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Patrick v. Principi

United States District Court, N.D. California
Feb 13, 2003
No. C 01-05225 WHA (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2003)

Opinion

No. C 01-05225 WHA

February 13, 2003


ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT


INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff alleges in this action that defendant employer discriminated against him on the basis of race. This order grants defendant's motion for summary judgment.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff, who is African-American, has worked since 1992 as a telecommunications specialist for the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs in the San Francisco Office of Information Field Office ("San Francisco Field Office"). From 1990 to 2000, the San Francisco Field Office was located in a privately owned building on Howard Street in San Francisco. Although plaintiffs position was reassigned in the mid-1990s to a division on the east coast, plaintiff continued to occupy office space in the San Francisco Field Office.

Plaintiff had an office on the sixth floor of the Howard Street building. In 1998, plaintiff requested additional space for testing equipment and was given space for this purpose on the building's tenth floor (Scroggs Decl. ¶ 5). The parties dispute whether, at that time, plaintiff characterized his need for space as temporary ( ibid.; Patrick Dep. at 53). Plaintiff used the tenth-floor space for a telecommunications data network laboratory to test the performance of equipment used in wide area networking, inter-operability, local area networking, data encryption technology, and virtual private networking (Patrick Dep. at 45).

Because of an increase in rent, defendant later decided to vacate the tenth floor of the Howard Street building (Scroggs Decl. ¶ 8). As a result, plaintiffs testing equipment needed to be moved ( id. ¶ 9). Beth Scroggs, the office manager of the San Francisco Field Office, worked to identify an alternative location for plaintiffs testing equipment ( id. ¶¶ 9-12). In so doing, Ms. Scroggs took into account the conclusions of an auditor that plaintiffs testing equipment had posed a security risk in its space on the tenth floor because of its accessibility ( id. ¶¶ 6, 9). Ms. Scroggs also recalled earlier reports of plaintiff's testing equipment emitting a "burning smell," indicated that the equipment should be kept in a location that was well ventilated and protected from direct sunlight ( id. ¶¶ 7, 9).

With these security and environmental concerns in mind, Ms. Scroggs suggested to plaintiff that he relocate his equipment to an area known as the console room ( id. ¶ 10). Through his supervisor, who works on the east coast, plaintiff informed Ms. Scroggs that this space was too small ( ibid.). Plaintiff sent Ms. Scroggs an e-mail in which he identified four possible locations for his testing equipment: the printer room, Bob Danders's former cubicle space, the Kernel play pen, and the cubicle outside plaintiff's sixth-floor office ( Id. ¶ 11). Ms. Scroggs concluded that none of these options would work ( ibid.). According to Ms. Scroggs, the printer room was not suitable because it would require moving and rewiring the printers and scanners ( ibid.). Danders's former cubicle space had been previously requested for use by contract employees. The Kernel play pen was occupied with other equipment and posed a security risk ( ibid.). Finally, a supervisor objected to locating the testing equipment in the cubicle outside plaintiffs office because of noise concerns ( ibid.).

Ms. Scroggs proposed another location to plaintiffs supervisor. The space was comparable in size to the space on the tenth floor and raised neither security nor environmental concerns ( id. ¶ 12). Ms. Scroggs hired a space designer to draw plans for this space ( ibid.). Plaintiff states that he rejected this option because it was a high-traffic area and would have required him to give up his private office (Patrick Dep. at 115, 122).

Having looked for alternative space on his own, plaintiff ultimately decided to locate his testing equipment in a small building on the campus of the Livermore Medical Center ( id. at 126). He also maintained a cubicle space in the San Francisco Field Office's new location in the Oakland Federal Building ( id. at 126-28).

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of his relocation, he is unable conduct his business activities in an efficient and dignified manner. In particular, plaintiff states that he is unable to conduct large vendor meetings because he does not have access to a suitable conference room (Patrick Dep. at 129). He also claims that the increased distance between his office (now in Oakland) his testing equipment (in Livermore) make his job more difficult ( ibid.). Plaintiff further suggests that the relocation has prevented him from earning overtime and from being the wide area network contact person for the area ( id. at 131).

After an adverse ruling on his claim from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, plaintiff filed the instant Title VII action pro se in December 2001. Plaintiff alleges that his employer discriminated against him on the basis of race by denying him the opportunity to relocate his laboratory activities to his preferred location. Defendant now moves for summary judgment. In response to defendant's motion, plaintiff submitted a "response" largely composed of his unsworn allegations. There is no indication that anyone other than plaintiff is willing to testify on his behalf.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff's claim is analyzed under the rubric set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). As the Ninth Circuit explained:

Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment under Title VII must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Specifically, the plaintiff must show that (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside the protected class were treated more favorably. The burden of production, but not persuasion, then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. If the employer does so, the plaintiff must show that the articulated reason is pretextual . . .
Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). A defendant is entitled to summary judgment when the plaintiff "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Mere allegations or denials do not satisfy the opposing party's burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact. Gasaway v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1994).

As a preliminary matter, this order questions whether plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination, particularly with respect to the requirement of an adverse employment action. Adopting an objective test, the Ninth Circuit recently held that an employment action is adverse only when "a reasonable person in the same circumstances would view the action as disadvantageous." Vasquez v. County of L.A., 307 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 2002). "Otherwise," the court noted, "every minor action that an employee did not like could become the basis of a discrimination suit." Ibid.

In Chuang, supra, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court holding that the forced relocation of a university laboratory did not constitute an adverse employment action. 225 F.3d at 1125. There, however, the professors whose laboratory was relocated suffered substantially as a result of the move. Because of disruption, delay, and the sheer inadequacy of the new space, the professors lost research grants on which their salaries depended. Ibid.

To be sure, Mr. Patrick does allege harm resulting from his move. He states that his ability to conduct vendor meetings has been compromised because he lacks access to a suitable conference room. He further complains of inconvenience caused by the need to travel between his equipment in Livermore and his office space in Oakland. He also suggests that the relocation has discouraged him from earning overtime and from being the wide area network contact person for the area. These are not adverse enough to qualify as an adverse employment action. When evaluating these claims, it must also be remembered that the Livermore site was of plaintiffs own choosing. Moreover, as defendant points out, plaintiffs pay has steadily increased (Robinson Decl. ¶¶ 2-3). On this record, this order holds that no reasonable jury could find that defendant's acts objectively and substantially disadvantaged plaintiff.

Even assuming that plaintiff can make a prima facie case of discrimination, plaintiff's case must necessarily also fail because he has failed to submit sufficient evidence that defendant's legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the relocation were pretextual. Once again, if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to state a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1124. After defendant has done so, it is up to the plaintiff to show that the stated reason is pretextual "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). Plaintiff must submit specific and substantial evidence to make this showing. Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2002). It does not matter if the stated justification is in fact without merit so long as the employer honestly believed its actions were justified. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002).

Defendant states that it decided to vacate the tenth floor and relocate plaintiffs equipment because of a rent increase. Plainly, this is a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason to relocate plaintiffs equipment. Having made that decision, defendant offered plaintiff two spaces within the same building for his testing equipment. Plaintiff declined them both. In turn, defendant rejected plaintiffs proposed locations, offering legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for doing so. To repeat, the printer room, according to Ms. Scroggs, was not suitable because it would require moving and rewiring the printers and scanners. Danders's former cubicle space had been previously requested for use by contract employees. The Kernel play pen was occupied with other equipment and posed a security risk. And a supervisor objected to locating the testing equipment in the cubicle outside plaintiffs office because of noise concerns. In sum, locating plaintiffs testing equipment in any of those locations would displace or disrupt other equipment or other employees.

Although plaintiff calls these reasons pretextual, plaintiff has not adequately supported this assertion. There is simply no evidence on the record, apart from plaintiffs conclusory allegations, that defendant was likely motivated by discriminatory reasons. The inquiry thus proceeds to whether defendant's explanations are unworthy of credence. Although plaintiff alleges that the security and environmental concerns cited by defendant were not enforced with respect to non-African-Americans, defendant offers no evidence on point beyond bald assertion. Moreover, defendant did not rely on these concerns alone. Plaintiffs remaining attempts to call defendant's reasoning into question simply do not rise to the level of "specific and substantial evidence" required by Aragon. On this record, no reasonable jury could conclude that defendant's asserted reasons were pretextual. Summary judgment, therefore, must be entered on defendant's behalf.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The clerk shall CLOSE the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Patrick v. Principi

United States District Court, N.D. California
Feb 13, 2003
No. C 01-05225 WHA (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2003)
Case details for

Patrick v. Principi

Case Details

Full title:Lester E. Patrick, Plaintiff, v. Anthony J. Principi, Secretary…

Court:United States District Court, N.D. California

Date published: Feb 13, 2003

Citations

No. C 01-05225 WHA (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2003)

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