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Pellaton v. Budget Dry Waterproofing

Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Middlesex at Middletown
Oct 26, 2009
2009 Ct. Sup. 17238 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2009)

Opinion

No. CV 08 4009408

October 26, 2009


MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE SPECIAL DEFENSES FOR INSUFFICIENT PLEADING


Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff, Charles M. Pellaton, commenced this action by service of process against the Defendants, Budget Dry Waterproofing, Inc. (hereinafter "Budget Dry") and Jason D. Weinstein, (hereinafter "Weinstein"). On January 26, 2009, the Plaintiff subsequently filed a nine-count substituted complaint in which he alleges the facts hereinafter articulated.

Defendant Budget Dry is a Connecticut corporation that is engaged in the business of waterproofing of basements in residential and commercial buildings in the states of Connecticut and New York. It has capital stock and has its principal office and place of business at 82 Iron Works Road, Killingworth, CT 06419. Defendant Weinstein is a director, officer, shareholder and/or the person in control of Budget Dry and runs Budget Dry's office and handles its books, records and finances. Budget Dry was incorporated and organized and commenced its business in early 2007. At that time, the Plaintiff Pellaton and Defendant Weinstein agreed that they would be the sole shareholders in Budget Dry. They agreed on a division of the shares that made Pellaton the majority shareholder and Weinstein the minority shareholder. As primary salesman of the corporation, Pellaton was on the road full time making sales for Budget Dry. Each of the nine causes of action arise from Defendant Weinstein alleged seizure of control of Budget Dry, his purported termination of Pellaton's relationship with Budget Dry, and his actions in causing Budget Dry to fail to pay Pellaton compensation owed for services rendered to Budget Dry.

Count one of the complaint requests that Budget Dry should be dissolved by Judicial Decree, and a receiver should be appointed to wind up Budget Dry's business and liquidate its assets; count two alleges breach of fiduciary duty; count three alleges fraud; count four requests a full court-ordered accounting of the finances of Budget Dry, count five alleges conversion; count six alleges statutory theft; count seven alleges unjust enrichment; count eight requests punitive damages; and count nine requests a constructive trust.

On May 4, 2009 Defendant Weinstein filed an answer to the Plaintiff's complaint. In that answer, the Defendant set forth two Special Defenses. The First Special Defense reads that the "Plaintiff has unclean hands." The Second Special Defense reads that the "Plaintiff's claims are barred by laches."

On July 28, 2009 the Plaintiff filed the instant motion to strike the Special Defenses of unclean hands and laches on the grounds that "each of the Special Defenses states a mere legal conclusion" and alleges no facts whatsoever in support of the legal conclusion' and therefore each of the Special Defenses fails to comply with the requirement in Connecticut Practice Book §§ 10-1 and 10-50. The Plaintiff also submitted a memorandum of law in support of his motion.

Standard of Review

As stated by our Supreme Court, "[w]henever any party wishes to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of any answer to any complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any part of that answer including any special defense contained therein, that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 325 n. 21, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998). Furthermore, "[a] motion to strike is properly granted if the [pleading] alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." Novametrix Medical Systems, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc., 224 Conn. 210, 215, 618 A.2d 25 (1992).

Analysis First and Second Special Defenses.

With respect to the First and Second Special Defense, the Plaintiff contends that the Defendant stated in each a mere legal conclusion and alleged no facts whatsoever in support of that legal conclusion. The Plaintiff contends that these Special Defenses fail to comply with the requirement in Connecticut Practice Book § 10-1 that each pleading shall contain a "plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies;" and (2) the requirement in Connecticut Practice Book § 10-50 that "facts" which are consistent with the statements in the Complaint but show that the Plaintiff has no cause of action "must be specially alleged."

This Court agrees with the plaintiff's legal arguments in this regard. See also Bascom/Magnotta, Inc v. Magnotta, 2005 WL 3470649 1 (Conn.Super. 2005) (unclean hands); and Senise v. Merritt Seven Venture, LLC, 40 Conn. L. Rptr. 770, 2006 WL 538227 (Conn.Super 2006) (laches).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, and upon the foregoing authorities, the Motion to Strike is granted.


Summaries of

Pellaton v. Budget Dry Waterproofing

Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Middlesex at Middletown
Oct 26, 2009
2009 Ct. Sup. 17238 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2009)
Case details for

Pellaton v. Budget Dry Waterproofing

Case Details

Full title:CHARLES M. PELLATON v. BUDGET DRY WATERPROOFING, INC. ET AL

Court:Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Middlesex at Middletown

Date published: Oct 26, 2009

Citations

2009 Ct. Sup. 17238 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2009)