Correctional Center ("DCC") located in Smyrna, Delaware. Pellegrini is a California state prisoner who was transferred to the DCC pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact, 11 Del. C. § 6571. Upon arriving at DCC, Pellegrini alleges, inter alia, that he requested assistance from Delaware state officials in obtaining California case law but was informed that the State of California was responsible for helping him.

Pellegrini requested a transfer to be closer to his family. From the address on Pellegrini's latest motion and the arguments he makes therein, however, it appears that he has subsequently been transferred from DCC to a prison in Chico, California.

Although Pellegrini asserted several claims against various Delaware state officials, a May 6, 1998 order by the Honorable Roderick R. McKelvie limited the scope of Pellegrini's action (D.I. 66). Judge McKelvie ruled that Pellegrini could proceed against the defendants, Francene Kobus ("Kobus") and Colleen T. Shotzberger ("Shotzberger"), on his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that they denied his constitutional right of access to the courts by interfering with his communications with California officials and with obtaining California legal materials (D.I. 66 at 2).

Before the court are a series of motions filed by Pellegrini and the defendants. Pellegrini's outstanding motions are (1) a motion for default judgment filed on July 10, 1998 for the defendants' alleged failure to respond to the complaint (D.I. 72), (2) a second motion for default judgment filed on August 13, 1998 (D.I. 81), and (3) a motion filed on April 30, 1999, for reconsideration of the court's denial of his motion for the appointment of counsel (D.I. 89). Kobus and Shotzberger filed a joint motion for summary judgment on July 28, 1998 (D.I. 76). Since Kobus and Shotzberger have not defaulted by failing to respond to Pellegrini's complaint within the time contemplated by Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(3), the court will deny Pellegrini's motions for default judgment. Additionally, since there are no genuine issues of material fact, the court will grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment and will deny Pellegrini's motion for reconsideration as moot.

Since the second motion for default judgment raises arguments similar to the first one, the court will consider them together. The only apparent difference is Pellegrini's argument in the second motion that the defendants' motion for summary judgment does not constitute a valid response to his complaint. For reasons outlined below, this argument is unavailing.

The other "motions" Pellegrini has filed in this case are actually answers or responses to other motions and will be considered as such by the court. Pellegrini filed a "Motion to Strike Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" (D.I. 79). This "motion" appears to be responsive to the defendants' summary judgment motion. He has also filed a "Motion to Strike Defendants' Motion Opposing Plaintiff's Request for Entry of Default . . ." (D.I. 80). This "motion" is more appropriately considered a reply memorandum to the defendants' response to his first motion for default judgment.

Judge McKelvie's order cited Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(3) and stated that if the defendants timely returned a waiver of service of process before being served, they would have 60 days to "serve an answer or otherwise respond" to the complaint (D.I. 66 at 3). Shotzberger and Kobus timely waived service on June 5, 1998 and June 8, 1998, respectively. Because of their waivers of service, Shotzberger had until August 28, 1998, and Kobus had until August 31, 1998, to respond to the complaint. By filing a motion for summary judgment on July 28, 1999, with accompanying brief and affidavits, the defendants satisfied Judge McKelvie's order that "[if a] defendant responds by way of a motion, said motion shall be accompanied by a brief or a memorandum of points and authorities and any supporting affidavits."

Pellegrini asserts that the circumstances surrounding the waiver of service of process are "suspicious". The record, however, does not suggest any improprieties. The U.S. Marshall sent the defendants a waiver of service of process form on May 29, 1998. Shotzberger waived service on June 5, 1998 (D.I. 70) and Kobus waived service on June 8, 1998 (D.I. 71). The U.S. Marshall received the waivers on June 10, 1998, and both were docketed on the same day. Since both waivers are within the 30 day time frame (exclusive of weekends and holidays) contemplated by Judge McKelvie's order, the record does not reflect anything "suspicious" about the timing of events. Pellegrini is mistaken when he asserts that Shotzberger and Kobus were "served" since the "USM-285" form he refers to is a request for a waiver of service of process rather than service of process itself. Finally, although Pellegrini alleges he was never supplied with copies of the executed waiver forms, such forms are docketed and are therefore contained in the record (D.I. 70-71).

Because Shotzberger and Kobus responded to Pellegrini's complaint within the time frame mandated by Judge McKelvie and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendants did not default under Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(3) (granting defendant 60 days from date of timely waiver of service to answer complaint); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a)(1)(B)(same). Since Pellegrini is not entitled to default judgment, the court turns to the defendants' outstanding motion for summary judgment.

Pellegrini also argues that the defendants defaulted since the motion for summary judgment and the defendants' response to the motions for default were signed by Alison L. Peters rather than the defendants' "attorney of record," Susan P. Tussey, thereby violating Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a). The record indicates that Ms. Peters — like Ms. Tussey — was a Deputy Attorney General at the time she signed the papers submitted to the court. Presumably, Ms. Peters took over the case from Ms. Tussey. Contrary to Pellegrini's assertions, there is nothing improper with this practice; Deputy Attorneys General are routinely reassigned cases from colleagues for a myriad of reasons, not the least of which is changes in office personnel. Certainly, this practice does not violate Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a).

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. See Pacitti v. Macy's, 193 F.3d 766, 772 (3d Cir. 1999). The nonmoving party, however, must demonstrate the existence of a material fact by supplying sufficient evidence — not mere allegations — for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant. See Olson v. General Elec. Aerospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996). To raise a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmovant "need not match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant but must exceed the 'mere scintilla' [of evidence] standard." Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The facts and circumstances of this case are described in detail in a Memorandum Opinion Judge McKelvie issued in conjunction with the May 6, 1998 order (D.I. 65). In brief, in October 1995, Pellegrini wrote a letter to Shotzberger, the administrator of the Interstate Corrections Compact for the State of Delaware Department of Correction. Pellegrini sought Shotzberger's assistance in obtaining California legal materials. Shotzberger responded in a letter dated October 24, 1995, stating that the DCC library staff was available to assist him. Additionally, she informed Pellegrini that Korbus, the DCC librarian, was aware of interstate cases and "has been extremely helpful in the past in assisting inmates from other states." Pellegrini then wrote to Kobus on November 14, 1995. Again, he asked for help in obtaining California legal materials. Kobus responded on December 6, 1995. She informed Pellegrini that "it is the State of California's responsibility to provide you with [California] law . . . I suggest you work with [California] to . . . obtain the legal information you need." Pellegrini wrote to the California Department of Corrections on January 12, 1996. He requested help in obtaining documents from the California state law library, and in "set[ting] up a connection."

Pellegrini also sent Shotzberger a similar letter on December 3, 1995.

In subsequent correspondence, Shotzberger told Pellegrini she did not have access to the information he sought and instructed him to contact Bruce Dykstra, an official at the California Department of Correction, for assistance. Pellegrini wrote Mr. Dykstra a letter seeking California legal materials.

On January 24, 1996, Pellegrini received an unsigned letter the California state library informing him that the "State Library currently does not provide any direct service to prisoners. Prisoners must request materials from their prison librarian who will then forward the request to a library which owns the item." In March, 1996 Pellegrini received a letter from Mr. Dykstra who indicated that he must pay for any request made to the California library and that it was his "responsibility to follow up if necessary [with any requests]."

In his memorandum opinion, Judge McKelvie found that since California officials are in a much better position to obtain California case law and statutes, the defendants did not have any primary responsibility to actively assist Pellegrini in obtaining legal materials from the State of California. Instead, Judge McKelvie found that Delaware officials merely bore a responsibility to assist Pellegrini in communicating with California officials and to refrain from impeding his receipt of legal material from California. Under the doctrine of the law of the case, this court is limited to considering whether the defendants' actions "prevent[ed] or limit[ed] Pellegrini from obtaining California legal materials from California officials." (D.I. 65 at 15); see also Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1290 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that "[a] successor judge should not lightly overturn decisions of his predecessors in a given case.").

Although there are several exceptions to the law of the case doctrine, they are inapplicable to this case. First, there has not been a change in the law of which this court is aware. Second, Pellegrini has not offered the court any new evidence. Finally, Judge McKelvie's finding is not clearly erroneous. See Schultz v. Onan Corp., 737 F.2d 339, 345 (3d Cir. 1984); Hayman v. Sarokin, 699 F.3d 162, 169 (3d Cir. 1982).

Kobus submitted an affidavit in support of Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Kobus' affidavit states, (1) that she informed Pellegrini that she does not have access to case law and statutes in other states, (2) that she told Pellegrini that it was the State of California's responsibility to provide him with state legal materials and that he should contact Shotzberger for assistance, and (3) that she was never contacted by anyone from the State of California to provide legal materials for Pellegrini, nor has she refused to receive any information or documents from the State of California intended for Pellegrini.

See Def. Br. Supp. Sum. J.

Shotzberger also submitted an affidavit. Her affidavit states, (1) that she merely assists inmates in establishing contact with out of state legal representatives since she does not personally have access to out of state legal materials, (2) that on January 24, 1997 she instructed Pellegrini to contact Mr. Dykstra for assistance in obtaining California legal materials, and (3) that she was never contacted by anyone from the State of California regarding Pellegrini's request for information, and that she never refused receipt or otherwise prevented Pellegrini from obtaining legal materials from the State of California.

See id.

Contrary to Pellegrini's assertions, he is not entitled to the presumption that all the allegations in his complaint are the for the purposes of summary judgment. According to the summary judgment standard articulated above, Pellegrini must at least proffer a 'mere scintilla' of evidence to demonstrate that a reasonable jury could find that the defendants interfered with his communications with officials from the State of California or impeded his receipt of material from California. There is absolutely nothing in the record — nor does Pellegrini provide any additional information — to dispute the defendants' statements that they directed Pellegrini to the appropriate authorities in State of California, and that they did not interfere with any correspondence, communication, or exchange of materials between Pellegrini and the State of California. The uncontradicted evidence in the record demonstrates that the defendants fulfilled their legal responsibilities to Pellegrini as interpreted by Judge McKelvie. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

Unlike motions to dismiss, in deciding summary judgment motions the court is obligated to look at the factual record to determine the existence of any genuine issue of material facts. Compare Gould Electronics, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that for motions to dismiss, the court evaluates the merits of the case by accepting all allegations in the complaint as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff), with Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that once summary judgment movant meets burden of showing absence of genuine issue of material fact, nonmovant cannot rest on pleadings but must counter with specific facts to demonstrate there are genuine triable issues).

Indeed, the record suggests the opposite conclusion. Judge McKelvie's memorandum opinion indicates that Kobus advised Pellegrini to contact Shotzberger who in turn assisted him in actually communicating with Mr. Dykstra regarding legal materials. Mr. Dykstra informed Pellegrini that it was his responsibility to "pursue any follow up if necessary." Although the record also indicates that Pellegrini received a letter which stated that he should request California legal materials from the DCC librarian who would then forward the request to California officials, there is no indication on the record that Pellegrini made a request of specific materials or that it was refused by the DCC library staff.

For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:

1. Pellegrini's motions for default judgment (D.I. 72, 81) are DENIED.

2. The defendants' motion for summary judgment (D.I. 76) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) is GRANTED.

3. Summary Judgment be and hereby is ENTERED in favor of the DEFENDANTS and against plaintiff on all claims in the complaint.

4. Pellegrini's motion for reconsideration (D.I. 89) is DENIED as moot.


Summaries of

Pellegrini v. Kobus

United States District Court, D. Delaware
Dec 11, 2000
Civil Action No. 96-410-GMS (D. Del. Dec. 11, 2000)
Case details for

Pellegrini v. Kobus

Case Details

Full title:Steven Pellegrini, Plaintiff, v. Francene M. Kobus and Colleen T…

Court:United States District Court, D. Delaware

Date published: Dec 11, 2000

Citations

Civil Action No. 96-410-GMS (D. Del. Dec. 11, 2000)