Opinion
No. 334771
11-21-2017
In re ESTATE OF RANDALL W. GUISE. DAVID PAVKA, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF RANDALL W. GUISE, Appellee, v. SUSAN NULL, Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED Hillsdale Probate Court
LC No. 15-035435-DE Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and SAWYER and MARKEY, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent Susan Null appeals by right the probate court's order granting the motion of personal representative David Pavka to return property. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
This appeal arises from a probate proceeding following the death of Randall W. Guise on October 28, 2015. At the time of his death, Randall was survived by 12 nieces and nephews. Pavka was appointed personal representative to proceed with the informal probate of the estate in November 2015.
Randall executed his last will and testament on July 21, 2015. The will contains the following provision at issue in this case:
ARTICLE III
I, Randall W. Guise, upon my death, direct that all of my personal belongings shall be distributed as follows:
Andrew Guise and Susan Null shall sort through all of the household goods, antiques, tools, and all other items of personal property and identify those items which shall stay within the Guise and Knapp family. Those items identified shall be distributed to members of those families, with the exception of Rhonda
Duchette and Bob Guise. Neither of these individuals shall take from my estate and are being purposely omitted.Article VII provides a list of persons and charities to which the proceeds should be given.
The remainder of personal property shall be placed for sale at auction and any proceeds therefrom shall be distributed pursuant to Article VII below.
In February 2016, Null met with five other nieces and nephews and distributed Randall's personal belongings. Null retained a John Deere tractor for herself and later sold it for $2,000. Pavka subsequently moved the probate court for an order requiring Null to return the $2,000 and any other items removed from Randall's home. According to the motion, Article III only allowed the identification and distribution of heirlooms, not all personal property. Pavka argued that the John Deere tractor and other valuable items were not heirlooms and should not have been distributed to Null. Null responded that Article III mandated the identification and distribution of all of Randall's personal property and that she had not acted beyond the scope of her authority. Later, Thomas Guise—Randall's nephew—objected to the distribution, stating that he had not been informed of the February 2016 meeting and that the distribution was unfair.
The probate court adopted Pavka's interpretation of the will, holding that Article III only provided for the identification and distribution of heirlooms due to Article III's language of "shall stay within . . . the family." The probate court ordered Null to return the $2,000 received from the sale of the tractor. It also ordered that a family-only auction should be held as to certain items—a golf cart, a Ford tractor, and a Great Dane semi-trailer—with the proceeds being distributed under Article VII.
On appeal, Null argues that the probate court erred in its interpretation of Article III as including only heirlooms and not all personal property. We agree.
This Court reviews the probate court's interpretation of the language of a will de novo. In re Bem Estate, 247 Mich App 427, 433; 637 NW2d 506 (2001). Any fact-finding by the probate court because of latent ambiguity is reviewed for clear error. Id. "A finding is clearly erroneous when a reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, even if there is evidence to support the finding." In re Bennet Estate, 255 Mich App 545, 549; 662 NW2d 772 (2003).
The primary goal of will interpretation, similar to statutory construction, is to give effect to the intent of the testator. Bem Estate, 247 Mich App at 433-434. Accordingly, the testator's intent at the time of the will's execution should be ascertained from the will itself and carried out as closely as possible. In re Maloney Trust, 423 Mich 632, 639; 377 NW2d 791 (1985). Thus, unless a patent or latent ambiguity is present, the probate court must ascertain the testator's intent from the four corners of the will. Id.; In re McPeak Estate, 210 Mich App 410, 412; 534 NW2d 140 (1995). A patent ambiguity exists where an uncertainty as to meaning arises due to the language used in the document. In re Kremlick Estate, 417 Mich 237, 240; 331 NW2d 228 (1983). A latent ambiguity exists where, although the language used in the document is clear, extrinsic facts or extraneous evidence creates the possibility of more than one meaning. Id.
Pursuant to the plain language contained within Randall's will, we conclude that Article III directed Null and Andrew to identify which of Randall's personal belongings would be distributed to the family members versus which would be sold at auction. Null's and Andrew's authority to identify these items was limited only to personal property. The words "which shall stay within" defines a subset of the personal property of items that were not to be sold at auction by operation of the will based on Null's and Andrew's discretion. The will's language does not expressly limit Null and Andrew to identifying only items that would be considered heirlooms. The probate court even appeared to acknowledge this, stating that "there's an inference that [the probate court] read into [Article III] . . . [that] he wanted those [items] to be given to family members for them to retain for their lifetime." As described, the will's plain language does not support such an inference. Contrary to petitioner's argument, the language is unambiguous, and without ambiguity the probate court was not permitted to entertain extrinsic evidence. McPeak Estate, 210 Mich App at 412. The mere fact that the parties provided differing interpretations of the text does not mean there is an ambiguity that permits the use of extrinsic evidence in interpretation. See Detroit Wabeek Bank & Trust Co v City of Adrian, 349 Mich 136, 143; 84 NW2d 441 (1957) ("The mere filing of a bill for construction of a will does not thereby make the will or any of its terms ambiguous any more than does the fact that competing litigants differ in their views as to the proper construction of the language or provisions in a will."). Therefore, because there are no ambiguities in the will, the probate court erred to the extent that it considered the statement of petitioner's counsel, who also witnessed the will, as evidence of Randall's intent that only heirlooms be distributed to the family members. Maloney Trust, 423 Mich at 639; McPeak Estate, 210 Mich App at 412.
The language of will as a whole also gives no support to petitioner's argument that Randall did not want anything other than heirlooms going to the family. The will contains no language supporting such an assumption. To the extent that it undermines this assumption, we note that Randall provided a purchase option for family members as to his Michigan real property in Article IV and devised his personal belongings to family members in Article III. Moreover, although petitioner argues that interpreting Article III as including all personal property rather than only heirlooms means that the family members are entitled to distribution of the entirety of Randall's estate other than real property, Article V expressly devises all retirement and savings accounts for the benefit of the persons and charities identified in Article VII.
The probate court erred in its determination that Article III only allowed for the identification and distribution of heirlooms to Randall's family rather than all personal property. However, although Article III gave Null and Andrew the authority to identify which personal belongings should be distributed to Randall's family and which personal belongings should be auctioned for the benefit of the persons and charities named in Article, VII, Article III did not give Null and Andrew the authority to distribute the personal belongings. Accordingly, Null's distribution of Randall's personal belongings was beyond the scope of her authority. We therefore affirm the probate court's order that Null return to the estate the $2,000 she took from her sale of the John Deere tractor: Null did not have the authority to distribute the tractor to herself and to then subsequently sell it and retain the proceeds. On remand, the personal representative shall exercise his authority to distribute to Randall's nieces and nephews the personal property Null identified.
We reverse the probate court's order requiring the auction of the golf cart, Ford tractor, and Great Dane semi-trailer within the family and mandating that proceeds be distributed according to Article VII, as this personal property is required to be distributed to Randall's nieces and nephews in accordance with Article III. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Jane E. Markey