Pearson v. South Carolina Department of Corrections

Full title: Warren L Pearson, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of Corrections…

Court: United States District Court, D. South Carolina

Date published: Oct 9, 2008

C/A No. 4:08-3138-RBH-TER (D.S.C. Oct. 9, 2008)

Opinion

C/A No. 4:08-3138-RBH-TER.

October 9, 2008

Report and Recommendation

THOMAS ROGERS, Magistrate Judge

This is a civil action filed pro se by a former state prison inmate.¹ Plaintiff, who is apparently no longer in prison, seeks compensatory damages from Defendants, contending that they improperly classified him as "violent" when he was put in the custody of SCDC at the Kirkland R E Center, and then housed him at the Perry Correctional Institution with persons convicted of true violent crimes and facing long prison terms. Plaintiff contends that he was harassed, threatened, and stolen from by those violent inmates because he had only a short prison term to serve and that he is still being harassed by their "associates" now that he is out of jail.²

1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and D.S.C. Civ. R. 73.02(B)(2)(e), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e); 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).

2 The only explicit discussion of an attack by a fellow inmate in the Complaint includes the fact that it occurred in 1999, thus making any § 1983 claim arising from that attack untimely when filed in 2008. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 265-80 (1985) (in § 1983 actions, federal courts should apply a state's general statute of limitations for personal injuries); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530 (South Carolina's three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims). Further, threats and verbal harassment do not rise to level of constitutional violations. Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985) (there is no federal constitutional right to be free from emotional distress, psychological stress, or mental anguish, and, hence, there is no liability under § 1983 regarding such claims); Sluys v. Gribetz, 842 F. Supp. 764, 765 n. 1 (S.D. N.Y. 1994); see Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 398 (2d Cir. 1983).

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Plaintiff's pro se Complaint filed in this case. This review has been conducted pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) ( en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979).

Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N. Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Complaint filed in this case is subject to summary dismissal under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Plaintiff does not have a viable constitutional claim for damages against any Defendant relating to his classification for custody purposes. The South Carolina Code of Laws vests exclusive authority relating to the care and housing of prisoners on the Director of SCDC and places no limitations on official discretion. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 24-1-130, 24-1-140, 24-3-20, 24-3-30. Federal courts are required to accord great consideration to a correctional system's need to maintain order, discipline, and control, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558-62 (1974), and it is well established that there is no constitutional right for a state prisoner or federal prisoner to be housed in a particular institution, at particular custody level, or in a particular portion or unit of a correctional institution. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983); Ange v. Paderick, 521 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1975); Lyons v. Clark, 694 F. Supp. 184, 187 (E.D. Va. 1988) (collecting cases). In other words, the placement and assignment of inmates into particular institutions or units by state or federal corrections departments are discretionary functions, and, generally, are not subject to review unless state or federal law places limitations on official discretion. Hayes v. Thompson, 726 F.2d 1015, 1016-17 (4th Cir. 1984) (collecting cases).

It is known from other cases previously decided in this judicial district that South Carolina law confers no protected liberty interest upon inmates of the South Carolina Department of Corrections from being classified, or being placed in administrative segregation, in a particular prison, or in a particular section of a prison. See, e.g., Keeler v. Pea, 782 F. Supp. 42, 43-44 (D. S.C. 1992) ( citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976)); Vice v. Harvey, 458 F. Supp. 1031, 1034 (D. S.C. 1978); Sheffield v. Edwards, 2008 WL 4200442 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2008) (unpublished case, text available in Westlaw). In other words, since Plaintiff was legally committed to the custody SCDC, the choices of where and how Plaintiff was to be confined were to be determined by the SCDC. Although the Plaintiff, apparently, preferred to be placed in another cell at Perry Correctional Institution, and possibly at Kirkland R E Center as well, his (the Plaintiff's) classification and placement at the both Perry and Kirkland did not violate Plaintiff's federally guaranteed constitutional rights. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 558-62; Mann v. Leeke, 73 F.R.D. 264, 265-267 (D.S.C. 1974); Ramey v. Hawk, 730 F. Supp. 1366, 1372 (E.D. N.C. 1989); see also Cooper v. Riddle, 540 F.2d 731, 732 (4th Cir. 1976) ( citing Meachum v. Fano: federal courts are not "to assume the role of super wardens of state penal institutions"). Accordingly, this Complaint is subject to summary dismissal as to all Defendants.

Furthermore, even if some kind of viable constitutional violation arising from his prison confinement were shown by Plaintiff, which, as stated previously, it is not, Defendant SCDC would not be subject to his request for damages.³ SCDC is immune from Plaintiff's claims in this case because the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages brought against the State of South Carolina or its integral parts. SCDC, as a South Carolina state agency, is an integral part of the state and, thus, entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case. The Eleventh Amendment provides:

3 To the extent Plaintiff asserts a claim for injunctive relief, it is moot because Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated. Claims for injunctive and declaratory relief become moot when a prisoner is no longer subjected to the condition of which the prisoner complains. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 825 (4th Cir. 1991); Ross v. Reed, 719 F.2d 689, 693 (4th Cir. 1983).

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); College Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); College Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 61-71 (1989); Bellamy v. Borders, 727 F. Supp. 247, 248-50 (D.S.C. 1989); Coffin v. South Carolina Dep't of Social Servs., 562 F. Supp. 579, 583-585 (D.S.C. 1983); Belcher v. South Carolina Bd. of Corrections, 460 F. Supp. 805, 808-09 (D.S.C. 1978); see also Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1996); Pennhurst State School Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (although express language of Eleventh Amendment only forbids suits by citizens of other States against a State, Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a State filed by its own citizens).

Under Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99n. 9, a state must expressly consent to suit in a federal district court. The State of South Carolina has not consented to suit in a federal court. Section 15-78-20(e) of the South Carolina Code of Laws (Cum. Supp. 1993), is a statute in the South Carolina Tort Claims Act which expressly provides that the State of South Carolina does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit only in a court of the State of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another state. See McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741, 743 (1985) (Opinion abolishing sovereign immunity in tort "does not abolish the immunity which applies to all legislative, judicial and executive bodies and to public officials who are vested with discretionary authority, for actions taken in their official capacities."). C f. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121 ("[N]either pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment.").

Recommendation

Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the Complaint in this case without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Denton v. Hernandez; Neitzke v. Williams; Haines v. Kerner; Brown v. Briscoe, 998 F.2d 201, 202-04 (4th Cir. 1993); Boyce v. Alizaduh; Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d at 74; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal). Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Court Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. In the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court judge need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must "only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Diamond v. Colonial Life Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4^th Cir. 2005).

Specific written objections must be filed within ten (10) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three (3) days for filing by mail. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a) (e). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk

United States District Court

P.O. Box 2317

Florence, South Carolina 29503

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); U. S. v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985).