Opinion
C.A.No. K19A-08-002 WLW
04-03-2020
CRYSTAL PATTERSON Appellant, v. PERDUE FARMS & UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEAL BOARD Appellee.
Crystal Patterson, pro se, Appellant. Monica L. Townsend, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware, attorney for the Appellee.
ORDER
Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board
AFFIRMED Crystal Patterson, pro se, Appellant. Monica L. Townsend, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware, attorney for the Appellee. WITHAM, R.J.
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal filed by Crystal Patterson ("Appellant") regarding a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board ("the Board") not to review the Referee's conclusion that Ms. Patterson's appeal was untimely. The Board determined that the Referee's conclusion was free from error, and Ms. Patterson's due process rights were not violated. For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the Board is AFFIRMED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Appellant was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits by a Claims Deputy Determination issued on June 3, 2019. The Determination was mailed to the Appellant's address on the record at the time. Unless appealed, the Determination became final on June 13, 2019. Appellant filed a request to appeal the Determination on June 17, 2019. On July 15, 2019, the Referee held a hearing to determine whether the appeal was timely. The Referee determined that the appeal was untimely because the Department of Labor properly mailed the Determination to the Appellant's address on the record. The Referee also found no administrative errors on the Department's part and affirmed the Determination. Appellant timely appealed the Referee's decision to the Board. The Board chose not to hear the appeal because the Board did not find any evidence of errors on the Department's part and agreed that the appeal of the Determination was untimely. Ms. Patterson then filed an appeal in the Superior Court of Delaware, challenging the Board's decision not to afford further review of the matter.
Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board on Appeal from the Decision of Kathryn M. Gantz at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. The Board operates under the authority of the Department of Labor.
See Id.
PARTIES' CONTENTIONS
2. Appellant claims that she did not receive the letter containing the Deputy's Determination until June 17, 2019. Appellant further explains that at the time the letter was sent out, she was in the process of moving from the residence she rented to a new home she purchased. Appellant claims that she was originally going to move on July 1, 2019, but actually ended up moving on June 15, 2019. After she moved, her old landlord informed her that a letter came for her at her old address, and Appellant went and got it on June 17, 2019. Appellant also claims that the letter arrived at her old address late anyway, and by the time it got there, it was too late to file an appeal.
Appellant's Opening Brief ("App. Brief"). The formal Determination issued by the Deputy became final on June 13, 2019.
See Id.
See Id.
See Id.
See Id. Appellant appears to claim that the letter did not even arrive at the address until June 17, 2019, which is four days after the time for an appeal of the Deputy's Determination ran out.
3. Even though the Board chose not to file an answering brief in this case, the Board's attorney at the time provided an explanation letter, which states that the Deputy's Determination was mailed to Appellant's address on the record on June 3, 2019. The Board's counsel further explains that because Ms. Patterson did not rebut the presumption that the letter was received by her, the Board found no error in the Referee's conclusion regarding the untimeliness of her appeal and properly declined further review.
Appellee's Response Letter ("Response Letter") at 2.
Id.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
4. This Court is limited in its review to "a determination of whether the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error." Substantial evidence is that "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." The Court does not consider the weight of the evidence, does not determine questions of credibility, and does not make findings of fact. "Absent an abuse of discretion, a Board decision that is without legal error and supported by substantial evidence will be affirmed." However, the Court reviews questions of law and statutory interpretation de novo.
Longobardi v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 287 A.2d 690, 692 (Del. Super. 1971) (citing Air Mod Corporation v. Newton, 215 A.2d 434 (Del.Supr.Ct.1965)).
Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981) (quoting Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
Sheryl Johnson v. First State Staffing Solutions and UIAB, 2020 WL 591776 at *2 (Del. Super. Feb. 6, 2020) (citing Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 325 A.2d 374, 375 (Del. Super. 1974).
Id. (citing Filanowski v. Port Contractors, Inc., 2007 WL 2229019, at *1 (Del. Aug. 2, 2007)).
Delaware Dep't of Nat. Res. & Envtl. Control v. Sussex Cty., 34 A.3d 1087, 1090 (Del. 2011).
DISCUSSION
5. The Board has the discretion to decide whether to hear a particular case on appeal. Additionally, "[t]he Board has broad discretion when deciding whether to review the record regarding the failure to file a timely appeal." Accordingly, the Court must not disturb a discretionary decision of the Board unless the Court finds that it was based on "clearly unreasonable or capricious grounds." Pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3318(b), a Claims Deputy's decision is considered final unless a claimant files an appeal within 10 days from the date that the decision is mailed to the claimant's last known address. Furthermore, an otherwise untimely appeal may still be considered if the claimant demonstrates severe circumstances that prevented a timely filing. Generally, "[d]ue process requires that a party have a full and fair opportunity to be heard in its own defense." When it comes to a hearing before the Board, the party whose rights may be affected is entitled to a notice and a hearing. To meet the requirement of a proper notice for a hearing before the Board, the Board must mail such notice to the party at least five days before the hearing. For a notice to be effective, it must be actually received, or it must be presumed received.
See 19 Del. C. § 3320(a). The Statute states that the Board "may affirm, modify, or reverse any decision of an appeal tribunal on the basis of the evidence previously submitted to the appeal tribunal..." (emphasis added).
Stemmer v. Colby Enterprises, 2012 WL 5550771 at *4 (Del. Super. Nov. 14, 2012) (citing 19 Del. C. § 3320(a)).
Id.
See Pumphrey v. Allen Harim Foods, 2019 WL 4034292 at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 26, 2019).
Straley v. Advanced Staffing, Inc., 2009 WL 1228572 at *2 (Del. Super. Apr. 30, 2009) (citing Morris v. S. Metals Processing Co., 530 A.2d 673, (Del.1987) (TABLE)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
6. In this case, the Board properly chose not to exercise its jurisdiction to hear the appeal because Appellants due process rights were not violated. In Stemmers, an employee claimed to never have received the letter from the Department of Labor regarding the denial of the unemployment benefits, and, therefore, the employee did not file the appeal to the Board on time. In Stemmers, the Board denied the employee's application for further review, and the Court affirmed the Board's conclusion because it was based on sufficient evidence that the Department of Labor made no error when they mailed the letter to the last known address. The Court took into consideration the fact that the Department testified that the letter was mailed on a particular day, and the employee verified the address.
Stemmers, 2012 WL 5550771 at *3.
See Id. at 3-4.
Id. at *3.
7. In this case, similarly to Stemmers, the Board stated that Appellant was properly contacted by mail at her last known residence. Appellant provided some explanation as to why the letter did not reach her on time; however, the explanation does not indicate that the Department of Labor made an error. Furthermore, whether or not Appellant changed her place of residence before the letter was sent out, she still appeared to have access to the mail at the address that the Department had on record. It is important to note that in Delaware when a letter is mailed to a resident's address that exists on the record, a rebuttable presumption is created that the resident received the letter. The presumption can be rebutted, however, if it is established by sufficient evidence that the letter was not received. "Lack of evidence of any mailing error by the Department of Labor supports the presumption that properly mailed and addressed mail was received."
See Straley, 2009 WL 1228572 at *3 (citing State ex rel. Hall v. Camper, 347 A.2d 137, 139 (Del. Super. 1975)) (emphasis added).
Id. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Funk v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 591 A.2d 222, 226 (Del.1991)). --------
8. Here, Appellant presented no evidence that the Department of Labor made any errors. Additionally, Appellant presented no evidence of severe circumstances that prevented her from filing a timely appeal. Appellant only asserted that some confusion with her mail occurred and claimed that the letter simply did not get to her address on record in time. These assertions do not amount to severe circumstances and also do not rebut the presumption that the letter was received. Appellant also admitted that the address the Department of Labor used was her address on the record at the time the initial Determination was issued. Therefore, Appellant in this case was presumed to receive a proper notice of a hearing, which supports the Board's conclusion that Appellant's procedural due process rights were not violated. Therefore, the Board properly exercised its discretion when it refused further review of the matter because the refusal was not based on unreasonable or capricious grounds.
CONCLUSION
9. For all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED
/s/William L. Witham, Jr.
Resident Judge