Opinion
C. A. 4:23-2375-JD-KDW
07-18-2023
Ashley and Mason, Sr. Parrott, Individually and o/b/o of M.C.P., Jr., Plaintiff, v. Florence School District One F.S.D.1.; Richard O'Malley, Superintendent; Brian Denny, F.S.D.1. L.E.A.; Courtney Mathews, Supervisor; Stephanie Walz, Teacher; and Matthew Cote, Assistant Principal, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Kaymani D. West, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiffs Ashley and Mason Parrott, Sr., filed this lawsuit individually, and on behalf of their minor child, M.C.P. Jr. (“M.P.”), alleging Florence School District One, Superintendent Richard O'Malley, Brian Denny, Florence School District One Local Education Agency, Supervisor Courtney Matthews, Teacher Stephanie Walz, and Assistant Principal Matthew Cole violated M.P.'s civil rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss the Amended Complaint in this case.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On June 9, 2023, the court issued an order notifying Plaintiffs their Complaint was subject to summary dismissal because they failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim. ECF No. 7. The order further advised Plaintiffs they had until June 23, 2023, to file an amended complaint or otherwise cure the identified deficiencies in the pleadings. Id. Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complainton June 21, 2023, supplemented on June 23, 2023. ECF No. 13; ECF No. 13-1.
Plaintiffs filed a supplemental pleading on June 23, 2023, in which they added Hannah Secka as an additional Plaintiff. See ECF No. 13-1. However, Hannah Secka did not sign the supplemental pleading and has therefore not been added as a party to this action.
Plaintiffs allege Defendants unlawfully changed M.P.'s placement from the least restrictive environment when his behavior was the manifestation of his disability, which resulted in the deprivation of meaningful education benefits and the denial of a free and appropriate public education. ECF No. 13 at 2. Plaintiffs contend Defendants discriminated against M.P. by failing to provide him with necessary accommodations for his disabilities as required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Id. Plaintiffs claim Defendants violated their constitutional rights, federal statutes, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. at 3. Plaintiffs allege each of the Defendants had personal knowledge of the ongoing pattern and practice of the use of manipulative and tactical techniques to discreetly conspire to break the law. Id. Plaintiffs seek monetary damages, reimbursement of education and care costs from August of 2022 until May 2023, legal fees, lost wages, emotional distress damages, and pain and suffering. Id. at 2-3.
Plaintiffs state M.P. was six years old and attended school at Delmae Heights Elementary School in Florence School District One at the time of the incident complained of. Id. at 12. Plaintiffs contend M.P. suffers from speech language impairment, ADHD, adjustment disorder w/ conduct, X-ALD, high blood pressure, and Addison's disease. Id. Plaintiffs state M.P. is considered special needs, and he attended school in a general education classroom. Id. at 12-13. Plaintiffs allege they filed two due process hearing requests in March 2023 with the South Carolina Department of Education, alleging Defendants violated federal law through exclusionary discipline on February 7, 2023, when M.P.'s placement was changed to homebased virtual instruction, and an ineffective individualized educational plan was developed. Id. at 13, 14-16. Plaintiffs claim the change in M.P.'s placement stemmed from a discipline referral on February 1, 2023, that found that M.P.'s actions of making a weapon of a paperclip and M.P. throwing a chair, pencil and other items at staff was not a manifestation of his disability. Id. at 17. Plaintiffs claim that on May 26, 2023, a state review officer's final decision found Defendants engaged in an unlawful manifestation determination review to justify removing M.P. from his home-based zoned school. Id. at 1.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se complaint. Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)).
Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 for “all civil actions”). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so; however, a district court may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999), construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Moreover, even when the filing fee is paid, the court possesses the inherent authority to ensure that a plaintiff has standing, that federal jurisdiction exists, and that a case is not frivolous. See Ross v. Baron, 493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 480 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting courts have “independent obligation to assess . . . subject-matter jurisdiction”).
Plaintiffs are not proceeding in forma pauperis. Therefore, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which allows sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim, is inapplicable.
B. Analysis
1. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) Claim
Plaintiffs seek monetary damages stemming from Defendants unlawfully changing M.P.'s placement from the least restrictive environment which they claim deprived M.P. of a meaningful educational benefit in violation of the provisions of the IDEA. ECF No. 13 at 2-11, 22-24. The touchstone of the IDEA is the actual provision of a free appropriate public education, not to provide a forum for tort-like claims of educational malpractice. See Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir.1998) (“Tort-like damages are simply inconsistent with the IDEA's statutory scheme.”)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 871 (1998). As such, the Fourth Circuit has consistently held that the IDEA does not authorize courts to grant monetary damages. Emery v. Roanoke City Sch. Bd., 432 F.3d 294, 298 (4th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends Plaintiffs' IDEA claims be summarily dismissed.
Although a plaintiff may be equitably reimbursed for funds expended on the child's education because of the school district's failure to provide free appropriate public education, or for attorney fees, Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for this type of recovery. Plaintiffs have not identified what expenses they may have incurred for M.P.'s education, nor have Plaintiffs identified what, if any, legal expenses they paid. See Emery v. Roanoke City School Bd., 432 F.3d 294, 298 (4th Cir. 2005); J.D. ex rel. Davis v. Kanawha Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 571 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2009).
2. The Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims
Plaintiffs also assert claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA arguing Defendants failed to provide accommodations for M.P. which constituted a failure to provide him a free appropriate public education. ECF No. 13 at 1-2, 24-25.
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act prohibit public entities from discriminating against an individual based on his or her disability; the individual must show that he was excluded from, or denied benefits, based on his or her disability. See 42 U.S.C. 12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). To state a claim under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must allege a disability, circumstances of being otherwise qualified to receive the benefits of a public service, program, or activity, and exclusion from participation in, or denial of, the benefits of such service, program, or activity, or otherwise discriminated against, on the basis of disability. See Constantine v. Rectors and Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 498 (4th Cir. 2005). To establish a claim under the Rehabilitation Act or ADA concerning children with disabilities in the education context, a plaintiff must also allege bad faith or gross mismanagement, or that the disability played a motivating role in the discrimination or adverse action. See Sellers, 141 F.3d at 528-529 (Rehabilitation Act); Constantine, 411 F.3d at 498, n. 17 (ADA).
Under Fourth Circuit precedent, a non-attorney parent generally cannot appear on behalf of a minor child in federal court. Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Schs., 418 F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 2005); see also, Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (“[W]e consider the competence of a layman representing himself to be clearly too limited to allow him to risk the rights of others.”). However, Plaintiffs argue they are allowed to file claims on behalf of M.P. under the holding in Winkelman v. Parma City School Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007). See ECF No. 13 at 4-11. This argument is without merit. In Winkelman, the Court held that parents enjoy their own independent enforceable rights under the IDEA to the substantive adequacy of their child's education, and may prosecute such claims, pro se, in federal court. Winkelmen, however, did not decide that the IDEA allows parents proceeding pro se to litigate on behalf of their minor child. Additionally, courts in this district have declined to extend the holding in Winkelmen to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by pro se parents on behalf of their minor children. See, e.g., D.N. v. Louisa Cnty. Public Schools, 156 F.Supp.3d 767, 774 (W.D. Va. 2016) (explaining that Winkelman does not translate into a broad right of parents to pursue statutory or common law claims on their child's behalf); Augustine v. Winchester Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 5:13cv00025, 2013 WL 5347465, at *6 n. 6 (W.D. Va. Sept. 17, 2013) (limiting the holding of Winkelman to claims brought solely under the IDEA).
Plaintiffs may bring an associational discrimination claim under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, by showing that they were discriminated against based on his or her association with a disabled person. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(g) (ADA); D.N. v. Louisa Cnty. Public Schools, 156 F.Supp.3d 767, 772 (W.D. Va. 2016) (Rehabilitation Act). Although the ADA and Section 504 allow claims for discrimination based on one's association with a person with disabilities, such a claim requires a separate and distinct denial of a benefit or service to a non-disabled person and may not be premised on a derivative benefit or harm based on treatment towards a disabled person. See Stukes v. School Board of City of Virginia Beach, C/A No. 2:18-644, 2019 WL 13298146, at *7 (E.D. Va. Nov. 21, 2019). The allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint do not allege Defendants discriminated against them because of their association with M.P. Instead, Plaintiffs seek to pursue their own claims against Florence School District One and its employees premised on derivative harm from Florence One's treatment of M.P. The undersigned recommends Plaintiffs' Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims should be summarily dismissed.
Plaintiffs seek monetary damages on behalf of M.P. for alleged violation of his civil rights. ECF No. 13 at 29, 31-36. Plaintiffs allege Defendants violated M.P.'s substantive due process rights by forcing M.P. into isolation based on behaviors that were a product of M.P.'s disability. ECF No. 13 at 32-35. Plaintiffs also contend Defendants forced M.P. to gather his belongings and physically pulled M.P. out of the classroom and down the hall. Id. Plaintiffs claim Florence County School District One employees utilized district policy and procedures to place M.P. in isolation to scream until he calmed down or became exhausted. Id. at 35. Plaintiffs contend Florence County created a zero-tolerance policy that deprived M.P. of his interest in bodily and mental integrity and fostered an environment where M.P. was terrorized by his teacher when he was not disruptive due to his disabilities. Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides for liability against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives an individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The undersigned finds Plaintiffs lack standing to bring claims on behalf of their son M.P. To establish standing, a plaintiff must prove that he “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Md. Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan, 971 F.3d 199, 210 (4th Cir. 2020). A plaintiff must generally assert his own legal rights and interests, not the legal rights or interests of third parties. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982). Plaintiffs have not alleged Defendants violated any rights personal to them which are protected under § 1983, but instead seek to recover for the violation of M.P.'s rights by Defendants. As noted supra, Plaintiffs are not attorneys and therefore may not pursue legal action on behalf of their son. See Gilchrist v. Kelley, No. RWT-09-470, 2009 WL 10701828, at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 9, 2009) (holding that federal courts “uniformly do not allow parents, guardians or next friends to appear pro se on behalf of a minor or incompetent person.”).
4. State Law Claims (Gross Negligence, Negligence, and Emotional Distress)
Because Plaintiffs' federal claims are subject to summary dismissal, and Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to establish diversity jurisdiction over their state law claims, the undersigned recommends the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims.
See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74 nn.13-16 (1978) (noting for diversity jurisdiction purpose, that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side). Plaintiffs and Defendants are all citizens of South Carolina. See ECF No. 13.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
By order issued on June 9, 2023, the undersigned gave Plaintiffs an opportunity to correct the defects in their Complaint and further warned Plaintiffs if they failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed without leave for further amendment. As discussed herein, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails to correct the deficiencies, and like the original Complaint, fails to allege sufficient facts to establish the court's jurisdiction or to state a claim. As the undersigned recommends that all but one of the claims raised in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint be dismissed because Plaintiffs are not attorneys and cannot file a lawsuit on M.P.'s behalf, the undersigned further recommends the district court give Plaintiffs an opportunity to secure counsel. If Plaintiffs fail to hire an attorney, the undersigned recommends the court dismiss the Amended Complaint without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).