Pedersen v. Midfirst Bank

4 Citing cases

  1. Yen Hwa Huang v. H.K. & Shanghai Banking Corp.

    1:20-cv-03548-LTS-SN (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 9, 2022)   Cited 6 times
    Concluding that the relevant analysis is whether "the claims are about events that occurred either before or after the processing of the wire transfer"

    For example, after the plaintiffs in Pedersen v. MidFirst Bank entered into a contract to buy a parcel of real estate, they received a fraudulent email (that appeared to be from their escrow agent) requesting that they wire the escrow funds to an account at MidFirst Bank (the defendant). 527 F.Supp.3d 188, 191 (N.D.N.Y. 2021).

  2. Markatos v. Citibank, N.A

    24-CV-0803 (KMK) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2024)

    In contrast, claims not based on the mechanics of the transfer itself-such as claims “based on Defendant's actions before and after the processing of the wire transfer”-are not always preempted. Jakob v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 639 F.Supp.3d 406, 412 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Pedersen v. MidFirst Bank, 527 F.Supp.3d 188, 193 (N.D.N.Y. 2021)); see also Beck v. Metro. Bank Holding Corp., No. 23-CV-7564, 2024 WL 3849461, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2024) (holding a common law contract claim was not preempted by Article 4-A where it concerned an agreement that a bank conduct an internal review for all authorized wire transfers); Sheerbonnet, 951 F.Supp. at 412 (noting allegations unrelated to “transactional” funds transfer errors were not preempted as they “d[id] not fit neatly into any of Article 4-A's ‘precise and detailed rules'”).

  3. Ison-Newsome v. JPMorgan Chase Bank

    Civil Action 3:22-CV-2805-L-BH (N.D. Tex. Jul. 21, 2023)

    See 3T Oil, 2018 WL 5018483, at *3; First State Bank of Brownsboro, 2020 WL 12991132, at *4 (“[T]o the extent [plaintiff's] claims are based on alleged conduct occurring before or after the automated funds transfer, they are not preempted.”); JESCO Constr. Corp., 2021 WL 9629459, at *10 (holding that Article 4A did not displace plaintiff's negligent or intentional misrepresentation claims because they were premised on representations made after the completion of the unauthorized transfers); see also Pedersen v. MidFirst Bank, 527 F.Supp.3d 188, 194 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (finding plaintiffs' common law claims based on defendant's actions before and after the processing of the wire transfer were not preempted by Article 4A). In 3T Oil, the plaintiff sued for negligent misrepresentation, alleging that after the wire transfer was completed, the bank represented that the funds had been flagged and would not leave the bank, and

  4. Bud's Goods & Provisions Corp. v. Doe

    630 F. Supp. 3d 320 (D. Mass. 2022)   Cited 1 times

    See N.Y.U.C.C. Law, § 4A-207, cmt 2 (standard format may allow inclusion of name of beneficiary and other information which can be useful to beneficiary's bank, but which plays no part in process of payment).See e.g. generally Wellton Int'l Express, 612 F.Supp.3d 358; Golden Door V & I, Inc. v. TD Bank, 123 A.D.3d 976, 977, 999 N.Y.S.2d 510; accord Pedersen v. MidFirst Bank, 527 F.Supp.3d 188, 192-93 (N.D.N.Y. 2021)(applying California law as jurisdiction where receiving bank was located, but noting that New York and California law are same). The Court finds no merit in Bud' assertion that its claims are not barred by the UCC given that as a result of the notation, HSBC had actual knowledge that Merton was not the proper beneficiary of the wire transfer (because, among other reasons, M. Holland and Son's Construction Inc. is a business and Merton's Account is a personal account).