Opinion
No. 1 CA-CV 13-0752
04-02-2015
ANUPAMA PATHAK, an individual, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. SANJAY BHARDWAJ, an individual, Defendant/Appellant.
COUNSEL Raine Law Firm, PLLC, Chandler By Thomas C. Raine Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Sanjay Bhardwaj, Fremont, CA Defendant/Appellant
NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2013-090710
The Honorable Margaret Benny, Commissioner
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Raine Law Firm, PLLC, Chandler
By Thomas C. Raine
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
Sanjay Bhardwaj, Fremont, CA
Defendant/Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Maurice Portley joined. THOMPSON, Judge:
¶1 Sanjay Bhardwaj (Husband) appeals from an order domesticating a divorce Decree and two judgments (collectively the Judgments) entered by a California family court. He contends that the Judgments are not entitled to full faith and credit in Arizona courts because the California court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In addition, Husband argues that Anupama Pathak (Wife) failed to comply with statutory procedures to domesticate the Judgments. We find that subject matter jurisdiction exists and affirm the order domesticating the Judgments.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 In the Decree dissolving the parties' marriage, the California family court ordered the parties to sell the marital property in Pinal County (the Property). After considering Husband's objection that the parties no longer held the property as joint tenants, the California court reaffirmed its order and refused to stay enforcement. When Husband recorded a lis pendens notice in Pinal County, the California court ordered the notice expunged, appointed a referee, and imposed sanctions on Husband.
¶3 Wife sought to domesticate the Judgments in Arizona in accordance with the Arizona's Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA), Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-1701 to -1708 (2003). She filed a sworn declaration, a notice of filing foreign judgment, and certified copies of the Judgments in Maricopa County Superior Court. In his motion to dismiss Wife's action, Husband argued that (1) the California court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate rights to sell property in Pinal County; (2) the Pinal County Superior Court had jurisdiction of the domestication action, not the Maricopa County Superior Court, (3) the California court rulings were no longer effective because the Property was transmuted post-Decree and Husband's share was held by a trust; and (4) the Arizona courts should not resolve the jurisdiction of the California family court because Husband had already raised the issue in an action filed in a federal court in California. The superior court rejected these arguments in a signed minute entry.
¶4 Ten days later, Husband filed an "Objection to Minute Order Entry of 10.23.13," asserting that the California court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and the Maricopa County Superior Court had deprived him of notice. He then filed an appeal without obtaining a ruling. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) (Supp. 2014).
Husband's objection cites no procedural rule and contains no other indication that it is a time-extending motion. We accordingly interpret the objection as a motion for reconsideration and hold that the failure to obtain a ruling on it prior to appeal has no impact on our jurisdiction. See James v. State, 215 Ariz. 182, 186, ¶¶ 15-16, 158 P.3d 905, 909 (App. 2007).
DISCUSSION
I. The California Court Had Jurisdiction to Adjudicate the Parties' Rights in the Pinal County Real Property
¶5 Husband contends that the California family court's Judgments are not entitled to full faith and credit because that court had no jurisdiction to affect title to realty located in Arizona. He concedes that the court had jurisdiction over the parties, but contends that it had no power to order a sale. We review subject matter and full faith and credit issues de novo. Hughes v. Creighton, 165 Ariz. 265, 267, 798 P.2d 403, 405 (App. 1990); Grynberg v. Shaffer, 216 Ariz. 256, 257, ¶ 5, 165 P.3d 234, 235 (App. 2007).
¶6 The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires states to enforce judgments rendered in foreign states. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. An authenticated foreign judgment is "entitled to the same effect" as an Arizona Superior Court judgment. A.R.S. § 12-1702. A party may attack a foreign judgment if the rendering court lacked jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter, the judgment was obtained without due process, was the result of extrinsic fraud, or was otherwise invalid or unenforceable. Phares v. Nutter, 125 Ariz. 291, 293, 609 P.2d 561, 563 (1980). When a judgment is void due to lack of jurisdiction, "the court has no discretion, but must vacate the judgment." Springfield Credit Union v. Johnson, 123 Ariz. 319, 323 n.5, 599 P.2d 772, 776 n.5 (1979). The validity of a foreign judgment is tested by the law of the state where it was rendered. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 96 (1971); see Ibach v. Ibach, 123 Ariz. 507, 510-11, 600 P.2d 1370, 1373-74 (1979).
¶7 The California dissolution action was an in personam proceeding, brought in equity to determine the rights of Wife and Husband. See Rozan v. Rozan, 317 P.2d 11, 16 (Cal. 1957). "It is well settled . . . that a court, with the parties before it, can compel the execution of a conveyance in the form required by the law of the situs and that such a conveyance will be recognized there." Id. at 15. The United States Supreme Court similarly recognizes that the California court had jurisdiction to adjudicate property rights even for realty located in another state:
[A] court of equity, acting upon the person of the defendant, may decree a conveyance of land situated in another jurisdiction, and even in a foreign country, and enforce the execution of the decree by process against the defendant . . . .Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1909); accord Rozan, 317 P.2d at 15; accord Kennedy v. Morrow, 77 Ariz. 152, 161, 268 P.2d 326, 333 (1954) (holding that "[w]hen equity has jurisdiction of the parties it may adjudicate their interests in the real property lying outside the territorial jurisdiction, and acting in personam, it will make such orders as the disposition of the case warrants" while using its contempt powers to enforce those orders); see generally Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 55 (1971) (a state has the power to order a person subject to its jurisdiction to act or not act in the state although the decree may affect a thing in the other state). Therefore, the California family court had authority to compel Husband to "act in relation to [Pinal County] property" by selling it, even though it lacked authority to directly affect title to property lying outside its jurisdiction. See Fall, 215 U.S. at 10. Likewise, the California court had jurisdiction to order the lis pendens notice expunged in Pinal County. See id. Having resolved the subject matter jurisdiction issue, we need not consider whether the California court's jurisdictional determination is entitled to res judicata effect.
. . . .
[B]y means of its power over the person of a party, a court of equity may, in a proper case, compel him to act in relation to property not within its jurisdiction; its decree does not operate directly upon the property nor affect the title, but is made effectual through the coercion of the defendant . . . .
Husband contends that Porter v. Porter supports his argument, but his reliance upon that authority is misplaced. 101 Ariz. 131, 416 P.2d 564 (1966). Porter was an action to quiet title, and the court was required to have in rem jurisdiction. Id. at 138, 416 P.2d at 571.
II. A Defect in Venue Does Not Deprive a Court of Jurisdiction to Domesticate Foreign Judgments
¶8 Husband alternatively argues the Maricopa County Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to domesticate the California family court's Judgments because the Property is located in Pinal County. We agree that the proper venue for actions concerning the Property is Pinal County. See A.R.S. § 12-401(12) (2003) (venue for actions concerning real property lies in the county where the real property is located). The defect in venue, however, did not deprive the Maricopa County Superior Court of jurisdiction. See Massengill v. Superior Ct., 3 Ariz. App. 588, 591, 416 P.2d 1009, 1012 (1966) (filing an action in the wrong county is not a fatal jurisdictional defect as there is but one Arizona Superior Court).
III. Res Judicata Bars Litigation of the Parties' Rights
¶9 Husband further contends that the California court's resolution of the issues is not entitled to res judicata effect and further litigation is required. We review res judicata issues de novo. Better Homes Constr., Inc. v. Goldwater, 203 Ariz. 295, 298, ¶ 10, 53 P.3d 1139, 1142 (App. 2002).
¶10 This court presumes that the California court's Judgments are valid. Oyakawa v. Gillett, 175 Ariz. 226, 229, 854 P.2d 1212, 1215 (App. 1993) (holding that Arizona courts must recognize a California judgment against the marital community). We have already held that the California court had subject matter jurisdiction. As to the merits, the California court's Judgments "must be affirmed to the extent [they] declare[] the rights of the parties before the court and modified to the extent that [they] purport[] to affect the title to the land." Rozan, 317 P.2d at 16. Therefore, the Decree's determination of the parties' rights and equities and orders to sell is res judicata and entitled to full faith and credit. See id. at 16.
The fact that Husband has also filed a federal court action concerning jurisdictional issues is irrelevant to our analysis.
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IV. The Arizona Court Did Not Deprive Husband of Notice
¶11 Husband additionally argues that the Arizona domestication procedure deprived him of notice and an opportunity to be heard on res judicata issues and whether the parties fully and fairly litigated in the California court. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 4. This court has rejected a similar argument in Douglas N. Higgins, Inc. v. Songer, 171 Ariz. 8, 827 P.2d 469 (App. 1991). We explained that a party's due process rights are satisfied by notice and an opportunity to defend the action in the judgment-rendering state. Id. at 12, 827 P.2d at 473. "The domestication of the [foreign] judgment is, in essence, a post-judgment proceeding and a prelude to execution on the judgment, for which no personal notice is required." Id. Arizona's UEFJA procedures satisfy due process. See id. (holding that sending notice of filing foreign judgment to judgment debtor's last known address satisfied due process standards). Moreover, Husband received actual notice of the Arizona domestication issues, as evidenced by his timely objection to the notice of filing foreign judgment. See Miller v. Eloie Farms, Inc., 128 Ariz. 269, 271, 625 P.2d 332, 334 (App. 1980) (holding that trustee's actual notice of domestication action satisfied due process).
V. The Alleged Domestication Defects Do Not Preclude the Judgments' Enforcement
¶12 Husband alternatively argues that defects in Wife's supporting documents preclude domestication and enforcement of the Judgments under the UEFJA. The UEFJA requires a party to domesticate a judgment by filing: (1) a copy of the foreign judgment "authenticated in accordance with the act of congress or the statutes of the state"; (2) an affidavit identifying the parties and the judgment debtor's last known post office address; and (3) a filing fee. A.R.S. §§ 12-1702, 1703(A), -1705. A "foreign judgment" is "any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state." A.R.S. § 12-1701. The California court's Decree and other Judgments meet this definition. See id.
¶13 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (West 2014), the records of state judicial proceedings or copies thereof shall be proved by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, together with a judge's certificate that the attestation is in proper form. On appeal, Husband argues that the California court clerk failed to certify that the Judgment copies are true and correct or attach a certificate of authenticity signed by the judge. We reject this argument because (1) each Judgment contains a certification on the last page, and (2) Husband waived the UEFJA argument in superior court by failing to specifically assert it prior to entry of the domestication order. See Airfreight Express Ltd. v. Evergreen Air Ctr., Inc., 215 Ariz. 103, 109-10, ¶ 17, 158 P.3d 232, 238-39 (App. 2007) (holding that failure to raise an objection in the superior court precludes its assertion on appeal); cf. A.R.S. § 25-1055(E) (2007) (registration defenses against a child custody order not timely presented are waived); A.R.S. § 25-1306(B) (2007) (child support order is confirmed by operation of law absent a timely objection). Husband's statement that he reserved unspecified admissibility and authentication objections does not preserve an argument on appeal.
¶14 The failure to raise an objection precludes relief unless the alleged defect defeats subject matter jurisdiction. Health for Life Brands, Inc. v. Powley, 203 Ariz. 536, 538, ¶¶ 11-12, 57 P.3d 726, 728 (App. 2002) (holding that procedural defects may be waived, but subject matter defects may not). We conclude that Wife's alleged failure to comply with the authentication statute does not raise a jurisdictional issue. See A.R.S. § 12-1706 (a judgment creditor's right "to bring an action to enforce his judgment instead of proceeding under this article remains unimpaired"). Accordingly, Husband has waived the issue.
VI. Remaining Issues
¶15 Husband also argues that only an Arizona Superior Court judge, and not a court commissioner, had authority to resolve his case. By failing to raise this issue prior to the domestication ruling, he has waived it, see Airfreight Express, 215 Ariz. at 109-10, ¶ 17, 158 P.3d at 238-39, and in any case the argument fails on the merits. This court commissioner served as a judge pro tem pursuant to Maricopa County Superior Court Administrative Order No. 2014-050. In that capacity, the commissioner had the same authority as a judge pro tem to resolve this issue. See A.R.S. § 12-144(D) (2003) ("The powers and duties of a judge pro tempore of the superior court are the same as are provided for superior court judges in article 2 of this chapter."). Finally, Husband's remaining issues were not presented to the superior court, and we deem them waived. See Airfreight Express, 215 Ariz. at 109-10, ¶ 17, 158 P.3d at 238-39.
CONCLUSION
¶16 Based on the foregoing analysis, we affirm the superior court's rulings. Wife is entitled to recover her costs on appeal contingent upon her compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.