Pearson v. Seattle

8 Citing cases

  1. Dex Media West, Inc. v. City of Seattle

    CASE NO. C10-1857JLR (W.D. Wash. Sep. 16, 2011)

    (See Resp. at 14 (citing Pearson v. City of Seattle, 90 P.2d 1020 (Wash. 1939); City of Seattle v. Dencker, 108 P. 1086 (Wash. 1910); City of Spokane v. Macho, 98 P. 755 (Wash. 1909)).) As described by recent commentators, in the second half of the Twentieth Century, the Washington Supreme Court began routinely conflating the Washington constitution's privileges and immunities clause with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution.

  2. Amos v. Prom, Inc.

    117 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Iowa 1954)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that public dance hall was subject to the ICRA as a "place of amusement" under a former wording of the statute

    The Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected that contention and held that the words "public amusement" were to be taken in a popular sense and were not to be taken in a sense that would confine them to public amusements of the nature of shows and exhibitions. In the case of Pearson v. City of Seattle, 1896, 14 Wn. 438, 44 P. 884, 885, there was involved a city ordinance which required licenses for "circuses, sideshows, skating rinks, operas, concerts, theaters, shows, exhibitions and other public amusements". The Court held that a public dance was included within the general phrase "other public amusements".

  3. Madison v. State

    161 Wn. 2d 85 (Wash. 2007)   Cited 47 times
    Holding that Washington statute restoring civil rights upon completion of sentence satisfies rational-basis test

    that exempted cereal and flour mills from its provisions and authorized them to sell mixed feeding stuffs while placing conditions on other persons, companies, corporations, or agents selling the same thing violated article I, section 12); Sherman Clay Co. v. Brown, 131 Wash. 679, 231 P. 166 (1924) (Seattle ordinance prohibiting secondhand dealers from disposing of goods for 10 days after purchase or receipt but exempting purchasers of stoves, furniture, or total contents of house violated article I, section 12 as being discriminatory as exempting a class within a class); State ex rel. Bacich v. Huse, 187 Wash. 75, 59 P.2d 1101 (1936) (act forbidding issuance of licenses to take salmon by gill nets except for those holding licenses in 1932 and 1933 set up arbitrary classification and conferred special privileges on those entitled to licenses in violation of article I, section 12), overruled on other grounds by Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 92 Wn.2d 939, 603 P.2d 819 (1979); Pearson v. City of Seattle, 199 Wash. 217, 90 P.2d 1020 (1939) (ordinance imposing license tax on solid fuel dealers plus additional amount for each solid fuel truck where liquid fuel dealers were not subjected to such fees was discriminatory and violated article I, section 12); City of Seattle v. Rogers, 6 Wn.2d 31, 106 P.2d 598 (1940) (ordinance making it unlawful to conduct a charity campaign without licenses where part of the proceeds was withheld as compensation for promoters and solicitors violated article I, section 12, where ordinance exempted the Seattle Community Fund); Ralph v. City of Wenatchee, 34 Wn.2d 638, 209 P.2d 270 (1949) (ordinance requiring license fees for only nonresident photographers violated article I, section 12); Larson v. City of Shelton, 37 Wn.2d 481, 224 P.2d 1067 (1950) (statute permitting honorably discharged veterans to peddle and sell goods after obtaining free license, where others were required to pay license fees, violated article I, section 12); Kaufman v. West, 133 Wash. 192, 233 P. 321 (1925); Verino v. Hi

  4. In re City of Enid

    195 Okla. 365 (Okla. 1945)   Cited 15 times
    Holding city liable for sales tax on gross proceeds from the sale of admissions to city swimming pool

    " Although the words "amusement" and "recreation" are not identical in meaning, they are synonymous when related to the passing of time in pleasant or agreeable occupations. Pearson v. City of Seattle, 14 Wn. 438, 44 P. 884; Young v. Board of Trustees, 90 Mont. 576, 4 P.2d 725; Beard v. Board of Education, 81 Utah, 51, 16 P.2d 900; Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms. We hold that the language employed in the various acts is sufficient to include the sales of admissions to the swimming pool operated by the appellant.

  5. Texas Company v. Cohn

    8 Wn. 2d 360 (Wash. 1941)   Cited 42 times
    Holding that "this court regards the equal privileges and immunities provision of Art. I, sec. 12, of the state constitution and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States as substantially identical"

    Automatic device sales were taxed, while hand sales were not taxed. The case did not involve the question of differences between commodities sold. The case of Pearson v. Seattle, 199 Wn. 217, 90 P.2d 1020, upon which respondents particularly rely, is clearly distinguishable, as the ordinance of the city of Seattle there involved was considered solely as a regulatory measure. This court, in effect, held that, since all commodities, including fuels, were subject to a general "weights and measures" ordinance, the city could not legally single out fuel oil dealers and impress upon them an additional regulation having substantially the same purpose. The city contended that the challenged ordinance should be construed as a revenue measure, but the court rejected the contention and invoked the more stringent rule which applies to regulatory laws, because of the language of the ordinance itself, which definitely and emphatically declared that it should be regarded as a police regulation.

  6. Bauer v. State

    7 Wn. 2d 476 (Wash. 1941)   Cited 7 times

    [1] Under the cases of Acme Finance Co. v. Huse, 192 Wn. 96, 73 P.2d 341, 114 A.L.R. 1345, and McDermott v. State, 197 Wn. 79, 84 P.2d 372, the complaint herein states a proper case for the entry of a declaratory judgment pursuant to Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 784-1 [P.C. § 8108-21] et seq. (Laws of 1935, chapter 113, p. 305, as amended by Laws of 1937, chapter 14, p. 39). Appellants argue that, because the statute here in question is regulatory, the authority of the legislature to classify persons to whom the act shall apply is more restricted than it is in statutes enacted for the purpose of raising revenue, citing In re Camp, 38 Wn. 393, 80 P. 547; Spokane v. Macho, 51 Wn. 322, 98 P. 755, 30 Am. St. 1100, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 263; and Pearson v. Seattle, 199 Wn. 217, 90 P.2d 1020. The statute here in question is undoubtedly regulatory in its nature and should not be classed as a revenue measure.

  7. State v. Inland Empire Refineries, Inc.

    3 Wn. 2d 651 (Wash. 1940)   Cited 13 times
    In Inland Empire, the Supreme Court of Washington determined that certain exemptions from taxation were unconstitutional.

    The result of the imposition of the fuel oil tax and the compensating tax is that users of fuel oil pay a tax of approximately thirteen per cent upon the fuel consumed by them, while users of the other fuels pay only the compensating tax of two per cent. In Pearson v. Seattle, 199 Wn. 217, 90 P.2d 1020, we held that a city ordinance which imposed a license fee for revenue purposes, although ostensibly for regulatory purposes, on solid fuel dealers, while a similar license fee was not imposed on liquid fuel dealers, was unreasonable and discriminatory, therefore void, in that it singled out a particular business and imposed upon it special regulations and taxes when the ground had otherwise been fully covered by existing laws. (In that case, another ordinance was in force which applied alike to both liquid and solid fuel dealers.) We sustained the challenge that the city could not, as it attempted by that ordinance, impose such a revenue tax under the guise of a police regulation.

  8. Allsman et al. v. Oklahoma City

    95 P. 468 (Okla. 1908)   Cited 14 times
    In Allsman et al. v. Oklahoma City, 21 Okla. 142, 95 P. 468, the plaintiff sued for the recovery of the unearned portion of certain money paid to the city for a liquor license, which had failed on account of the repeal of the statute under which it was issued.

    "Where a liquor license has been issued and is thereafter canceled without fault of the licensee, he is entitled to a repayment pro tanto of the sum paid for the unexpired time." In Pearson v. City of Seattle, 14 Wn. 438, 44 P. 884, the city, after issuing the license authorizing the licensee to conduct public amusements in connection with his saloon, passed an ordinance prohibiting such amusement, and the court held that the licensee was entitled to recover the unearned portion of the money paid for his license. In passing the court said: