Id. , p. 7, 33 So.3d at 395. In Paschal v. Hazlinsky , 35,513 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/19/01), 803 So.2d 413, the court found no error in the granting of a protective order from abuse where the testimony was that, during an altercation with her daughters, a mother was hit in the chest which resulted in a large bruise. The court found that there was no abuse of discretion by the hearing officer who "weighed the credibility of the witnesses and concluded that the evidence showed that the daughters had caused the bruise on Eva's chest (of which there was photographic evidence) and that they had physically restrained her at some point during the dispute."
Due process requires some kind of hearing and notice thereof. Paschal v. Hazlinsky, 35,513 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 12/19/01), 803 So.2d 413, 417. In the case sub judice, we can find no support for the assertion that Defendant was not afforded due process in defending Plaintiff's claims against him. Procedural due process requires that a person be given a meaningfulopportunity to be heard. Bays v. Bays, 2000-1727 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So.2d 754, 758. Parties who fail to avail themselves of the opportunities to be heard by the court, of which they admittedly were aware, may not complain that they were denied due process.
Zuco v. Tucker, 9 Neb.App. 155, 609 N.W.2d 59 (2000). See, Gourley v. Gourley, 158 Wash.2d 460, 145 P.3d 1185 (2006); H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 815 A.2d 405 (2003); McKinney v. McKinney, 820 N.E.2d 682 (Ind.App.2005); Paschal v. Hazlinsky, 803 So.2d 413 (La.App.2001). Zuco v. Tucker, supra note 13.
Notably, appellate courts from other jurisdictions have held that statutes similar to this state's Protection from Domestic Abuse Act are not violative of due process. See, e.g.,Paschal v. Hazlinsky, 803 So.2d 413, 417-19 (La.Ct.App. 2001) (holding no due process violation with respect to hearings for protective orders against domestic abuse); Kampf v. Kampf, 237 Mich.App. 377, 603 N.W.2d 295, 299 (1999) (concluding Wife's obtaining personal protection order without notice to Husband did not violate his procedural due process rights); Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282, 288-89 n. 9 (Minn. 1992), superseded in part by statute inBurkstrand v. Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206 (Minn.
Due process generally requires some kind of hearing and notice of that hearing. Paschal v. Hazlinsky, 35,513 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/19/01), 803 So.2d 413, 417. But, no one has a vested right in any given mode of procedure.
Ms. Beninate generally asserts that this procedure at issue deprives a parent of his or her due process rights to have a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Due process generally requires some kind of hearing and notice of that hearing. Paschal v. Hazlinsky, 35,513 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/19/01), 803 So.2d 413, 417. But, no one has a vested right in any given mode of procedure.
The determination of what procedural safeguards are required for due process depends on the nature of the proceeding and the nature of the right or interest affected. Paschal v. Hazlinsky, 35,513, p. 6 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 12/19/01), 803 So.2d 413, 418. The record establishes that Mr. Burkart was given proper notice of the scheduled hearing, which was in fact a contradictory hearing on a rule to show cause, and that he was not deprived of an opportunity to be heard on the issues actually relevant to the requested injunctive relief under La.R.S. 9:371.
They provide a swift and accessible remedy to meet the urgency of a domestic abuse situation. See In re Marriage of Fiffe, 140 P.3d 160, 162 (Colo.Ct.App. 2005) ("A temporary protection order is usually requested under immediate, urgent circumstances and, thus, most often is ruled upon ex parte."); Paschal v. Hazlinsky, 803 So.2d 413, 417 (La.Ct.App. 2001) (noting urgency of domestic violence situations). Thus, requiring a prior hearing would defeat the purpose of offering immediate relief from imminent danger.
See Rouyea v. Rouyea, 00-2613 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/28/01), 808 So.2d 558; Paschall v. Hazlinsky, 35,513 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/19/01), 803 So.2d 413. Accordingly, we will apply the abuse of discretion standard of review in this matter.