Williams contends that decisions rendered prior to McCain apply and that she owed no common law duty of care to Twanda in the instant case. See Pedigo v. Smith, 395 So.2d 615, 616 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) ("[T]he owner of land is under no affirmative duty to remedy conditions of purely natural origin upon his land.") (citation omitted); Evans v. Southern Holding Corp., 391 So.2d 231 (Fla. 3d DCA), pet. for review denied, 399 So.2d 1142 (Fla. 1981). These decisions adopted the traditional view that a property owner owed no duty of care to motorists whose vision was obscured by natural conditions on the owners' property adjacent to the highway.

Nothing that the General Assembly of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church has done, or could have done, precludes civil courts from inquiring and deciding for themselves, where civil rights are involved, whether or not the doctrines of the two churches in question are the same substantially, and whether or not the action taken in reference to the so-called union and merger was authorized by the constitution of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church. Hatfield v. DeLong, 156 Ind. 209; Smith v. Pedigo, 145 Ind. 361; O'Donovan v. Chatard, 97 Ind. 423; Grimes v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 201, 254; Bouldin v. Alexander, 15 Wallace, 131; Perry v. Wheeler, 12 Bush., 541; Mason v. Finch, 28 Mich. 286; Krecker v. Shirey, 163 Pa., 534, 29 L.R.A., 476; Prickett v. Wells (Mo.), 24 S.W. 52-53; Pounder v. Ash, 36 Neb. 564; Lemp v. Raven, 113 Mich. 375; Bird v. St. Mark's Ch., 62 Iowa 567; Kerr's Appeal 89 Pa. 97; McAuley's Appeal, 77 Pa., 397; Harmon v. Dreher, 2 Speer's Eq., 87; Jennings v. Scarbrough, 56 N.J. Law, 401; Smith v. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511; Mount Helen Baptist Church v. Jones, 79 Miss. 488-582; Bear v. Heasley, 98 Mich. 279, 24 L.R.A., 615, 621-24; Bridges v. Wilson, 11 Heisk., 458; Deaderick v. Lampson, 11 Heisk., 523; Nance v. Busby, 91 Tenn. 304; Travers v. Abbey, 104 Tenn. 665; Rodgers v. Burnett, 108 Tenn. 173; Watson v. Garvin, 54 Mo., 377; Ferraria v. Vasconcellos, 31 Ill. 35; Watson v. Avery, 2 Bush., 332; Associate Reform Church v. Trustees of Theological Seminary, 4 N.J. Ch., R. (3 Green), 77; Gart

In the almost identical case of Morales v. Costa, 427 So.2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), we recently stated that a landowner may be liable for the maintenance of vegetation "which grows and exists [on] private property, but which protrudes into [the] public right-of-way," so as to obstruct a stop sign located there. On the basis of Morales and the cases and authorities it cites, the judgment in Maercks' favor cannot stand. Morales effectively distinguishes Evans v. Southern Holding Corp., 391 So.2d 231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), rev. denied, 399 So.2d 1142 (Fla. 1981) and Pedigo v. Smith, 395 So.2d 615 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), upon which the landowner primarily relies. In the light of the language and principles of Morales it can make no difference that the defendant in that case planted the tree directly in the swale, rather than, as here, on the owner's property.

Usually the courts exhibit great diffidence in regard to determining a question of theology or doctrine. 76 C.J.S. Religious Societies § 86, p. 873; Trett v. Lambeth, supra, Mo.App., 195 S.W.2d 524(2); Olear v. Haniak, 235 Mo.App. 249, 131 S.W.2d 375, 381; Stone v. Bogue, 238 Mo. App. 392, 181 S.W.2d 187 (3, 4). It is only where such determination becomes necessary in order to settle property and civil rights as distinguished from ecclesiastical rights that the courts will be concerned with doctrine, and then not in order to determine which is correct but only in order to determine which of the disputing factions adheres to the original doctrine. Boyles v. Roberts, supra, 222 Mo. 613, 121 S.W. 805(1); see history "Courts and Churches in Missouri" 1956 Wash.U.L.Q. 67; Annotation: 8 A.L.R. 105, 114 et seq.; Annotation: 70 A.L.R. 75; 3 St. Louis U.L.J. 304 (1954-1955); Smith v. Pedigo, 145 Ind. 361, 33 N.E. 777, 778, 44 N.E. 363, 19 L.R.A. 433, 32 L.R.A. 838. It is frequently stated, and is the general rule, that where the church has a connective association in an organization which has a judicatory to determine questions of doctrine within the framework of that faith, the courts will be bound by a determination of that body, prior to schism. Hayes v. Manning, 263 Mo. 1, 172 S.W. 897, 905; Barkley v. Hayes (W.D.Mo.)

It is the duty of courts to see that dedicated property is not diverted from the trust to which it has been dedicated. Lamb v. Cain, 129 Ind. 486; Smith v. Pedigo, 145 Ind. 385 and 406; Princeton v. Adams, 10 Cush. 129. The guaranty of religious freedom does not affect this rule.

However, with the exception of our holding in Whitt, there are no Florida decisions imposing liability upon a property owner based on natural conditions contained wholly within the boundary of the private property. See Stevens v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 415 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (asserting that in the absence of a violation of a statute, a landowner does not have a duty to "maintain his property in a condition so that a motorist approaching a public highway intersection can see other approaching motorists"); Pedigo v. Smith, 395 So. 2d 615, 615-17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (finding no liability of landowner for visual obstruction of tree located on the property); Evans, 391 So. 2d at 232-33 (declining to impose liability where foliage entirely on property obstructed view of the intersection). This remains a critical distinction in our case law where we have recognized a duty of landowners to motorists.

However, with the exception of our holding in Whitt, there are no Florida decisions imposing liability upon a property owner based on natural conditions contained wholly within the boundary of the private property. See Stevens v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 415 So.2d 51, 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (asserting that in the absence of a violation of a statute, a landowner does not have a duty to "maintain his property in a condition so that a motorist approaching a public highway intersection can see other approaching motorists"); Pedigo v. Smith, 395 So.2d 615, 615-17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (finding no liability of landowner for visual obstruction of tree located on the property); Evans, 391 So.2d at 232-33 (declining to impose liability where foliage entirely on property obstructed view of the intersection). This remains a critical distinction in our case law where we have recognized a duty of landowners to motorists.

See, e.g., Bassett v. Edwards, 30 So.2d 374, 376 (Fla. 1947) (holding it was the duty of both drivers to observe foliage at an intersection and to operate their vehicles as required under prevailing conditions because every user of a highway is required to exercise reasonable care for his own safety and protection). See, e.g., Coburn v. City of Tucson, 691 P.2d 1078, 1080-81 (Ariz. 1984) (stating that landowner has no duty to use land so as to protect travelers); Pedigo v. Smith, 395 So.2d 615, 616 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (adhering to the view that in the absence of a violation of a statute regulating the removal or height of trees, there is no common law duty on a landowner to maintain his property in a condition so that a motorist approaching a public highway intersection has a clear view of other traffic and intersection traffic signals); Evans v. Southern Holding Corp., 391 So.2d 231, 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (same); Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 566 N.E.2d 1365, 1365 (Ill. 1991) (holding that a landowner has no "duty to maintain his property in such a manner that his driveway is visible to travelers on an adjacent roadway"); Pyne v. Witmer, 512 N.E.2d 993, 997 (Ill.App.Ct. 1987) (holding that landowners had no duty to remove foliage from their property so motorists approaching intersection could see other approaching motorists); Fritz v. Parkison, 397 N.W.2d 714, 717 (Iowa 1986) (finding landowner owed no duty to motorist where landowner planted trees but trees did not obstruct traveled way); Bohn v. Racette,

On the other hand, in the case of a church with a congregational polity, with the result that the local congregation is autonomous and subject to majority rule, the danger of manipulation by a shifting and impermanent temporal majority so as to hasten deviations from established doctrine and usage is greater and consequently invites more frequent and intrusive judicial scrutiny. For example, see Bouldin v. Alexander, 15 Wall. 131, 21 L.Ed. 69 (1872); Canterbury v. Canterbury, 143 W. Va. 165, 100 S.E.2d 565 (1957); Woodrum v. Burton, 88 W. Va. 322, 107 S.E. 102 (1921); Smith v. Pedigo, 145 Ind. 361, 33 N.E. 777, pet. for reh. den., 145 Ind. 361, 44 N.E. 363 (1896); Mt. Zion Baptist Church v. Whitmore, 83 Iowa 138, 49 N.W. 81 (1891). This was the general posture of court relationship with the churches when in 1871, the United States Supreme Court took its first plunge into the rolling waters of contradictory court decisions involving church property disputes.

Illinois: Stallings v. Finney, 287 Ill. 145, 122 N.E. 369. Indiana: Smith v. Pedigo, 145 Ind. 361, 33 N.E. 777, 19 L.R.A. 433. Iowa: Mt. Zion Baptist Church v. Whitmore, 83 Iowa 138, 49 N.W. 81, 13 L.R.A. 198.