Pelinkovic v. Ashcroft

27 Citing cases

  1. Xiu Qin Yang v. Mukasey

    278 F. App'x 668 (7th Cir. 2008)

    We review the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion. Pelinkovic v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 2004). Generally, an alien may file one motion to reopen within 90 days of the date on which the final administrative decision was entered based on evidence that "is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing."

  2. Yi-Tu Lian v. Ashcroft

    379 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 2004)   Cited 29 times
    Vacating and remanding claim for relief from removal when "most of IJ's opinion was "taken up with irrelevancies"

    Torture is defined as "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person," by or with the acquiescence of an official, for various purposes, including punishment. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1); see, e.g., Pelinkovic v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 532, 541 (7th Cir. 2004). Lian applied for and received a Chinese passport in 2001.

  3. Lasu v. Barr

    970 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2020)   Cited 22 times
    Explaining that someone seeking CAT relief must show he "would be personally at risk"

    Though the record reflects that ethnic violence is occurring in South Sudan, Lasu needed to demonstrate that he would more likely than not be tortured by South Sudanese authorities. See Pelinkovic v. Ashcroft , 366 F.3d 532, 542 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he Pelinkovics’ failure to make a particularized showing that any of them would more likely than not be subject to torture upon their return, as differentiated from the general risk shared by all ethnic Albanians in Montenegro, dooms their case."); Ngure v. Ashcroft , 367 F.3d 975, 993 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting that reports that the Kenyan government tortured student leaders was insufficient because petitioner "has not provided evidence that he is similarly situated" to those individuals); Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 182-83, 188 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting a Sierra Leone petitioner's CAT claim even though the government committed widespread human rights abuses, including arbitrary killing of civilians, because those findings "alone are insufficient to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that a particular civilian ... will be tortured by [the government]"). The dissent evaluates under a "sufficient justification" standard of review the BIA's conclusion that the IJ cl

  4. Abdulkarim Ali Ahmed Al Hababi v. Whitaker

    No. 18-2062 (7th Cir. Nov. 27, 2018)

    Al Hababi cannot satisfy the highly deferential abuse of discretion standard he faces in challenging the Board's decision not to reopen his case. See Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 2004); Pelinkovic v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 532, 537-38 (7th Cir. 2004). Motions to reopen are "strongly disfavored."

  5. Lu v. Holder

    No. 12-2843 (7th Cir. Mar. 12, 2013)

    We review the Board's decision not to reopen an asylum claim under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. See Pelinkovic v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). We will uphold the Board's decision to deny Lu's motion to reopen "unless it was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination against a particular group or race."

  6. Ping Zheng v. Holder

    701 F.3d 237 (7th Cir. 2012)   Cited 8 times
    Finding no changed circumstances in Fujian between 2001 and 2011

    This decision can be upset only if the Board abused its discretion. Pelinkovic v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir.2004). Under this standard, the court will uphold the Board's decision to deny Zheng's motion to reopen “unless it was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination against a particular group or race.” Mansour v. I.N.S., 230 F.3d 902, 907 (7th Cir.2000). III.

  7. Liang v. Holder

    626 F.3d 983 (7th Cir. 2010)   Cited 16 times
    Affirming Board's decision to disregard Chinese village notice because it was not authenticated and other evidence undermined its reliability

    Under this "highly deferential" standard, we will uphold the Board's decisions to deny Liang's motion to reopen "unless it was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination against a particular race or group." Mansour v. I.N.S., 230 F.3d 902, 907 (7th Cir. 2000); Pelinkovic v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 2004). A major obstacle to Liang's motion to reopen her removal proceedings based on changed country conditions was the fact that China's "one-child" policy did not represent a change in the country's conditions.

  8. Gutierrez-Berdin v. Holder

    618 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2010)   Cited 22 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding the IJ properly considered the Form I–213 “[s]ince petitioner did not demonstrate any inaccuracy in its contents”

    Petitioner's argument that the agency erred by failing to consider Mexico's problem with drug violence fares no better because he did not demonstrate that there was a reasonable possibility or clear probability that he personally would be persecuted on account of a protected characteristic. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(B); Pelinkovic v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 532, 539 (7th Cir. 2004) ("We note, as we have many times before, that crisis conditions common to all citizens of the affected country do not present a prima facie case warranting reopening of an asylum claim."). The Board did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion.

  9. Borovsky v. Holder

    612 F.3d 917 (7th Cir. 2010)   Cited 61 times
    Concluding that unspecified threats did not compel finding of past persecution

    In support of his fear of imprisonment, Borovsky offered only a single Web page containing the opinion of a person identified as a justice officer in the Israeli Army. This source was not authoritative enough to compel the finding that Borovsky would be imprisoned upon his return to Israel. Cf. Pelinkovic v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 532, 538 (7th Cir. 2004) (single article on sporadic attempts to punish draft evaders failed to show that applicants would be punished). Although the Web page provided the name and title of the authoring officer, it provided no information on his background, authority to determine punishment for military desertion, or the legal sources that he relied on. Also, the terse nature of the officer's responses does little to bolster this source's reliability. In response to a question posted by an individual similarly situated to Borovsky, the officer simply stated, "You[r] return to Israel will result in your arrest in the airport, military tribunal, prison, follow[ed] by service in the army."

  10. Pathmakanthan v. Holder

    612 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 2010)   Cited 12 times
    Acknowledging that in limited circumstances persecution may be directed at an entire subset of a population but reiterating that a high standard applies to such claims

    We deny the petition because the decision of the BIA was supported by rational explanation. Pelinkovic v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 2004). Nor did it inexplicably depart from established policies or rest on an impermissible basis.