Opinion
No. 85-620
Decided February 5, 1986.
Criminal law — Sexual conduct with juvenile — R.C. Chapters 2907 and 2151 — Jurisdiction of court of common pleas.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Scioto County.
Appellant, James F. Peck, was arrested in August 1983 pursuant to a complaint charging him with sexual abuse of his three minor stepchildren. The preliminary hearing before the Cleveland Municipal Court was waived, and appellant was bound over to the grand jury which indicted him on two counts of corruption of a minor, and numerous counts of rape and gross sexual imposition. A no contest plea was entered at appellant's arraignment before the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, which court, sua sponte, then changed his plea to one of not guilty. In September 1983 appellant, with counsel, entered guilty pleas to three counts of rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(3). The remaining charges were nolled at that time. A sentence of life as to each count, concurrent as to two and consecutive as to a third, was imposed in October 1983.
Appellant then sought a writ of habeas corpus from the court of appeals alleging that (1) neither the municipal court nor the court of common pleas had jurisdiction to entertain charges or enter judgment against an adult relating to his sexual conduct with a juvenile as set forth in R.C. Chapter 2907; and (2) the Juvenile Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County had exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases and enter judgments against adults charged with any violation under R.C. Chapter 2151.
The court of appeals dismissed the complaint for reason of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
This cause is now before this court upon appeal as a matter of right.
James F. Peck, pro se. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., attorney general, and Alexander G. Thomas, for appellee Superintendent of the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.
The issue is whether the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine cases of adults charged with sexual activity with a minor in violation of R.C. Chapter 2907 (sex offenses) where such offenses might also constitute a violation of R.C. Chapter 2151 (juvenile court). Our answer is in the negative.
Appellant relies on R.C. 2151.23(A)(5) which reads:
"The Juvenile Court has exclusive original jurisdiction under the Revised Code:
"* * *
"(5) To hear and determine all criminal cases charging adults with the violation of any section of Chapter 2151 of the Revised Code."
Appellant was charged with and convicted of three counts of rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02. R.C. 2151.23 is the legislative enactment conferring jurisdiction on the juvenile court and such enactment explicitly limits the court "[t]o hear and determine all criminal cases charging adults with the violation of any section of Chapter 2151 of the Revised Code." While appellant might, for example, have been charged with and convicted of abusing a child under R.C. 2151.41, the fact is that he was not. R.C. 2151.23(A)(5) thus contradicts, rather than supports, appellant's contention.
Inasmuch as appellant was convicted and sentenced by the court of common pleas, a court of competent jurisdiction, the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing the complaint is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES, C. BROWN, DOUGLAS and WRIGHT, JJ., concur.