Opinion
CIVIL 1:22-CV-2063
07-18-2023
JOSHUA I. PAYNE, Plaintiff, v. C.O. STANBAUGH, Defendant.
Mariani, Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
This is a prisoner civil rights case filed by the pro se plaintiff, Joshua Payne, a state inmate incarcerated in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill. Payne brings his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendant-a correctional officer at SCI Camp Hill-violated his First Amendment rights by confiscating Payne's legal materials that were in the possession of another inmate, which Payne asserts was retaliatory and designed to hinder his access to the courts. He also asserts a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. (Doc. 1).
On this score, Payne's complaint asserts that on or about October 26, 2022, Officer Stanbaugh approached him and informed him that he had confiscated legal materials belonging to Payne that were in the possession of another inmate named Smith. (Id., ¶ 6). Payne alleges that Stanbaugh threw away these legal materials because they related to cases filed against other correctional staff. (Id., ¶¶ 7-8). The complaint avers that the legal materials Stanbaugh confiscated comprised of 75 pages of material relating to several ongoing civil and criminal cases that Payne was involved in. (Id., ¶ 17). Payne asserts that he filed a grievance through the DOC's grievance process but, as of the filing of the complaint on December 29, 2022, never received an initial review response to his grievance in accordance with the policy. (Id., ¶¶ 9-15).
Thus, Payne filed the instant action against Stanbaugh, alleging claims of First Amendment retaliation and a violation of his right of access to the courts. (Id., ¶¶ 18-19). He further asserts a claim under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id., ¶ 21). The defendant subsequently filed the instant motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Payne lacks standing to assert these constitutional claims, and further, that his claims are without merit. (Doc. 13).
The motion is fully briefed and is ripe for resolution. (Docs. 14, 18). After consideration, we recommend that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without prejudice to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint.
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679. According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id., at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[After Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.' ”Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
B. The Defendant's Motion Should be Granted.
As we have explained, Payne asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his rights under the First Amendment, as well as an Equal Protection claim. However, for the following reasons, we conclude that Payne has failed to state a claim against the defendant for violations of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, we will recommend that the motion to dismiss be granted.
1. First Amendment Retaliation and Access to Courts
Payne asserts civil rights claims pursuant to § 1983, alleging that the defendant violated the First Amendment when Stanbaugh retaliated against him and denied him access to the courts. Regarding his retaliation claim, Payne avers that he was retaliated against by Stanbaugh when he confiscated Payne's legal materials from inmate Smith, which Payne asserts was retaliatory for the lawsuits he had filed against other correctional staff. Payne further asserts in a conclusory fashion that the confiscation of his legal materials hindered his access to the courts in several cases listed in his complaint.
In order to state a claim of retaliation under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that [he] engaged in a protected activity, (2) that defendant[']s retaliatory action was sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her rights, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the retaliatory action.” Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006)). Stated differently, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the protected speech was “a ‘substantial factor' in the alleged retaliatory action.” McAndrew v. Bucks County Bd. Of Comm'rs, 183 F.Supp.3d 713, 731 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2009)). If a plaintiff makes such a showing, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show that, even if the protected speech had not taken place, it would have taken the same action. Id.
With respect to the third element, there are three ways in which a plaintiff can establish causation for a First Amendment retaliation claim, showing: “(1) an ‘unusually suggestive temporal proximity' between the speech and the alleged retaliatory conduct; (2) a ‘pattern of antagonism coupled with timing'; or (3) that the ‘record as a whole' permits the trier of fact to infer causation.” McAndrew, 183 F.Supp.3d at 737 (quoting DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d at 267). Additionally, an unusually suggestive temporal proximity, by itself, can be enough to infer causation. LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Community Center Ass'n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001)). However,
While “ ‘suggestive temporal proximity' is relevant to establishing a causal link between protected conduct and retaliatory action ... in First Amendment retaliation cases,” Ambrose v. Twp. of Robinson, Pa., 303 F.3d 488, 494 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) (emphasis added), it is not dispositive of the issue. See DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d at 267. Rather, a plaintiff may also establish the requisite causal connection by showing “a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal link.” Id. (citing Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503-04 (3d Cir. 1997); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920-21 (3d Cir. 1997)). The plaintiff may establish that causal link by offering evidence which “gleaned from the record as a whole” could lead a reasonable fact-finder to infer causation. Id. (citing Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 2000)). Finally, Plaintiff is not required to show “but for causation;” rather, she is required to show that the “exercise of free speech rights played ‘some substantial role' in the employer's decision.” Marrero v. Camden Cty. Bd. of Social Services, 164 F.Supp.2d 455, 469 (D.N.J. 2001) (citing Suppan, 203 F.3d at 236).Malone v. Economy Borough Municipal Authority, 669 F.Supp.2d 582, 603 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
In the instant case, the defendant does not dispute that Payne's lawsuits constitute protected activity for purposes of the First Amendment. However, the defendant asserts that Payne has not shown that he suffered an adverse action, or that any adverse action was causally connected to his protected activity.
Payne has alleged that Stanbaugh confiscated his legal materials consisting of 75 pages of materials relating to several criminal and civil cases in which he was involved. On this score, courts have recognized that “a delay in providing access to legal materials may constitute adverse action sufficient to support a First Amendment retaliation claim.” Wyatt v. Malisko, 2020 WL 3001936, at * n.7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2020), report and recommendation adopted 2020 WL 2992088 (M.D. Pa. June 4, 2020) (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 578-79 & n.1 (1998); Hart v. Goulette, Civil No. 16-cv-028-PB, 2016 WL 4575581, at *5 (D.N.H. July 22, 2016)). Moreover, at this stage, Payne has alleged facts that may support a finding of unusually suggestive timing. Indeed, one of the lawsuits Payne cites in his complaint was filed in September of 2022, and the alleged retaliatory action occurred roughly one month later in October of 2022.
However, even if we conclude that Payne has set forth a prima facie case of retaliation, the defendant has met his burden to show that the action would have been taken regardless of Payne's protected activity. On this score, Stanbaugh asserts that the legal materials were confiscated from another inmate. Thus, the legal materials were considered contraband under DOC policy, as inmates are not permitted to have possessions belonging to other inmates. Indeed, DC-ADM 815 defines “contraband” as, inter alia, “property belonging to another inmate.” See DC-ADM 815, § 3C(1)(o) (effective Sept. 13, 2022). Payne concedes in his brief that he voluntarily gave his legal materials to inmate Smith. (Doc. 18, at 4).
https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Pages/DOC-Policies.aspx (last accessed July 18, 2022). We note that we may take judicial notice of information publicly available on government websites. Small v. Kauffman, 2022 WL 3036050, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2022) (citing Vanderklok v. U.S., 868 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 2017)).
Accordingly, this policy supports the defendant's contention that the same action would have been taken regardless of Payne's protected activity. See Starnes v. Butler County Court of Common Pleas, 50th Judicial District, 971 F.3d 416, 430 (3d Cir. 2020) (noting that a defendant has the opportunity to rebut a prima facie case of retaliation by showing it would have taken the same action regardless of any retaliatory motive). Indeed, the defendant asserts that regardless of the plaintiff's pending lawsuits or the substance of those lawsuits, his property would have been confiscated from inmate Smith as contraband in accordance with the DOC's policy. See Burgos v. Canino, 641 F.Supp.2d 443, 456 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (finding no retaliatory causation where the defendant's actions were taken in accordance with prison policy). Accordingly, we conclude that Payne's retaliation claim fails as a matter of law.
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the plaintiff's access-to-courts claim. A prisoner's ability to bring a claim to the court's attention is a decidedly important interest. Indeed, even the Supreme Court has articulated that “prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). This right of access to the courts enumerated by the Supreme Court, however, is not inherently coupled with “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 14 (1996). Rather, “meaningful access” to the courts is the controlling determination for whether a prisoner's right to access the courts has been satisfied. Bounds, 439 U.S. at 823. While there is no constitutional mandate that provides said freestanding right to accessing a law library, Bounds does instruct that the right of access to the courts requires that prisoners receive “adequate law libraries ...” Id. at 828.
Asserting an actionable claim for denial of access to the courts requires a prisoner to allege that (1) they “lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous' or ‘arguable' underlying claim” and (2) they have no available remedy for the lost claim other than the present denial of access action. Rivera v. Monko, 37 F.4th 909, 915 (3rd Cir. 2022) (citing Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3rd Cir. 2008)). Most significant is the nonfrivolous nature of the claim allegedly lost. The lost claim must be “more than hope” in order to be deemed nonfrivolous. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 416 (2002).
On this score, Payne appears to assert that he was denied access to the courts because the legal material confiscated related to several criminal and civil matters that he was involved in. However, the complaint fails to assert facts from which we could conclude that Payne's claims in these cases were meritorious. Indeed, Payne fails to describe any of the claims in these civil cases, as well as what motions or claims he was unable to assert and how they were meritorious. Rather, he simply lists the citations for these lawsuits without any context whatsoever. Accordingly, at this stage, Payne has not alleged enough to state a claim for denial of access to the courts.
2. Equal Protection
Payne also endeavors to assert a claim under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint appears to assert that Payne was retaliated against and denied access to the courts because he is a prisoner in the Level 5 housing unit, which he contends is a violation of Equal Protection. (Doc. 1, ¶ 21). On this score, the Equal Protection clause requires that all people similarly situated be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). “[T]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (quotations omitted). Claims for equal protection violations are subject to differing levels of scrutiny depending on the status of the claimant. Statutes or actions that substantially burden a fundamental right or target a suspect class must be reviewed under “strict scrutiny,” which means that in order to be valid, they must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982); Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2000). In contrast, if state action neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, it does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause, so long as the state action bears a rational relationship to some legitimate end. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 317.
While the legal grounds for Payne's Equal Protection claim remain somewhat murky, it is well settled that prisoners do not constitute a suspect class for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, and thus Payne's Equal Protection claim is governed by rational-basis review. See Myrie v. Comm'r, N.J. Dep't of Corr., 267 F.3d 251, 263 (3d Cir. 2001); Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 317. Accordingly, to sustain his Equal Protection claim, Payne bears the burden of showing that he has been arbitrarily treated differently from similarly situated inmates, that the defendant did so intentionally, and that this difference in treatment bears no rational relation to any legitimate penological interest. See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006); McKeithan v. Kerestes, No. 1:11-CV-1441, 2014 WL 3734569, at *9-10 (M.D. Pa. July 28, 2014).
In this case, Payne has failed to allege facts which would sustain this substantial burden. Indeed, the gist of Payne's complaint is not an allegation of disparate treatment of similarly situated inmates. Rather, at its heart, this complaint alleges that similarly situated inmates, namely prisoners in the Level 5 housing unit, were treated in a similar fashion, in that they were all retaliated against and denied access to the courts in ways which offended the First Amendment. Thus, while Payne's complaint may allege constitutional infractions, we do not read it as stating that he was treated differently from other similarly situated prisoners. Rather, we understand Payne to be alleging that all inmates in his situation were treated unfairly. Such allegations may state a constitutional claim under the First Amendment, but they do not describe the type of disparate conduct condemned by the Equal Protection clause.
Finally, while we have found that this complaint fails as a matter of law in its current form, we recognize that pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Therefore, it is recommended that the court dismiss this legally deficient complaint but afford the plaintiff an opportunity to either attempt to amend his complaint to state a federal claim within the jurisdiction of this court.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. 13), be GRANTED, and the plaintiff's claims should be dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff endeavoring to correct the defects cited in this report, provided that the plaintiff acts within 20 days of any dismissal order.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.