Opinion
No. COA12–1552.
2013-08-6
Whitney PARKER, Plaintiff v. Aaron A. SMITH, Defendant.
No brief filed for plaintiff-appellee. Aaron A. Smith, pro se, for defendant-appellant.
Appeal by defendant from order entered 6 August 2012 by Judge Ronald L. Chapman in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 May 2013. No brief filed for plaintiff-appellee. Aaron A. Smith, pro se, for defendant-appellant.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Aaron A. Smith (“defendant”) appeals from an order denying sanctions pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 11 (“Rule 11 sanctions”) against Whitney Parker (“plaintiff”). Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50C–2 (“50C–2”) was dismissed. We affirm the trial court's order denying defendant's motion for Rule 11 sanctions.
I. Background
On 10 April 2012, plaintiff filed a 50C–2 complaint in Mecklenburg County District Court seeking a “no contact” order. Plaintiff alleged in her complaint, inter alia, that defendant was stalking her and sent her multiple text messages to include, “I will bury you.” On 11 April 2012, the trial court entered an ex parte temporary no contact order that was effective for ten days. Defendant was ordered not to contact, visit, assault, molest, abuse, injure or otherwise interfere with plaintiff. He was also ordered to cease stalking and harassing her. He was ordered not to enter or remain at plaintiff's residence, school, place of employment or be within fifty yards of her and her family. A hearing for a permanent order was set for 19 April 2012, then subsequently continued.
On 18 April 2012, defendant submitted a verified answer, affirmative defenses, counterclaims, and motion for Rule 11 sanctions. Defendant alleged that he and plaintiff were parties to a contractual agreement in which he loaned plaintiff money in excess of $23,000. Defendant asserted that because of this agreement, he had a “legal purpose” to contact plaintiff and her complaint was filed for an improper purpose. Therefore, defendant moved for Rule 11 sanctions alleging plaintiff's improper purpose was to harass him and cause unnecessary delays or a needless increase in the cost of litigation.
On 16 May 2012, plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing and the trial court dismissed her complaint without prejudice. The next hearing, scheduled for 31 May 2012 to address defendant's counterclaims and motion for sanctions, was rescheduled. On 20 July 2012, the trial court found, inter alia, that plaintiff's complaint was dismissed with prejudice and she had not filed her complaint for an improper purpose. The trial court concluded that plaintiff's complaint was legally sufficient and warranted under existing law. Therefore, the court concluded that Rule 11 sanctions were not proper against either party and denied both plaintiff and defendant's motions for Rule 11 sanctions. Defendant appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's decision regarding whether or not to impose Rule 11 sanctions de novo. Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 165, 381 S.E.2d 706, 714 (1989). This Court determines “(1) whether the trial court's conclusions of law support its judgment or determination, (2) whether the trial court's conclusions of law are supported by its findings of fact, and (3) whether the findings of fact are supported by [the] sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. If we make “these three determinations in the affirmative,” we must uphold the trial court's decision regarding Rule 11 sanctions. Id.
III. Rule 11 Sanctions
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not imposing sanctions under the improper purpose prong of Rule 11. Specifically, defendant asserts that because the court failed to make the appropriate findings of fact to establish that plaintiff filed the complaint for an improper purpose, neither the evidence nor the law support the court's conclusion. We disagree.
As an initial matter, in the first order dated 16 May 2012, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint without prejudice. However, in Judge Ronald L. Chapman's (“Judge Chapman”) order denying Rule 11 sanctions dated 6 August 2012, Judge Chapman found that plaintiff's complaint was dismissed with prejudice. According to Bryson v. Sullivan, it was not relevant whether a dismissal was with or without prejudice and dismissal does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to consider collateral issues such as sanctions that require consideration after the action is terminated. Bryson v. Sullivan, 330 N.C. 644, 664, 412 S.E.2d 327, 338 (1992). Although plaintiff's complaint has been dismissed, the type of dismissal is irrelevant. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to determine the collateral issue of Rule 11 sanctions.
Pursuant to Rule 11:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 11(a) (2011). “[U]nder Rule 11, the signer certifies that three distinct things are true: the pleading is (1) warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law (legal sufficiency); (2) well grounded in fact; and (3) not interposed for any improper purpose.” Johns v. Johns, 195 N.C.App. 201, 206, 672 S.E.2d 34, 38 (2009) (citation omitted). “A violation of any one of these requirements ‘mandates the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11.’ “ Id. (citation omitted).
In the instant case, defendant only challenges the trial court's finding regarding whether plaintiff filed her complaint for an improper purpose. According to our Supreme Court, “[t]he improper purpose prong of Rule 11 is separate and distinct from the factual and legal sufficiency requirements.” Bryson, 330 N.C. at 663, 412 S.E.2d at 337. “Thus, even if a paper is well grounded in fact and law, it may still violate Rule 11 if it is served or filed for an improper purpose.” Coventry Woods Neighborhood Ass'n Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 213 N.C.App. 236, –––, 713 S.E.2d 162, 166 (2011) (citation omitted). “An objective standard is used to determine the existence of an improper purpose, with the burden on the movant to prove such improper purpose.” Brown v. Hurley, 124 N.C.App. 377, 382, 477 S.E.2d 234, 238 (1996).
An improper purpose is defined as “any purpose other than one to vindicate rights or to put claims to a proper test,” and “may be inferred from the alleged offender's objective behavior.” Ward v.. Jett Properties, LLC, 191 N.C.App. 605, 609, 663 S.E.2d 862, 865 (2008) (citation omitted). “In assessing [this] behavior, we look at the ‘totality of the circumstances.’ “ Johns, 195 N.C.App. at 212, 672 S.E.2d at 42 (citation omitted). Examples of circumstances from which an improper purpose may be inferred include “the filing of meritless papers by counsel who have extensive experience in the pertinent area of law ... filing suit with no factual basis for the purpose of fishing for some evidence of liability ... [and] continuing to press an obviously meritless claim after being specifically advised of its meritlessness by a judge or magistrate[.]” Mack v. Moore, 107 N.C.App. 87, 93, 418 S.E.2d 685, 689 (1992) (quotation marks omitted).
In the instant case, plaintiff filed a 50C–2 complaint, alleging that defendant was stalking her. Stalking is defined in North Carolina as the following:
On more than one occasion, following or otherwise harassing, as defined in G.S. 14–277.3A(b)(2), another person without legal purpose with the intent to do any of the following: (a) Place the person in reasonable fear either for the person's safety or the safety of the person's immediate family or close personal associates, (b) Cause that person to suffer substantial emotional distress by placing that person in fear of death, bodily injury, or continued harassment and that in fact causes that person substantial emotional distress.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50C–1(6) (2011). Defendant filed a verified answer alleging that because he and plaintiff had a contractual agreement for the repayment of loans in excess of $23,000 he had a “legal purpose” to contact plaintiff. The trial court never reached the merits of plaintiff's complaint because plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing and her complaint was dismissed without prejudice. Nevertheless, the trial court conducted a hearing regarding defendant's claim for Rule 11 sanctions on 20 July 2012. Defendant asserted that plaintiff's filing of the 50C complaint demonstrated an “abuse of the courts” because she attempted to delay repayment of the loan. Moreover, defendant argued that by failing to dismiss the claim after being “put on notice” by the Verified Answer, plaintiff unnecessarily prolonged litigation, causing defendant to incur further legal fees. As evidence of the sufficiency of plaintiff's claim, the trial court considered plaintiff's 50C–2 complaint, which alleged, inter alia, that defendant had
tormented, terrorized, or terrified the plaintiff ... with the intent to place the plaintiff in reasonable fear for the plaintiff's safety ... or with the intent to cause, and which did cause, the plaintiff to suffer substantial emotional distress by placing the plaintiff in fear of death, bodily injury, or continued torment or terror in that:
defendant threatened plaintiff's property and family via text and indicated in a text “I will bury you.” After the hearing, the Judge stated that he believed “that all the requirements are met at least facially in the Complaint” and denied the request for sanctions.
Although plaintiff's complaint was dismissed, the trial court concluded, inter alia, that plaintiff's complaint was legally sufficient and warranted under existing law at the time it was filed. The trial court also found that plaintiff did not file her complaint for an improper purpose. The trial court concluded that Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff and defendant were not proper and denied both plaintiff and defendant's motions for Rule 11 sanctions.
Despite defendant's contentions that plaintiff admitted she made a mistake in filing the 50C–2 complaint, there is no evidence of this admission, other than defendant's attorney's statements at the 31 May 2012 hearing. Defendant also argues that plaintiff was put on notice that her claim was meritless and continued to pursue them. Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant had a “legal purpose” to contact plaintiff, the context of the alleged statements to plaintiff, i.e. threats to “bury” her, were not for the legal purpose of recouping money. Therefore, defendant's assertion in his answer that he had a legal purpose to contact her did not put her on notice that her 50C–2 complaint seeking relief from his harassing contact was meritless. Furthermore, even if one of plaintiff's purposes in filing the 50C–2 complaint was improper, if she also had a proper purpose, “a court should not sanction counsel for an intention that the court does not approve, so long as the added purpose is not undertaken in bad faith and is not so excessive as to eliminate a proper purpose.” Coventry, 213 N.C.App. at –––, 713 S.E.2d at 166 (citing In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 518 (4th Cir.1990)). We cannot infer an improper purpose based on the face of plaintiff's 50C–2 complaint.
We find that the trial court's findings of fact are supported by evidence and adequately support the conclusions of law. Moreover, the conclusions of law sufficiently support its order denying sanctions and we uphold the decision of the trial court denying defendant's motion for Rule 11 sanctions.
IV. Findings of Fact Under Rule 52
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to find specific facts and separately state its conclusions as required by N.C. Gen.Stat. 1A–1, Rule 52. We disagree.
“In a non-jury trial, Rule 52(a) of the N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that the trial court ‘find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon....’ “ Kirkhart v. Saieed, 98 N.C.App. 49, 54, 389 S.E.2d 837, 840 (1990). If there “is some evidence to support the trial court's findings, the appellate courts are bound by such findings, even though there is contrary evidence to sustain other findings.” Id . (citation omitted).
In the instant case, plaintiff's 50C–2 complaint alleged that defendant harassed plaintiff by sending her threatening text messages. This evidence supported the trial court's finding that the complaint was not filed for an improper purpose. Even if defendant offered contrary evidence indicating that plaintiff filed the 50C–2 complaint for the purpose of avoiding repayment of a loan, there was evidence, on the face of the 50C–2 complaint, that defendant harassed plaintiff. Therefore, we are bound by the trial court's finding that the 50C–2 complaint was not filed for an improper purpose.
While the trial court did not make an express conclusion that the 50C–2 complaint was not filed for an improper purpose, it did conclude that sanctions against plaintiff were not proper. Since defendant argued that improper purpose was a basis for Rule 11 sanctions, by concluding that sanctions were improper, the trial court did deny sanctions on the improper purpose basis. See Bryson, 330 N.C. at 664, 412 S.E.2d at 338. Therefore, we find that the trial court's order complied with Rule 52(a).
V. Conclusion
The evidence supported the trial court's findings of fact, the findings of fact supported the conclusions of law and the conclusions of law supported the trial court's judgment. See Turner, 325 N.C. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 714. Therefore, we must affirm the trial court's order denying defendant's motion for Rule 11 sanctions.
Affirmed. Judges STEELMAN and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).