Opinion
CIV-22-607-PRW
03-17-2023
ROY LEE PARKERSON, JR., Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AMANDA MAXFIELD GREEN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, a state pre-trial detainee represented by counsel, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging civil rights violations. (Doc. 17, Amended Complaint). United States District Judge Patrick R. Wyrick referred the matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). (Doc. 3).
Before the court is Defendant Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority's (“OCCJA's”) Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 20). Plaintiff has filed a response (Doc. 21), and the Motion is at issue. For the reasons set forth fully below, the undersigned recommends that the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20) be DENIED.
I. Procedural History and the Instant Motion
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint in state court on June 24, 2022, alleging constitutional violations arising from an incident at the Oklahoma County Detention Center (“OCDC”). (Doc. 1, at Exs. 1, 2). The Complaint named four defendants: the Board of County Commissioners of Oklahoma County (“Board of County Commissioners”), the OCCJA, the Oklahoma County Sheriff, and Michael Hughes. (Doc. 1, at Ex. 2, at 1).
On July 20, 2022, Defendants the Board of County Commissioners and the Oklahoma County Sheriff filed a notice of removal in this court. (Doc. 1). On October 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint naming as Defendants the Board of County Commissioners, the OCCJA, and Michael Hughes. (Doc. 17). The Amended Complaint alleges two causes of action against all Defendants including violations of Plaintiff's Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on December 3, 2020, Defendant Hughes, a detention officer, purposefully released a segregated inmate from his cell. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hughes allowed that inmate to enter Plaintiff's cell and stab him while he slept. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hughes did not immediately report an inmate-on-inmate altercation nor did he immediately notify medical personnel of Plaintiff's severe injuries. (Id.) Plaintiff has requested monetary damages. (Id. at 9). Defendant the Board of County Commissioners filed an answer to the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 18). Defendant the OCCJA filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 20). Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. 21). Defendant Hughes has not responded or entered an appearance.
II. Standard of Review
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 2010). In applying this standard, the court must “accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in a complaint and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[, and t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
“The court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.” Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). The undersigned, therefore, has carefully considered the allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint but has ignored any new factual assertions Plaintiff includes in his response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
III. Defendant the OCCJA Is an Entity Subject to Suit Under § 1983.
“In order to state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must ‘allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.'” Bruner v. Baker, 506 F.3d 1021, 1025-26 (10th Cir. 2007). “[M]unicipalities and other local governmental units” are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Defendant the OCCJA first argues that under Oklahoma law, it is not a suable entity under § 1983; instead, it argues that the suit should only be brought against Oklahoma County through the Board of County Commissioners. (Doc. 20, at 2). The undersigned disagrees.
The OCCJA states that it is a public trust that was created by the Board of County Commissioners to oversee the control and operations of the OCDC. (Id.) The OCCJA argues that while it may be an independent entity in its operations of the OCDC, it is an agency of Oklahoma County and is not a separate entity for the purposes of liability. (Id. at 3). In support of this argument, the OCCJA cites several cases involving other jail trusts in Oklahoma. (Id. at 3-5). The OCCJA incorrectly argues that Chichakli v. Samuels, Case No. CIV-15-687-D, 2016 WL 2743542 (W.D. Okla. May 11, 2016), dealt with the same liability issue as the instant case. In Chichakli, the plaintiff brought civil rights claims against the director of the Grady County Criminal Justice Authority (“Jail Trust”) as well as a Grady County Commissioner in his official capacity, and thereby Grady County. Id. at *1, 3. The County Commissioner asserted that the Jail Trust operated the Grady County Jail, which “preclude[d] [the Commissioner] and the Board [of County Commissioners] from liability regarding incidents occurring at the Grady County Jail.” Id. at *4. But the court held that although “the [Jail] Trust is a distinct legal entity from Grady County,” it “acts in furtherance of Grady County's authority and in no way guarantees immunity to Grady County.” Id. Thus, the court dismissed neither the Jail Trust nor the County Commissioner. In fact, the court reiterated its ruling that both the Jail Trust and the County were proper defendants to the action, Chichakli v. Samuels, 2017 WL 4456629, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 4, 2017), and they remained defendants until the case settled. See Case No. CIV-15-687-D (Doc. 172).
In another case argued by the OCCJA, the court similarly held, citing Chichakli, that Grady County was not exempt from liability in a § 1983 suit even though the Jail Trust oversaw the entirety of the jail's operations, and the court denied the Board of County Commissioners' motion for summary judgment arguing that the Board was an “improper party.” Foltz v. Grady Cnty. Bd. Of Cnty. Comm'rs, Case No. CIV-15-996-M, 2017 WL 11557921 at *5 (W.D. Okla. July 25, 2017), report and recommendation adopted as to this ruling, No. CIV-15-996-M (Doc. 282). The Board and the Jail Trust have both remained Defendants throughout the litigation, which is still pending. See Case No. CIV-15-996-M (Docket Sheet).
Likewise, in Hickey v. Oklahoma Cnty. Det. Ctr., Case No. CIV-20-1291-R, 2022 WL 945319 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 29, 2022), this court implicitly recognized that the OCCJA may be a proper defendant under § 1983. Id. at *2. Referring to the OCCJA, the court stated that “a public trust such as the Jail Trust is a distinct legal entity, and its activities and obligations are determined by the written instrument under which it was created. Plaintiff is correct that the Jail Trust is the ultimate operator of the OCDC.” Id. The court ultimately dismissed that plaintiff's claims against the OCCJA because “Plaintiff [did] not provide any factual allegations that demonstrate the Jail Trust was responsible for the alleged violation of his constitutional rights.” Id. By contrast, in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has provided factual allegations that connect the OCCJA to his claimed constitutional violations. See infra, Section IV(B).
Thus, the OCCJA has only cited authority indicating that both a jail trust and a county, through its board of county commissioners, can be held for civil rights violations. The OCCJA has cited no authority for the proposition that a jail trust in Oklahoma is not a “local governmental unit[] to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. It appears that no case has directly addressed the question, although the Tenth Circuit addressed the merits of a § 1983 municipal liability claim against the McCurtain County Jail Trust without comment. Rife v. Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety, 854 F.3d 637, 653 (10th Cir. 2017). Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the court find the OCCJA is a proper party to this suit and that the OCCJA's Motion to Dismiss on this point be DENIED.
IV. Plaintiff Has Pled Sufficient Facts to State a Claim for Municipal Liability Against the OCCJA.
The OCCJA argues in the alternative that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to plead facts sufficient to state a claim for municipal liability against it. The undersigned disagrees.
A. Standard for Municipal Liability
In Monell, the Supreme Court explained that a municipality or other local government unit may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, “to prove a § 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must show the existence of a municipal policy or custom which directly caused the alleged injury.” Pyle v. Woods, 874 F.3d 1257, 1266 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)). Additionally, a plaintiff must “show that the policy was enacted or maintained with deliberate indifference to an almost inevitable constitutional injury.” Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 769 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389)). Accordingly, to prevail on a § 1983 claim against municipal defendants, “the plaintiff must prove ‘(1) official policy or custom, (2) causation, and (3) state of mind.'” Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 998 (10th Cir. 2019) (bracket omitted) (quoting Schneider, 717 F.3d at 769).
1. Official Policy or Custom
To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must first identify an official policy or custom of the municipality, whether enacted or maintained by its legislative body or an authorized decisionmaker. Schneider, 717 F.3d at 769-70. A plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a “municipal policy or custom” in one of the following forms:
(1) a formal regulation or policy statement; (2) an informal custom amounting to a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; (3) the decisions of employees with final policymaking authority; (4) the ratification by such final policymakers of the decisions - and the basis for them - of subordinates to whom authority was delegated subject to these policymakers' review and approval; or (5) the failure to adequately train or supervise employees, so long as that failure results from deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be caused.Waller v. City and Cty. Of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010)).
2. Causation
After identifying such an official policy or custom, the plaintiff must then establish that the policy or custom either: (1) directly violated a federal right of the plaintiff, or (2) was the “moving force” behind a county employee's violation of a federal right of the plaintiff. Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 962 F.3d 1204, 1240 (10th Cir. 2020). “Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee.” Id. at 1241 (citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 405).
3. State of Mind
Finally, Plaintiff must prove that the municipal action was taken with deliberate indifference to its known or obvious consequences. Id. (citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 407). “The deliberate indifference standard may be satisfied when the municipality has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm.” Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1284 (10th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). “While typically notice is ‘established by proving the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct,' it can also be established ‘in a narrow range of circumstances where a violation of federal rights is a highly predictable or plainly obvious consequence of a municipality's action or inaction.'” Hinkle, 962 F.3d at 1241 (quoting Waller, 932 F.3d at 1284).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff has alleged that the OCDC has a long history of failing to adequately hire, train, and supervise its detention officers, which he alleges caused his stabbing by another inmate on December 3, 2020. (Doc. 17, at 3-7). Plaintiff's allegations regarding the unconstitutional conditions of the OCDC relate back to 2008, long before the OCCJA was given control of the facility's operations. (Id.) However, Plaintiff alleges that the OCCJA had actual and constructive notice of these issues through multiple investigations and resulting reports over the years. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he Jail Trust was created to address these issues, but has failed to implement any effective actions to address the short staffing and untrained staff members.” (Id. at 5, ¶ 26).
Plaintiff specifically alleges that a 2008 report by the Department of Justice found that “certain conditions at the Jail violate the constitutional rights of detainees confined there,” including that “the Jail fails to provide for detainees' [] reasonable protection from harm.” (Id. at 3, ¶ 15). He alleges that since 2008, the Department of Justice further identified deficiencies at OCDC including that “[t]here is an inordinately high risk of detainee-on-detainee violence due to inability to properly supervise.” (Id. at 4, ¶ 20). Plaintiff alleges that the OCCJA hired a consultant who authored a report stating that “Staff is not trained to detect and/or intervene in inmate incidents appropriately.” (Id. at ¶¶ 2223) Plaintiff alleges that
[i]n May 2021, the National Institute of Corrections provided a report to the BOCC and [the OCCJA] stating the following: . . . ‘Clear and convincing present level of staffing was insufficient for a safe and secure jail[;]' . . . [t]he jail had started to implement even ‘same-day' hirings and failed to perform even background checks on new hires[;] . . . [i]nformed the [OCCJA] that
they need to change to direct supervision as soon as possible to curb adverse events.(Id. at 4-5, ¶ 24). Plaintiff alleges that a review of the OCDC identified that a “lack of training” led to “poor candidates [for detention officers] and employees in charge of maintaining a safe jail,” and “[t]hat the lack of training and failure to attract good candidates to staff the jail is one of the moving forces behind these attacks occurring.” (Id. at 5, ¶¶ 32-33). Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he consultants, audits and reviews described briefly in this Amended Complaint, have warned and instructed [the OCCJA] of these known unconstitutional deficiencies, and how to correct the unconstitutional deficiencies.” (Id. at 8, ¶ 42).
The foregoing allegations, construed as true, adequately allege (1) a failure to adequately hire, train, or supervise OCDC detention officers, (2) that those failures caused Plaintiff's injuries when a poorly hired, trained, and supervised detention officer allowed a fellow inmate access to Plaintiff's cell to attack him, and (3) actual or constructive knowledge by OCCJA that its failures were substantially certain to result in harm of the type alleged, and that the OCCJA consciously chose to disregard that risk. See Waller, 932 F.3d at 1283; Bryson, 627 F.3d at 789.
Plaintiff separately alleges that at OCDC there is a “pattern and practice amongst jailers to have unchecked access to opening inmates' cells to aid and abet inmate-on-inmate violence.” (Doc. 17, at 5-6, ¶ 34). Plaintiff claims that
Defendant Hughes' conduct in allowing free access to open cells to accommodate violent attacks was in accordance with the known pattern and practices of the OCDC; said practices have existed for many years at the OCDC and have been widely investigated by the DOJ and widely reported
in the news. Despite these risks and prior acts of failing to protect inmates due to these known risks of unilateral access to cells, OCDC continues to implement the same policies and procedures that allowed these attacks to occur.(Id. at 6, ¶ 36). Plaintiff also alleges that the OCCJA's hiring and training practices have “led to hiring unqualified Jailers, like [Defendant] Hughes, who in turn have, on more than one occasion, made deliberate actions that harm and seriously injure inmates at OCDC.” (Id. at 8, ¶ 42).
These allegations are thinner and less specific than the allegations regarding failure to hire, train, and supervise. However, if construed as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, they adequately allege (1) “an informal custom amounting to a widespread practice” of detention officers opening cells to facilitate inmate-on-inmate attacks, (2) that the custom caused Plaintiff's injuries when Defendant Hughes allowed a fellow inmate access to his cell to attack him, and (3) actual or constructive knowledge by OCCJA, through investigations, reports, and prior incidents, that such a custom existed and would be certain to result in harm of the type alleged, and that the OCCJA consciously chose to disregard that risk by failing to implement policies to prevent such access. See Waller, 932 F.3d at 1283; Bryson, 627 F.3d at 789.
Whether or not Plaintiff's claims are provable is a matter to be determined at a later stage of this litigation. At this stage, Plaintiff has alleged claims that have “facial plausibility,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, which is all that is required. Accordingly, the OCCJA's Motion to Dismiss should be DENIED on this point.
V. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object.
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the Court DENY Defendant the Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 20).
The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of Court on or before April 7, 2023, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises the parties that failure to file a timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives their right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues contained herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation does not terminate the referral in the present case.