Pedersen v. Midfirst Bank

6 Citing cases

  1. Jakob v. JPMorgan Chase Bank

    22-CV-03921 (HG) (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2022)

    Any common law claims concerning the “existence of unauthorized wire transfers,” the processing of the wire transfer, or the “mechanics of how [the wire transfer] transactions were conducted” are, however, preempted by the UCC. 2006 Frank Calandra, 816 F.Supp.2d at 236; see also Pedersen v. MidFirst Bank, 527 F.Supp.3d 188, 193 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (finding common law claims concerning processing of wire transfer preempted by UCC). However, to the extent Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is based on Defendant's actions “before and after the processing of the wire transfer, such claims are not preempted.

  2. Yen Hwa Huang v. H.K. & Shanghai Banking Corp.

    1:20-cv-03548-LTS-SN (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 9, 2022)   Cited 6 times
    Concluding that the relevant analysis is whether "the claims are about events that occurred either before or after the processing of the wire transfer"

    For example, after the plaintiffs in Pedersen v. MidFirst Bank entered into a contract to buy a parcel of real estate, they received a fraudulent email (that appeared to be from their escrow agent) requesting that they wire the escrow funds to an account at MidFirst Bank (the defendant). 527 F.Supp.3d 188, 191 (N.D.N.Y. 2021).

  3. Markatos v. Citibank, N.A

    24-CV-0803 (KMK) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2024)

    In contrast, claims not based on the mechanics of the transfer itself-such as claims “based on Defendant's actions before and after the processing of the wire transfer”-are not always preempted. Jakob v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 639 F.Supp.3d 406, 412 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Pedersen v. MidFirst Bank, 527 F.Supp.3d 188, 193 (N.D.N.Y. 2021)); see also Beck v. Metro. Bank Holding Corp., No. 23-CV-7564, 2024 WL 3849461, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2024) (holding a common law contract claim was not preempted by Article 4-A where it concerned an agreement that a bank conduct an internal review for all authorized wire transfers); Sheerbonnet, 951 F.Supp. at 412 (noting allegations unrelated to “transactional” funds transfer errors were not preempted as they “d[id] not fit neatly into any of Article 4-A's ‘precise and detailed rules'”).

  4. United States v. Volmar Constr.

    23-CV-10732 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2024)

    In any event, each of Volmar's claims fails for at least one other reason as well. Its first claim for “fail[ure] to properly monitor, and therefore, detect, that the account at Truist to which the funds were wired was fraudulent,” TPC ¶ 8 is plainly preempted by the U.C.C. Article 4-A of the U.C.C., which New York has adopted, “displaces any common law claim if the UCC's provisions squarely cover the transactions at issue, . . . and was intended to be the exclusive means of determining the rights, duties and liabilities of banks and their customers with respect to [wire] transfers.” Pedersen v. MidFirst Bank, 527 F.Supp.3d 188, 193 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Ma v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 597 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 2010). Courts have interpreted that to mean that claims “based on the bank's processing of the wire transfer” that is, concerning “the mechanics of an electronic fund transfer” are barred. Huang v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. LTD, No. 20-CV-03548 (LTS) (SN), 2022 WL 4123879, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2022) (cleaned up); see Beck v. Metro. Bank Holding Corp., No. 23-CV-07564 (NJC), 2024 WL 3849461, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2024) (holding that a breach-of-contract claim similar to Volmar's was preempted by Article 4-A).

  5. Ison-Newsome v. JPMorgan Chase Bank

    Civil Action 3:22-CV-2805-L-BH (N.D. Tex. Jul. 21, 2023)

    See 3T Oil, 2018 WL 5018483, at *3; First State Bank of Brownsboro, 2020 WL 12991132, at *4 (“[T]o the extent [plaintiff's] claims are based on alleged conduct occurring before or after the automated funds transfer, they are not preempted.”); JESCO Constr. Corp., 2021 WL 9629459, at *10 (holding that Article 4A did not displace plaintiff's negligent or intentional misrepresentation claims because they were premised on representations made after the completion of the unauthorized transfers); see also Pedersen v. MidFirst Bank, 527 F.Supp.3d 188, 194 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (finding plaintiffs' common law claims based on defendant's actions before and after the processing of the wire transfer were not preempted by Article 4A). In 3T Oil, the plaintiff sued for negligent misrepresentation, alleging that after the wire transfer was completed, the bank represented that the funds had been flagged and would not leave the bank, and

  6. Bud's Goods & Provisions Corp. v. Doe

    630 F. Supp. 3d 320 (D. Mass. 2022)   Cited 1 times

    See N.Y.U.C.C. Law, § 4A-207, cmt 2 (standard format may allow inclusion of name of beneficiary and other information which can be useful to beneficiary's bank, but which plays no part in process of payment).See e.g. generally Wellton Int'l Express, 612 F.Supp.3d 358; Golden Door V & I, Inc. v. TD Bank, 123 A.D.3d 976, 977, 999 N.Y.S.2d 510; accord Pedersen v. MidFirst Bank, 527 F.Supp.3d 188, 192-93 (N.D.N.Y. 2021)(applying California law as jurisdiction where receiving bank was located, but noting that New York and California law are same). The Court finds no merit in Bud' assertion that its claims are not barred by the UCC given that as a result of the notation, HSBC had actual knowledge that Merton was not the proper beneficiary of the wire transfer (because, among other reasons, M. Holland and Son's Construction Inc. is a business and Merton's Account is a personal account).