Opinion
Civil Action 2:22-03183-BHH-MGB
02-15-2024
Michael Patterson, Plaintiff, v. Bryan Stirling, Charles Williams, John Palmer, Amy Enloe, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff Michael Patterson (“Plaintiff”), appearing pro se, originally filed this action in the Greenville County Court of Common Pleas, alleging claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“SCTCA”), SC Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 et seq. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) On September 19, 2022, Defendants removed the action to federal court. (Dkt. No. 1.) This matter is now before the Court upon Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 70). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends granting in part the Motion for Summary Judgment. Specifically, summary judgment should be granted as to Plaintiff's federal claims and those claims should be dismissed. The undersigned further recommends the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims and remand those claims to Greenville County.
Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration.
BACKGROUND
This civil action arises from events that occurred while Plaintiff was an inmate housed at Perry Correctional Institution (“Perry”). (Dkt. No. 1-1.) In his verified Complaint,Plaintiff alleges that when he arrived at Perry, he was housed in D-Dorm. According to Plaintiff, he observed that “the desk sitting writing area was stripped out the room as well as the bed frame and the bed frame was replaced by a five inch concrete slab.” (Id. at 9.) Additionally, “the room window was completely covered over by sheet metal and that sheet metal completely prevented Plaintiff from viewing any of the natural surroundings,” including the sun and sky. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff alleges that he was moved to a different wing in the same building on April 26, 2022, and his new room was in the same condition. The documents attached to the Complaint show that both rooms in which Plaintiff was housed were in the Restrictive Housing Unit (“RHU”. (Id. at 24, 31.)
“A complaint is ‘verified' if it is ‘signed, sworn, and submitted under penalty of perjury.'” Goodman v. Diggs, 986 F.3d 493, 495 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307, 314 (7th Cir. 2020)).
Plaintiff alleges he “sought to address the decor requirements with staff by sending a request to both [Defendants] Warden Charles Williams and Deputy Warden John Palmer.” (Id. at 10.) In these requests, Plaintiff “noted that the room decor was not within ACA/CAC state or federal mandates or standards.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that in his requests to Defendant Palmer, Plaintiff “noted that the lights go out at 11:30PM at night and come back on at 4:00AM” and he “addressed the windows being covered.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that in his requests to Defendant Williams, Plaintiff “noted that the 5 inch concrete slab that replaced the bed frame was so low to the ground that it caused greater injury to Plaintiff already suffering from scoliosis.” (Id.) More specifically, “Plaintiff is forced to sit in the ‘V' position,” which causes Plaintiff “severe pain and suffering and further injury to scoliosis.” (Id.)
Plaintiff also alleges he sought help from Defendant “Nurse Practitioner Amy Enloe, informing her of his scoliosis injury worsening and that such conditions were exacerbating his lower back pain and making the problem worse.” (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff alleges he began having suicidal thoughts due to Defendants' “illegal and grossly negligent acts, deliberate indifference, cruel and unusual punishment, [and] denial of adequate medical care and/or basic needs of civilized life.” (Id.)
Under “legal claims,” the Complaint alleges Defendants were grossly negligent under the SCTCA and that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by showing deliberate indifference to a prison condition and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. He asks for a “preliminary or permanent injunction ordering Defendants” Stirling, Palmer, and William to cease the above-complained of conditions and also to “cease denying inmates a means or method to see as well as hear the TVs provided.” (Id.) Plaintiff asks for compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 15-16.)
Plaintiff filed this action in the Greenville County Court of Common Pleas on August 10, 2022. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) On September 19, 2022, Defendants removed the action to federal court. (Dkt. No. 1.) On September 26, 2022, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 9.) On November 9, 2022, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) granting in part and denying in part the motion. (Dkt. No. 17.) Relevant here, the R&R recommended that the motion be denied as to the § 1983 conditions of confinement claim against Defendants Williams and Palmer specific to allegations about the concrete bed. (Id. at 11.) The R&R recommended that any other § 1983 conditions of confinement claims be dismissed. (Id.) The R&R further recommended the motion to dismiss be denied as to the § 1983 claims for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Defendants Williams, Palmer, and Enloe. (Id. at 15.) On January 11, 2023, the District Judge adopted the recommendations in the R&R. (Dkt. No. 45.)
On May 12, 2023, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 70.) On May 15, 2023, this Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. (Dkt. No. 72.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on July 20, 2023, and Defendants filed a reply on July 26, 2023. (Dkt. Nos. 78; 79.) Plaintiff filed a sur-reply on August 11, 2023. (Dkt. No. 80.) The Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for review.
STANDARDS
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “‘the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'” Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Because Plaintiff is representing himself, these standards must be applied while liberally construing his filings in this case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
DISCUSSION
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue: (1) Plaintiff fails to establish any § 1983 conditions of confinement claims against Defendants Williams and Palmer; (2) Plaintiff fails to establish any § 1983 claims against Defendants Williams, Palmer, and Enloe for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need; (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to any § 1983 claims; and (4) Plaintiff's gross negligence claim fails as a matter of law. (Dkt. No. 70-1.)
The undersigned considers these arguments, below.
A. § 1983 Claims
The Complaint alleges claims against Defendants under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's conditions of confinement and for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) To establish a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for denial of medical care, a plaintiff must put forth facts sufficient to demonstrate that an official was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976); Pfaller v. Amonette, 55 F.4th 436, 445 (4th Cir. 2022). A deliberate indifference claim has both an objective and subjective component. Gordon v. Schilling, 937 F.3d 348, 356 (4th Cir. 2019). “That is, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant prison official acted with ‘deliberate indifference' (the subjective component) to the plaintiff's ‘serious medical needs' (the objective component).” Id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Similarly, to state a claim that conditions of confinement violate constitutional requirements, “a plaintiff must show both ‘(1) a serious deprivation of a basic human need; and (2) deliberate indifference to prison conditions on the part of prison officials.'” Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991)).
A medical condition is serious enough to satisfy the objective component if it has “been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Id. (citing Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016)). The subjective component of a deliberate indifference claim has two subparts: “a plaintiff must show the prison official (1) had actual knowledge of the risk of harm to the inmate and (2) recognized that his actions were insufficient to mitigate the risk of harm to the inmate arising from his medical needs.” Pfaller, 55 F.4th at 445 (citing Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
While mere negligence is not enough, id. (citing De'lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003)), evidence of an official's “actual purposive intent” is not required, id. (citing De'lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 525 (4th Cir. 2013)). “Instead, deliberate indifference is most akin to criminal-law recklessness.” Id. “[S]o long as the official who knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety ‘responded reasonably to the risk,' they cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment, ‘even if the harm ultimately was not averted.'” Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994)). Indeed, an inmate's mere disagreement with medical providers about the proper course of treatment does not support an Eighth Amendment cause of action. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985).
A non-medical prison official generally cannot be held liable for a failure to provide an inmate medical treatment where that inmate is under the care of medical personnel. Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that non-medical personnel are entitled to rely on the professional judgment of medical practitioners to determine appropriate treatment for a patient); see also Iko, 535 F.3d at 242 (holding “ ‘[i]f a prisoner is under the care of medical experts . . ., a nonmedical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands'” (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)). To establish a claim of deliberate indifference against non-medical prison staff, a plaintiff must show that the nonmedical personnel (1) were personally involved in the treatment or denial of treatment, (2) deliberately interfered with treatment, or (3) tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the medical provider's conduct. Howell v. Walrath, No. 1:20-cv-1193, 2021 WL 5881803, at *5 (E.D. Va. Dec. 10, 2021); see Coleman v. Stevenson, No. 0:09-cv-872-HMH, 2010 WL 2990737, at *4 (D.S.C. June 22, 2010) (“Mere knowledge is not sufficient to establish personal participation.”) adopted by, 2010 WL 2990740 (D.S.C. July 26, 2010), aff'd, 407 Fed.Appx. 709 (4th Cir. 2011); Mallett v. Johnson, No. 8:08-cv-863-PMD, 2008 WL 5351618, at *7 (D.S.C. Dec. 22, 2008) (“A medical indifference claim is not appropriate against a superintendent/supervisor absent an allegation that he was personally connected to the treatment received.”) (citing Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)).
Before analyzing the merits of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims, the undersigned first summarizes the relevant evidence in the record.
1. Evidence
a. Concrete beds and mattresses at Perry
As explanation for the transition to concrete beds in the Delta Dormitory (“D-Dorm”) of RHU, Defendants have submitted an affidavit from a former Warden at Perry, Scott Lewis, who describes the reasons the wire bed frames were replaced with the concrete slab beds. (Dkt. No. 709.) He avers the wire bed frames presented “a number of safety concerns,” including that: (1) “inmates removed pieces of the frame from the beds and used them as weapons”; (2) inmates were able to “move the bed and hide under the bed,” which was problematic “during forced cell movements; and (3) “inmates would stand on the bed and remove the light bulb from the light socket in the ceiling of the cell.” (Id.) Lewis further avers that “SCDC frequently incurred costs fixing, replacing, and maintaining the wire bed frames damaged by inmates in the Delta Dormitory of RHU.” (Id.)
For these reasons, Lewis avers, he submitted a memorandum on January 12, 2018, asking that the Deputy Director of Operations “Chang[e] metal beds to cement beds in RHU compound” at Perry. (Dkt. Nos. 70-9; 70-10.) Lewis has submitted this memorandum with his affidavit, which confirms Lewis's reasons for the change to concrete beds. Defendants have also submitted an affidavit from the SCDC Inmate Construction Manager who avers the concrete bed renovations were completed in 2019. (Dkt. No. 70-2.) “SCDC constructed the beds using poured concrete and two by eight lumbar framing,” with an average finished height of “approximately seven and one-half inches.” (Id.)
Relevant here, Defendants have also submitted an affidavit from Katherine Lominac, the SCDC Commissary Business Operations Manager. Lominac avers that prior to 2014, “SCDC purchased mattresses from Prison Industries with the following dimensions: 30 inches wide, 75 inches long, and 4 inches high.” (Dkt. No. 70-11.) Lominic avers that in 2014, SCDC began purchasing larger mattresses which are “30 inches wide, 76 inches long, and 5.25 inches high.” (Dkt. No. 70-11.) She avers that because “[m]attresses remain in SCDC facilities until they are no longer usable, . . . there may be some old mattresses in SCDC facilities. However, the majority of the mattresses currently in use are the newer mattresses.” (Id.)
b. Plaintiff's Movement within Perry
Defendants have submitted various documents pertaining to Plaintiff's movement within Perry, including an affidavit from Defendant Warden Charles Williams. Williams has been employed as the Warden at Perry since January 17, 2020. (Dkt. No. 70-16 at 1.) According to Williams, Plaintiff was first housed in the Charlie Dormitory of RHU when he arrived at Perry on October 29, 2021, and he remained there until November 4, 2021, when he was moved to the Delta Dormitory. On January 19, 2023, Plaintiff's “behavior classification was changed and he returned to Charlie Dormitory where he remained until February 1, 202[3].” (Id.) Plaintiff committed a disciplinary infraction on February 1, 2023, resulting in his move back to the Delta Dormitory. On March 17, 2023, Plaintiff left the Delta Dormitory for placement in the Step-Down Program in a general population housing unit, where he is currently housed. (Id.)
Williams avers that “cells in the Charlie Dormitory are equipped with a metal bed frame,” while “cells in the Delta Dormitory are equipped with a concrete bed that has a height of approximately seven and one-half inches.” (Id. at 2.) He avers that inmates at Perry “are issued a standard mattress. Since 2018, the mattresses supplied to [Perry] are five and one-quarter inches high. Most of older mattresses are no longer used at [Perry]. In addition, inmates may request to change their mattress.” (Id.)
c. Plaintiff's RTSM and grievances
The record includes Plaintiff's submitted request to staff member forms (“RTSM”) and grievances, many of which are directed to Defendants Williams and Palmer. In his affidavit, Defendant John Palmer avers that he served as the Deputy Warden at Perry from August 17, 2019 until July 16, 2022. (Dkt. No. 71 at 1.) He avers that he is “not responsible for receiving, reviewing, or responding to Request to Staff Member forms that are submitted by inmates.” (Id.) Upon review, it does not appear that Palmer directly responded to any of the RTSMs in the record. Rather, the responses to those RTSMs directed to Palmer, discussed below, appear to belong to other SCDC personnel.
On November 2, 2021 and November 3, 2021, Plaintiff submitted RTSM forms to Warden Williams, complaining of his placement in the RHU at Perry. (Dkt. No. 70-19 at 2-4.) The response to the first RTSM states, “You will be recommended for S.D. due to your last incident at McCormick. The seriousness of the incident is the reason you were transferred to the RHU here at Perry.” (Id. at 2.) The response to the second RTSM states, “There is much more to this incident than what you have stated.” (Id. at 4.)
On May 2, 2022, Plaintiff submitted an RTSM form to Warden Williams, stating that “nobeds, sitting or writing area are against state & federal regulation,” and complaining that
the 5 inch concrete slab that I am forced to put my bed on forces me to sit in a ‘V' position forcing my knees to be at my chest. And I've been having constant back pain because of the way I'm forced to sit. Can I be switched to a dorm with beds not on floor?(Id. at 5.) The response to this request states, “Where can I find this information regarding the state and federal regulation?” (Id.) On May 9, 2022, Plaintiff submitted an RTSM to Deputy Warden Palmer stating, inter alia, that “the beds which [are] 5 inches off the floor cause inmates to sit in the V position with their knees above their chest, caus[ing] back problems, pain and injuries.” (Dkt. No. 71-1 at 2.) The response here states, inter alia, the bed height “is above both the ACA and ADA standard.” (Id.)
On June 6, 2022, Plaintiff submitted an RTSM to Deputy Warden Palmer stating the beds in RHU violate federal and state regulations and complaining that “the 5 inch concrete slab has me [] suffering severe back pain in which medical has prescribed me Tylenol which is not working.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 27.) The response states, “For the record, beds are 8 inches above the floor” and “we are within standards of both ADA and ACA. Keep wasting your time.” (Id.)
On July 4, 2022, Plaintiff submitted an RTSM to Warden Williams, stating that he suffers from scoliosis and he has had to sleep on a 5 inch slab since November 2021. Plaintiff complains that sitting in the ‘V' position puts “all my weight on the small of my back and causes me pain and suffering for several months now. I have been given Tylenol by medical which does nothing for my pain. Please fix beds to the ACA/CAC standards.” (Dkt. No. 70-19 at 6.) Plaintiff submitted a nearly identical RTSM to Deputy Warden Palmer that same day. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 28.) The response to the RTSM directed to Warden Williams states, “Sign up for sick call about your medical condition. If you are sitting in a position that is uncomfortable, change positions.” (Dkt. No. 7019 at 6.) On July 6, 2022, Plaintiff submitted another RTSM to Deputy Warden Palmer asking how the current beds comply with ADA/ACA standards and stating he has signed up for sick-call several times already. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 29.) The response here states, inter alia, “Consider this complaint closed as I will not continue to tell everyone in RHU the same stuff.” (Id.)
d. Plaintiff's Medical Records
1. Plaintiff's alleged history of scoliosis
In an RTSM Plaintiff submitted to medical on August 9, 2022, Plaintiff claims he has had scoliosis “ever since I left the streets” and that he has a “back injury from a car wreck.” (Dkt. No. 83 at 10.) Relevant here, Defendants have submitted an affidavit from Defendant Amy Enloe, a Nurse Practitioner at Perry. (Dkt. No. 70-3.) Enloe avers that when Plaintiff arrived at Perry, “there was no indication in his medical records that he had been diagnosed with scoliosis.” (Id. at 1.) She explains that “scoliosis is curvature of the spine,” and “many people who have scoliosis do not know that they have the condition and do not have any symptoms relating to the condition.” (Id.)
Defendants have also submitted an affidavit from, David Martinez, the SCDC American with Disabilities Act Coordinator, who avers that “Plaintiff has never been identified as a qualified individual with a disability while in SCDC's custody.” (Dkt. No. 70-13.) Mr. Martinez further avers that when Plaintiff received a physical examination upon his transfer to SCDC custody on September 5, 2013, Plaintiff “denied suffering from any medical, mental health, emotional or dental problems, noting only a peanut allergy.” (Id.)
2. Plaintiff's Sick Call Requests and Medical Treatment
The record includes numerous Sick Call Requests Plaintiff submitted between May of 2022 and January 2023, claiming that his back pain has not been relieved by Tylenol and asking that his medical record be updated to document his scoliosis. (Dkt. No. 83 at 2-19.) In her affidavit, Nurse Enloe avers that she is “not responsible for receiving, reviewing, or responding to either Sick Call Requests or RTSMs that are submitted by inmates.” (Dkt. No. 70-3 at 1.) Enloe clarifies her involvement with the inmates' medical care, stating:
When an inmate is seen during sick call at [Perry], he is seen by a registered nurse. I review medical records prepared by the nurse to assess the inmate's complaints, in addition to the inmate's physical examination, when I determine the plan of care for an inmate I determine whether an inmate needs prescription medication, which I then prescribe, additional testing, or to be seen by another type of medical provider.(Id. at 2.)
Plaintiff's medical record shows he was seen by a nurse for a sick call on May 19, 2022, complaining of, inter alia, “low back pain.” (Dkt. No. 83-1 at 6.) The notes here record, inter alia, “Inmate states that by sleeping and laying on a concrete slab is hurting his back. Upon visual inspection, inmate is able to move freely without limitation of movement, no redness noted.” (Id.) As treatment, Plaintiff was advised to utilize certain exercises and was prescribed “Acetaminophen 325 mg to take Q8 hurs x3 days for relief of back pain.” (Id.) Plaintiff was “informed that if symptoms persist or worsen to notify medical for further evaluation.” (Id.) The notes conclude with, “Will forward to Enloe, FNP for further review.” (Id.)
On June 30, 2022, Plaintiff was seen by a nurse for sick call complaining of low back pain. (Id. at 13.) Here, the notes record,
Inmate states that he has a history of back pain due to scoliosis. He states that being on the concrete floor is killing him. Inmate asked if he could be moved to a different dorm off of the floor. Upon assessment, the inmate's back does have a curvature to his spine. Inmate does appear to have somewhat limited rotation of his back. Inmate informed that his request to be on something else would be forwarded to Enloe, FNP for further review and recommendations.(Id.) In her affidavit, Nurse Enloe avers that based on Plaintiff's June 30, 2022 sick call, she “prescribed a 90-day quantity of Naprosyn 500 mg to be taken by Inmate Patterson twice daily for treatment of back pain.” (Dkt. No. 70-3 at 2.) According to Enloe, “Naprosyn is a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID) used to treat inflammation and manage mild to moderate pain.” (Id.) Enloe avers that “[g]iven his complaints of back pain despite the treatment and prescriptions provided to him, on September 17, 2022, I referred Inmate Patterson to Anderson Radiology for x-rays of the spine.” (Dkt. No. 70-3 at 3.)
On October 27, 2022, Plaintiff was seen by a nurse for sick call, again complaining of back pain. (Dkt. No. 83-1 at 18.) Plaintiff was “informed he has an upcoming appt for an X-ray of his spine.” (Id.) In her affidavit, Enloe avers that based on this sick call, she “prescribed a 30-day quantity of Acetaminophen 325 mg to Inmate Patterson, two tablets to be taken every six hours as needed.” (Dkt. No. 70-3 at 2.) The record shows that the x-rays requested by Nurse Enloe were taken of Plaintiff's lower back on November 10, 2022, at Anderson Radiology. (Dkt. No. 83-3 at 2.) The “impression” states, “Rightward lumbar spine angulation. Minimal dextroscoliosis thoracic lumbar junction versus positioning. No evidence of degenerative disc disease or acute injury of the spine.” (Id.) In her affidavit, Enloe avers that “[o]n December 19, 2022, [she] prescribed a Prednisone 10mg dose pack that was to be taken by Inmate Patterson from December 19, 2022, through December 30, 2022. Prednisone is a steroid.” (Dkt. No. 70-3 at 3.)
The record indicates Plaintiff saw Enloe for treatment of his back pain on January 5, 2023. (Dkt. No. 83-1 at 19.) In her affidavit, Enloe avers that during this visit, she “prescribed a 30-day quantity of Meloxicam 15 mg to be taken by Inmate Patterson once daily. Meloxicam is a NS AID that is commonly used to treat osteoarthritis and rheumatoid arthritis.” (Dkt. No. 70-3 at 3.) Enloe further avers that she referred Plaintiff “to the Orthopedic Clinic for Inmate Patterson's complaints of back pain.” (Id.)
On February 1, 2023, Plaintiff was seen by a nurse for sick call continuing to complain of lower back pain. (Dkt. No. 83-1 at 21.) In her affidavit, Enloe avers that “[o]n February 6, 2023, [she] prescribed a 90-day quantity of Ibuprofen 600 mg to be taken by Inmate Patterson up to three times per day as needed for treatment of back pain.” (Dkt. No. 70-3 at 3.) Enloe further avers,
Inmates are responsible to request refills of any mediation [sic] prescribed before the prescription expires. Inmate Patterson allowed his prescriptions for Naprosyn 500 mg, Acetaminophen 325 mg, Meloxicam 15 mg to expire without requesting any refill. Inmate Patterson did not request an additional prescription for the previously prescribed Prednisone 10mg dose pack.(Id.)
The record shows that on March 27, 2023, Plaintiff was seen at the Physical Therapy Clinic. (Dkt. No. 83-4 at 2.) Enloe avers that during this visit, “a physical therapist performed a physical therapy session with [Plaintiff] and taught him how to perform independent physical therapy using a TheraBand.” (Dkt. No. 70-3 at 3.) Also on March 27, 2023, Plaintiff was seen at the Orthopedic Clinic for an evaluation of his back pain. The clinician prescribed a steroid dose pack, recommended that Plaintiff continue taking Tylenol, and resume taking ibuprofen after he completed his steroid dose pack. The clinician also recommended that Plaintiff should perform independent physical therapy exercises using a TheraBand over the next three months. The attending Orthopedic physician, Dr. Koon, reviewed and agreed with those recommendations. Dr. Koon also determined that Plaintiff should follow up with neurosurgery after an MRI is completed in three months. (Id.; Dkt. No. 83-4 at 2.)
3. Affidavit Testimony
Defendants Palmer and Williams have provided affidavit testimony averring they were not personally involved in Plaintiff's medical care. Specifically, in his affidavit, Defendant Deputy Warden Palmer avers,
Prior to my departure from [Perry], . . . I was not aware that [Plaintiff] was diagnosed with scoliosis or as suffering from a serious medical condition. I was not aware of any order or recommendation from a medical professional that inmate Patterson should have an alternative sleeping arrangement or housing assignment during his incarceration at [Perry]. I have not taken any action to either delay, interfere with, or deny medical treatment to [Plaintiff].(Dkt. No. 71 at 1-2.)
Similarly, Defendant Warden Williams avers, “I have not taken any action to delay, interfere with or deny any medical treatment to [Plaintiff]. I am not aware of any recommendation or order from a medical professional that [Plaintiff] receive any alternative sleeping arrangement or housing assignment during his incarceration at [Perry].” (Dkt. No. 70-16 at 2.)
2. Analysis of § 1983 Conditions of Confinement Claim
As noted above, through the Court's ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff's § 1983 conditions of confinement claim is limited to Defendants' alleged deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm concerning the height of Plaintiff's concrete bed while in RHU housing and Plaintiff's resulting injuries. (Dkt. Nos. 9; 17; 45.) In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that when he arrived at Perry, he was placed in a dorm in RHU with a five-inch concrete slab for a bed. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 9.) Defendant Williams has provided affidavit testimony that Plaintiff was housed in RHU at Perry from October 29, 2021 through March 17, 2023. (Dkt. No. 70-16 at 1.) On March 17, 2023, Plaintiff was placed in the Step-Down Program and moved to a general population housing unit. (Id.; Dkt. No. 78 at 4.) Williams avers that Plaintiff is still housed in the general population. (Dkt. No. 70-16 at 1.) Construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record indicates Plaintiff was subjected to sleeping on a concrete bed at Perry for approximately 17 months. The Complaint alleges that the concrete bed frame “caused Plaintiff severe pain and suffering and further injury to scoliosis.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 10.)
Upon review, the evidence establishes a genuine dispute of material fact as to the objective prong of this conditions of confinement claim. Specifically, the record shows that Plaintiff's alleged back pain persisted for months without any relief from prescribed pain medication and warranted referrals to specialists for treatment. See Clark v. Smith, No. 22-6958, 2023 WL 4198038, at *3 (4th Cir. June 27, 2023) (“We find that it is plausible that a torn Achilles tendon satisfies this standard [for objectively serious condition], especially when combined with Clark's allegations of extreme pain and swelling.”) (citing, inter alia, Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1370-71 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the Supreme Court in Estelle “never questioned that the inmate's allegations of severe pain from his back injury were sufficiently serious to support his Eighth Amendment claim”); Brown v. Walton, No. 3:17-cv-338, 2018 WL 3946534, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2018) (considering allegations of “sustained injuries to [plaintiff's] head, neck, shoulder, and back, including a pinched nerve, which required a ‘C-collar for [his] neck,' a sling for his arm and shoulder, and two pain medications”; finding “[a]t this juncture, the Court assumes that [plaintiff's] injuries were sufficiently serious to satisfy the Eighth Amendment pleading standards”).
Although Plaintiff may be able to satisfy the objective prong of this Eighth Amendment claim, he cannot show that Defendants acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind under the subjective prong. His claims against Defendants Palmer and Williams are based entirely their alleged failure to properly respond to the allegations in the RTSM forms Plaintiff directed to them, complaining of the concrete beds in RHU. As an initial matter, Defendant Deputy Warden Palmer has averred that he is “not responsible for receiving, reviewing, or responding to [RTSM] forms that are submitted by inmates.” (Dkt. No. 71 at 1.) He further avers he did “not know Plaintiff was diagnosed with scoliosis or as suffering from a serious medical condition.” (Id.) Both Palmer and Williams aver that they were “not aware of any order or recommendation from a medical professional that [Plaintiff] should have an alternative sleeping arrangement or housing assignment during his incarceration at [Perry].” (Dkt. No. 70-16 at 2; 71 at 1-2.)
In his response brief, Plaintiff alleges that he “verbally complain[ed] to both Warden Charles Williams and Deputy Warden John Palmer about moving because of his back pains.” (Dkt. No. 78 at 1.) Because Plaintiff has not verified these allegations in his response brief, the undersigned does not consider them as affidavit testimony with evidentiary value for summary judgment purposes. See, e.g., Aten v. Richland Cnty., No. 5:16-cv-03614-PMD-KDW, 2018 WL 4560572, at *8 (D.S.C. July 3, 2018) (“While Plaintiff makes numerous unverified allegations, those types of assertions are not sufficient to establish that genuine issues of material fact exist” to support a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need), adopted by, 2018 WL 4109608 (D.S.C. Aug. 29, 2018), aff'd sub nom. Aten v. Wiggins, 839 Fed.Appx. 798 (4th Cir. 2021); cf. Sweat v. Cook, No. 9:09-cv-1255-HFF-BM, 2010 WL 1428328, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 12, 2010) (“In this Circuit, verified complaints by pro se litigants are to be considered as affidavits and may, standing alone, defeat a motion for summary judgment when the allegations contained therein are based on personal knowledge.”), adopted by, 2010 WL 1444190 (D.S.C. Apr. 9, 2010), aff'd, 402 Fed.Appx. 807 (4th Cir. 2010).
Even assuming Palmer and Williams actually received the RTSM forms directed to them from Plaintiff in May, June, and early July of 2022 complaining that the concrete beds in RHU caused Plaintiff severe back pain, the record shows that Plaintiff had begun to receive medical treatment for his back pain during that same time period. Specifically, while Plaintiff complained in his RTSMs to Williams and Palmer on July 4, 2022 that he was only given Tylenol to alleviate his back pain caused by the concrete beds, the record shows that on June 30, 2022, Plaintiff was prescribed a 90-day quantity of a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug. (Dkt. No. 70-3 at 2.) There is no evidence that Plaintiff complained to Palmer and Williams of continued back pain after July 4, 2022, such that they were aware the alleged discomfort caused by the concrete beds was not resolved through medical treatment.
The RTSM directed to Palmer on July 6, 2022 simply asked Palmer to clarify the response Plaintiff received to his prior RTSM. (Dkt. No. 71-1 at 5.)
Further, the Fourth Circuit has held that the “existence of some valid penological purpose . . . could negate any presumption that prison officials were acting with malicious or sadistic intent in subjecting a prisoner to a particular condition.” Mason v. Talley, No. 1:21-cv-1118 (LMB/JFA), 2023 WL 2619160, at *11 (E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2023) (citing Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 36263 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[A] legitimate penological justification can support prolonged detention of an inmate in segregated or solitary confinement . . . even though such conditions create an objective risk of serious emotional and psychological harm.”); see also Thorpe v. Clarke, 37 F.4th 926, 941 (4th Cir. 2022) (“Absence of penological purpose plays a part in [conditions of confinement inquiry], as it helps establish that corrections officers acted with culpable mental state rather than for justifiable reasons”); Lopez v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 486, 490 (4th Cir. 1990) (looking to “institutional competence” and penological objectives to decide whether “prison administrators' conduct constitutes deliberate indifference”).
Here, Defendants have produced evidence that the beds in RHU at Perry were changed from metal to cement in 2019 for specific policy reasons including, inter alia, “less metal to be used for weapons; safer for forced cell movement teams (I/M hiding under bed); . . . fewer hiding places for contraband; . . . lower beds make it more difficult to reach lights (still within ADA regulations); . . . limit likelihood of self-harm.” (Dkt. No. 70-10 at 2.) Scott Lewis, the former Warden at Perry, averred that the beds in RHU were changed to cement beds at a lower height in order to “eliminate . . . safety, security and maintenance concerns.” (Dkt. No. 70-9 at 2.) This clear penological justification for the condition of confinement at issue further indicates that Defendants lacked the subjective deliberate indifference required to establish an Eighth Amendment violation.
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned cannot find that Palmer and Williams had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff based on the height of the concrete beds and disregarded that substantial risk. The legitimate penological justification for the beds further supports finding that Defendants Palmer and Williams were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's constitutional rights under § 1983. See, e.g., Thorpe, 37 F.4th at 934 (To demonstrate an intentional violation of the Eighth Amendment, “correction officers must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists' and actually ‘draw the inference' before liability attaches” (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834)); Coleman v. N. Carolina Dep't of Pub. Safety, No. 3:20-cv-570-MOC-DSC, 2023 WL 5493586, at *12 (W.D. N.C. Aug. 24, 2023) (granting summary judgment on § 1983 conditions of confinement claim because, inter alia, plaintiff cannot show that the defendants “actually knew of, and disregarded, a substantial risk to [the plaintiff's] health or safety.... Since the Guards were following [North Carolina Department of Public Safety] policy, they cannot be said to have imposed a substantial risk to [plaintiff's] health or safety. To the contrary, as noted above, these restrictions were imposed for legitimate penological purposes.”); Keith v. Degeorgis, No. 1:14-cv-36-RMG, 2015 WL 1958277, at *4 (D.S.C. May 1, 2015) (granting summary judgment on conditions of confinement claim based on metal bed exacerbating plaintiff's “back problems/scoliosis” because, inter alia, “Plaintiff has provided no evidence showing that Defendants had knowledge of Plaintiff's alleged condition from any medical authority and knew that a metal bed would exacerbate his conditions.”).
The undersigned therefore recommends Defendants Palmer and Williams are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to conditions of confinement.
3. Analysis of § 1983 Claim for Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need
In his remaining § 1983 claim, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Palmer, Williams, and Enloe were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The Complaint appears to base this claim on the alleged ineffective treatment Plaintiff received for his back pain, which was exacerbated by the height of the concrete beds in RHU. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 10-15.)
As an initial matter, there is insufficient evidence to support any deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Palmer and Williams, who are non-medical personnel. Plaintiff's argument that these Defendants failed to adequately respond to Plaintiff's RTSMs claiming insufficient medical treatment for his back pain does not indicate that Defendants Williams and Palmer were personally involved with a denial of treatment, deliberately interfered with prison doctors' treatment, or tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the prison physicians' misconduct. See Miltier, 896 F.2d at 854 (To bring a denial of medical treatment claim against non-medical prison personnel, an inmate must show that such officials were personally involved with a denial of treatment, deliberately interfered with prison doctors' treatment, or tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the prison physicians' misconduct.); Shelton v. Wang, No. 7:20-cv-00704, 2022 WL 4460520, at *6 (W.D. Va. Sept. 26, 2022) (finding allegation that non-medical personnel “did ‘nothing' in response to Shelton's grievance appeal” did not establish § 1983 deliberate indifference claim; “Because [plaintiff] does not allege that these defendants were able to order the orthopedic boots themselves, or that they interfered with him getting medical treatment from Dr. Wang or other medical personnel, the court cannot find that they were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need”); Mallett, 2008 WL 5351618, at *7 (“A medical indifference claim is not appropriate against a superintendent/supervisor absent an allegation that he was personally connected to the treatment received.”). Further, as discussed above, the record shows Plaintiff was receiving treatment for his back pain from medical professionals when he submitted the RTSMs at issue. It is well established that “[i]f a prisoner is under the care of medical experts . . ., a nonmedical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Iko, 535 F.3d at 242.
Likewise, there is no evidence Defendant Nurse Practitioner Amy Enloe was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. Rather, the record shows that at Enloe's direction, Plaintiff received regular treatment for his back pain throughout the time period at issue. Specifically, Plaintiff received multiple prescriptions of pain medications, an X-ray, and physical therapy and treatment at an orthopedic clinic. While Plaintiff may believe he should have received different medical treatment, “[a] disagreement as to the proper treatment to be received does not in and of itself state a constitutional violation.” Mickell v. Ozmint, No. 3:08-cv-2973-RBH, 2009 WL 1361873, at *4 (D.S.C. May 11, 2009) (granting summary judgment on § 1983 deliberate indifference claim where “plaintiff disagrees with the treatment he has been offered”); see also Krug v. Loranth, No. 1:13-cv-01409-DCN, 2014 WL 4955365, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2014) (“The fact that a prisoner believed he had a more serious injury or that he required better treatment does not establish a constitutional violation.”), aff'd, 599 Fed.Appx. 512 (4th Cir. 2015).
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends Defendants Palmer, Williams, and Enloe are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
Because the undersigned finds no questions of fact as to whether Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, the undersigned does not address Defendants' qualified immunity argument. See Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
D. State Law Claims
Having recommended the dismissal of all federal claims, only Plaintiff's state-law claims for gross negligence remain. Because there are no federal claims remaining, the undersigned recommends the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims. As noted by the Fourth Circuit, “once a district court has dismissed the federal claims in an action, it maintains ‘wide discretion' to dismiss the supplemental state law claims over which it properly has supplemental jurisdiction.” Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., 446 F.3d 541, 553 n. 4 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 353-54 (1988)). A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) if . . . (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C § 1367(c)(3)-(4). When determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, a district court must consider “convenience and fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy, comity, and considerations of judicial economy.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7).
Here, the undersigned is unable to find that the parties would be inconvenienced or unfairly prejudiced by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims, nor does the undersigned find there to be any underlying issues of federal policy involved in Plaintiff's state law claims. The comity factor and considerations of judicial economy weigh in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. For these reasons, the Court should decline to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law causes of action. See Giddings v. Green, No. CV PJM-21-2850, 2023 WL 1767453, at *7 (D. Md. Feb. 2, 2023) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where summary judgment was granted on the plaintiff's federal claims; “To the extent that Plaintiff also brings medical negligence claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.... These claims are dismissed without prejudice.”), aff'd as modified, 2023 WL 4105730 (4th Cir. June 21, 2023); Johnson v. Ozmint, No. 9:08-cv-0431-PMD-BM, 2009 WL 252152, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb. 2, 2009) (dismissing federal claims and noting, “With respect to these remaining state law causes of action, when federal claims presented in a case which has been removed to federal court from state court are dismissed, the case should be remanded to state court for resolution of any remaining state law claims ”). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's state-law claims be remanded to Greenville County.
Given that these recommendations are dispositive of the case, the undersigned does not address Defendants' argument about the merits of Plaintiff's state-law claims. (Dkt. No. 70-1 at 20-21.)
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 70) be GRANTED IN PART. Specifically, the undersigned recommends the Court grant summary judgment as to Plaintiff's federal claims and dismiss those claims with prejudice. The undersigned further recommends the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims and remand those claims to Greenville County.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).