Opinion
C. A. 9:22-cv-01041-RMG-MHC
01-06-2023
Shelia Webb Parker, Plaintiff, v. Kilolo Kijakazi,[1] Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Shelia Webb Parker (Parker) filed the complaint in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ's) final decision denying her claim for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits under the Social Security Act (Act). This case was referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation pursuant to Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a) (D.S.C.). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that the ALJ's decision be affirmed.
Citations to the record refer to the page numbers in the Social Security Administration Record. See ECF No. 8.
Parker applied for SSI in November 2019, alleging disability beginning May 28, 2019. R.p. 205. Parker later amended her alleged onset date of disability to November 7, 2019, the date of her application. R.p. 405. She alleged disability caused by right ankle and back pain. R.pp. 75, 91. The state agency denied her claim at the initial and reconsideration levels. R.pp. 75-121.
On December 9, 2021, an administrative hearing was held before an ALJ, where Parker, who was represented by counsel, and an impartial vocational expert testified. R.pp. 45-71. On January 20, 2022, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision and denied Parker's claim. R.pp. 21-37. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's decision final. R.pp. 1-6. This appeal followed.
Because this Court writes primarily for the parties who are familiar with the facts, the Court dispenses with a lengthy recitation of the medical history from the relevant period. To the extent specific records or information are relevant to or at issue in this case, they are addressed within the Discussion section below.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Scope of Review
Jurisdiction of this Court is pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Under § 405(g), judicial review of a final decision regarding disability benefits is limited to determining (1) whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Walls v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, a reviewing court must uphold the final decision when “an ALJ has applied correct legal standards and the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Brown v. Comm r Soc. Sec. Admin., 873 F.3d 251, 267 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Substantial evidence” is an evidentiary standard that is not high: it is “more than a mere scintilla” and means only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). A reviewing court does not reweigh conflicts in evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012). “Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [ALJ].” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, this limited review does not mean the findings of an ALJ are to be mechanically accepted, as the “statutorily granted review contemplates more than an uncritical rubber stamping of the administrative action.” Howard v. Saul, 408 F.Supp.3d 721, 725-26 (D.S.C. 2019) (quoting Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 1969)).
B. Social Security Disability Evaluation Process
To be considered “disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he has an impairment or combination of impairments which prevent him from engaging in all substantial gainful activity for which he is qualified by his age, education, experience, and functional capacity, and which has lasted or could reasonably be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423. The Social Security Administration established a five-step sequential procedure in order to evaluate whether an individual is disabled for purposes of receiving benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634-35 (4th Cir. 2015) (outlining the questions asked in the five-step procedure). The burden rests with the claimant to make the necessary showings at each of the first four steps to prove disability. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 634-35. If the claimant fails to carry his burden, he is found not disabled. Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 861 (4th Cir. 2017). If the claimant is successful at each of the first four steps, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Id.
At the first step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged disability onset date. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that meet the regulations' severity and duration requirements. Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). At step three, the ALJ considers whether the severe impairment meets the criteria of an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P (the “Listings”) or is equal to a listed impairment. If so, the claimant is automatically eligible for benefits; if not, before moving on to step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC). Id. §§ 404.1520(d), (e), 416.920(d), (e); Lewis, 858 F.3d at 861.
The RFC is “the most the claimant can still do despite physical and mental limitations that affect her ability to work.” Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
At step four, the ALJ determines whether, despite the severe impairment, the claimant retains the RFC to perform his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), (f), 416.920(e), (f). If the ALJ finds the claimant capable of performing his past relevant work, he is not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If the requirements to perform the claimant's past relevant work exceed his RFC, then the ALJ goes on to the final step.
At step five, the burden of proof shifts to the Social Security Administration to show that the claimant can perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and RFC. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g);Mascio, 780 F.3d at 634-35. Typically, the Commissioner offers this evidence through the testimony of a vocational expert answering hypotheticals that incorporate the claimant's limitations. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635. “If the Commissioner meets her burden, the ALJ finds the claimant not disabled and denies the application for benefits.” Id.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS
The ALJ employed the statutorily-required five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether Parker was disabled from the alleged onset date of November 7, 2019. R.pp. 21-37. The ALJ found, in pertinent part:
1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 7, 2019, the application date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).
2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: Right ankle and foot posttraumatic arthritis, status-post right tibio-talo-calcaneal (“TTC”) fusion; Foraminal narrowing at C6-C7; and Lumbar facet arthropathy (20 CFR 416.920(c)).
3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
4. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except the claimant can never operate foot controls with the right foot. The claimant can climb ramps and stairs occasionally, but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant can occasionally balance, stoop and crouch, but never kneel or crawl. The claimant can never work at unprotected heights. The claimant can occasionally work in an environment with moving mechanical parts. The claimant can occasionally operate a motor vehicle. The claimant can occasionally be in an environment with humidity and wetness.
5. The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965).
6. The claimant was born on August 31, 1976 and was 43 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.963).
7. The claimant has at least a high school education (20 CFR 416.964).
8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant does not have past relevant work (20 CFR 416.968).
9. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 416.969 and 416.969a).
10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since November 7, 2019, the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)).R.pp. 23-37.
IV. DISCUSSION
Parker presents three arguments in support of remand. First, Parker argues that her claim was unconstitutionally adjudicated. ECF No. 9 at 22-28. Second, Parker argues the ALJ's persuasiveness evaluation of medical opinion evidence was not supported by substantial evidence. ECF No. 9 at 12-19. Third, Parker maintains that the ALJ erred by failing to account for her non-severe mental health impairments in the RFC. ECF No. 9 at 19-22. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that none of Parker's arguments warrant remand.
A. Statutory authority under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act
Parker argues the ALJ's decision was an “unconstitutional adjudication of her claim.” ECF No. 9 at 29. Specifically, Parker argues that then-Acting Commissioner Nancy Berryhill lacked the statutory authority under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (“FVRA”) to ratify the appointments of Social Security Administration (“SSA”) ALJs in 2018. ECF No. 9 at 22-28. A brief background of the FVRA and Ms. Berryhill's tenure is warranted to fully understand Parker's position.
The FVRA authorizes certain officials to act during vacancies in Senate-confirmed offices. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345, 3346; see also N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S.Ct. 929, 934-35 (2017). Section 3346(a) of the FVRA limits how long an acting official can execute the duties of a vacant office. Under the statute,
(a) Except in the case of a vacancy caused by sickness, the person serving as an acting officer as described under section 3345 may serve in the office-
(1) for no longer than 210 days beginning on the date the vacancy occurs; or
(2) subject to subsection (b), once a first or second nomination for the office is submitted to the Senate, from the date of such nomination for the period that the nomination is pending in the Senate.5 U.S.C. § 3346(a). For vacancies existing during the first 60 days after a Presidential transition, the 210-day period runs from the later of 90 days after inauguration or 90 days after the vacancy. Id. § 3349a(b). If a first nomination does not result in a confirmation, an acting official may serve for another 210 days, see id. § 3346(b)(1), and during a second nomination, see id. § 3346(b)(2)(A). If the second nomination fails, then an acting official may serve for another 210 days. Id. § 3346(b)(2)(B).
Ms. Berryhill, then the Deputy Commissioner of Operations for the SSA, was designated Acting Commissioner on January 21, 2017, and served until November 16, 2017, when her initial 210-day period for acting service expired. On April 17, 2018, President Trump nominated Andrew Saul to be the Commissioner of the SSA. Upon submission of the nomination, Ms. Berryhill resumed her service as Acting Commissioner during the nomination's pendency and served until Mr. Saul was sworn in as Commissioner.
Around this time, while Ms. Berryhill was serving as Acting Commissioner, the Supreme Court decided Lucia v. S.E.C., 138 S.Ct. 2044 (2018). In Lucia, the Court held that ALJs employed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) were inferior officers of the United States subject to the Appointments Clause. Lucia, 138 S.Ct. at 2055. That clause specifies “the permissible methods of appointing ‘officers of the United States,' a class of government officials distinct from mere employees.” Id. at 2049 (citing U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2). Specifically, it requires such officers be appointed by the President, a court of law, or the head of a department. See U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Jones Bros., Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 898 F.3d 669, 676 (6th Cir. 2018). Because the SEC ALJ in that case was not a mere employee but an officer whose appointment required action by the President, a court of law, or a department head, his appointment was defective and his action a nullity. See Lucia, 138 S.Ct. at 2055.
Following Lucia, many Social Security claimants raised similar challenges to the appointment of SSA ALJs adjudicating their claims. On July 16, 2018, the month after Lucia, Ms. Berryhill resolved these Appointments Clause concerns by ratifying the appointments of all SSA ALJs and approving them as her own. See SSR 19-1(p), 2019 WL 1324866, at *2 (S.S.A. Mar. 15, 2019).
Recently, the Court held such claims could proceed in federal court even if the claimants had not raised any objection to the appointment during administrative proceedings. See Carr v. Saul, 141 S.Ct. 1352 (2021).
Parker disputes whether § 3346(a)(2) of the FVRA permitted Ms. Berryhill to resume her role as Acting Commissioner after President Trump submitted Mr. Saul's nomination to the Senate on April 17, 2018. Parker maintains that Ms. Berryhill's tenure under the FVRA expired before she ratified the appointment of all SSA ALJs on July 16, 2018. Thus, Parker maintains that the ALJ who decided her case was not properly appointed under the Appointments Clause, as Ms. Berryhill lacked the authority to ratify any appointments of SSA ALJs. She argues that remand for a new hearing, before a properly appointed official, is required. The Court disagrees.
Other District Court opinions have already squarely addressed the issue Parker raises. All of them, apart from a single case relied upon by Parker, have flatly rejected Parker's position.Although it appears no judge within the District of South Carolina has opined on the issue, the undersigned finds persuasive the District Courts within the Fourth Circuit which have. Recently, Judge Mullen of the Western District of North Carolina held, in pertinent part:
Parker urges this Court to embrace Brian T.D. v. Kijakazi, 580 F.Supp.3d 615, 617 (D. Minn. 2022), appealfiled, No. 22-1601 (8th Cir. Mar. 22, 2022), in which a District Court concluded that because the initial 210-day acting service period lapsed before the submission of Mr. Saul's nomination in April 2018, Ms. Berryhill could not serve as Acting Commissioner during the pendency of the nomination and thus could not lawfully ratify and approve the appointments of SSA ALJs as her own. Like other courts in the Fourth Circuit, the undersigned does not find Brian T.D. persuasive. See, e.g., Lance M. v. Kijakazi, No. 2:21-CV-628, 2022 WL 3009122, at *14 (E.D. Va. July 13, 2022) (collecting cases rejecting Brian T.D.'s interpretation of the FVRA), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:21CV628, 2022 WL 3007588 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2022).
Statutory interpretation “begins with the text.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638 (2016). Here, the text of § 3346(a)(2) is plain. Section 3346(a) provides that an acting official who is serving under the FVRA may serve “for no longer than 210 days” from the date of the vacancy, “or,” 5 U.S.C. § 3346(a)(1) (emphasis added), “once a first or second nomination for the office is submitted to the Senate ... for the period that the nomination is pending in the Senate.” Id. at § 3346(a)(2). By using the disjunctive “or,” the FVRA provides for acting service during either or both of two periods: (1) for 210 days after the vacancy, or (2) during the pendency of a first or second nomination. It provides a single trigger for permissible service during a first or second nomination's pendency: the submission of the nomination. Thus, under § 3346(a)(2)'s plain text, “once” Mr. Saul's “nomination for the office” of Commissioner “[wa]s submitted to the Senate,” Ms. Berryhill could serve “for the period that the nomination [wa]s pending in the Senate.” Id.
Tellingly, the actual text of the statute does not mention any requirement that a nomination be submitted within the initial 210-day period. The statute simply says that “once a first or second nomination ... is submitted,” the acting official designated under the FVRA may serve “for the period that the nomination is pending.” 5 U.S.C. § 3346(a)(2) (emphasis added). Congress certainly could have chosen to condition such service on the submission of a nomination within 210 days, but it did not. The Court must “resist reading words ... into a statute that do not appear on its face.” Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009) (cleaned up).
The great majority of courts that have addressed this issue agree that § 3346(a)(2) “contains a ‘spring-back' provision that enabled Ms. Berryhill to resume her role as Acting Commissioner as of the date that Andrew Saul was nominated for Commissioner in April 2018.” Thomas S. v. Comm'r, No. C21-05213-MAT, 2022 WL 268844, at *3 n.2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2022); see also Reuter v. Saul, No. 19-CV-2053-LRR, 2020 WL 7222109, at *15 n.11 (N.D. Iowa May 29, 2020), adopted by 2020 WL 6161405, at *6 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 21, 2020); Nw. Immigrant Rts. Proj. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 496 F.Supp.3d 31, 5758 (D.D.C. 2020) (although “far more than 210 days passed” after resignation of permanent official before submission of nomination, a “separate provision of the FVRA permits an acting official to serve ‘from the date of' a first nomination for the vacant office and ‘for the period that the nomination is pending in the Senate,'” such that acting official could “lawfully serv[e] as Acting Secretary” upon submission of nomination).
Moreover, the legislative history and the views of the Executive Branch and Legislative Branch confirm that § 3346(a)(2) serves as a spring-back provision. The Senate Report accompanying the bill that became the FVRA explained that “[u]nder new section 3346(a)(2),” an acting officer could serve for 150 days and “may serve while that nomination is pending ... even if the nomination is submitted
after the 150 days has passed.” S. Rep. No. 105-250, at 14 (1998) (emphasis added). By contrast, “between the 151st day and the day the nomination is submitted,” the office must remain vacant. Id. at 14; see also Id. at 18. The Executive Branch has understood § 3346(a)(2) to operate this way since the FVRA's enactment. See Guidance on Application of Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 23 Op. O.L.C. 60, 68 (1999) (FVRA “permits an acting officer” to serve “again upon the submission of a nomination, even if the 210-day period expired before that nomination was submitted”).
The Government Accountability Office-a non-partisan agency within the legislative Branch specifically tasked by Congress with monitoring the Executive Branch's compliance with § 3346 also agrees. See, e.g., Violation of the 210-Day Limit Imposed by the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998-Department of Energy, Director of Office of Science, B-328888 (GAO Mar. 3, 2017) (acting official whose initial 210-days had expired “could resume her service ... when the President submitted [a] nomination to the Senate”), https://www.gao.gov/assets/b-328888.pdf. Thus, the Executive and Legislative Branches agree that § 3346(a)(2) permits acting service during the pendency of a first or second nomination without regard to when the nomination is submitted.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court is persuaded that the Plaintiff's argument is without merit.Williams v. Kijakazi, No. 1:21-CV-141-GCM, 2022 WL 2163008, at *3-4 (W.D. N.C. June 15, 2022) (footnotes omitted).
Judge Mullen's reasoning in Williams is sound, and the undersigned incorporates it into this Report and Recommendation as the basis for rejecting Parker's arguments on this issue. Indeed, the plain language of 5 U.S.C. § 3346 allowed Ms. Berryhill to resume her role as Acting Commissioner on the date that Mr. Saul was nominated. Consequently, she had the necessary statutory authority to ratify the appointment of the SSA ALJs in 2018 and thus remand on this basis is not warranted.
B. Medical opinion evidence
Parker argues the ALJ's evaluation of medical opinion evidence is not supported by substantial evidence. ECF No. 9 at 12-19. Specifically, Parker maintains that the ALJ's persuasiveness evaluation of Dr. John Womack-Parker's treating physician-was “formulated using misrepresented or cherrypicked evidence.” ECF No. 9 at 19. She further argues that the ALJ failed to evaluate the relevant factors under the new regulations while considering the persuasiveness of Dr. Womack's opinion. ECF No. 9 at 16-17. The Court disagrees.
Effective March 27, 2017, numerous social security regulations and social security rulings (SSRs) were amended or superseded, making the new regulations applicable to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 FR 5844-01, 2017 WL 168819 (Jan. 18, 2017), corrected by 82 Fed.Reg. 15132-01, 2017 WL 1105368 (Mar. 27, 2017). Because Parker's claim for benefits was filed after March 27, 2017, the ALJ was required to evaluate the application under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and 416.920c.
Social Security Rulings, or “SSRs,” are “interpretations by the Social Security Administration of the Social Security Act.” Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1204 n.3 (4th Cir. 1995). They do not carry the force of law but are “binding on all components of the Social Security Administration,” 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1), as well as on ALJs when they are adjudicating Social Security cases. See Bray v. Comm r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2009).
Under the new regulations, the ALJ is not to defer to or give any specific weight to medical opinions based on their source. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Rather, ALJs are instructed to consider and evaluate the persuasiveness of the opinion evidence by considering the following factors: (1) supportability, (2) consistency, (3) relationship with the claimant, (4) specialization, and (5) other factors that tend to support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b), (c), 416.920c(b), (c). Supportability and consistency are the most important factors to consider, and an ALJ must explain how these factors are considered in the determination or decision. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), (b)(2), 416.920c(a), (b)(2). The ALJ may, but is not required to, explain how the other factors are considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), (c), 416.920c(b)(2), (c).
This effectively does away with the so called “Treating Physician Rule” under the provisions of 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2) and 416.927(c)(2), whereby an ALJ was directed to give controlling weight to the opinion of a treating physician if it was well supported by medically-acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and was not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence of record. In addition, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(5) and 416.927(c)(5) provided that ALJ's should “generally give more weight to the opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty than to the opinion of a medical source who is not a specialist.”
This represents another significant departure from the requirements of 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) and 416.927(c), whereby, if the ALJ declined to accord controlling weight to the treating physician's opinion, he was to weigh the medical opinions of record based on all of the following factors: (1) examining relationship; (2) treating relationship; (3) supportability; (4) consistency; (5) specialization; and (6) other factors that tended to support or contradict the opinion.
The supportability factor looks inward-directing an ALJ to examine: (1) the extent to which the objective medical evidence presented by the medical source supports that medical source's opinion; and (2) whether the medical source supports the opinion with explanation.Conversely, the consistency factor looks outward-directing an ALJ to evaluate a medical source's opinion in comparison to other evidence in the record. Put differently, the ALJ's analysis considers whether the medical source's opinion: (1) is supported by the source's own records and explanations; and (2) is consistent with the other evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(2), 416.920c(c)(1)-(2).
In evaluating the supportability factor, “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1); 416.920c(c)(1). “Supportability” denotes “[t]he extent to which a medical source's opinion is supported by relevant objective medical evidence and the source's supporting explanation.” Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed.Reg. 5844-01, 5853, 2017 WL 168819 (Jan. 18, 2017); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1); 416.920c(c)(1).
As for the consistency factor, “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2). In other words, “consistency” denotes “the extent to which the opinion is consistent with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim.” Revisions to Rules, 82 Fed.Reg. at 5853; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(1).
Although these amended regulations do away with the idea of assigning “weight” to medical opinions, the ALJ's reasons for finding the opinion of a medical source unpersuasive still must be supported by substantial evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has repeatedly stated that “[a]n ALJ has the obligation to consider all relevant medical evidence and cannot simply cherrypick facts that support a finding of nondisability while ignoring evidence that points to a disability finding.” Lewis, 858 F.3d at 869 (quoting Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010)); see also Arakas v. Comm 'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 983 F.3d 83, 98 (4th Cir. 2020). Moreover, an ALJ continues to have an obligation to “include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion.” Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 190 (4th Cir. 2016) (quotingMascio, 780 F.3d at 636); see also SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at *7 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996) (“The RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).”). Similarly, remand may be appropriate when the courts are left to guess at how the ALJ arrived at the conclusions and meaningful review is frustrated. Mascio, 780 F.3d 636-37. The ALJ must “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [her] conclusion.” Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189 (citation omitted).
Here, in June 2020, Dr. Womack completed a questionnaire in which he noted that he had treated Parker from February 2020 to June 2020 for right ankle post-traumatic arthritis, and he further noted the severity of her pain was 3/10. R.p. 692. He opined that Parker's pain would interfere with the attention and concentration needed to perform even simple work tasks “constantly.” R.p. 693. He also opined that Parker could walk one block without rest or severe pain, sit for more than two hours at one time and for a total of at least six hours in an eight-hour workday; stand for thirty minutes at one time and stand/walk for a total of less than two hours in an eight-hour workday; required position changes, unscheduled breaks, and the use of a cane; could never lift less than tend pounds; and would be absent more than four days per month. R.pp. 693-95.
In evaluating the persuasiveness of Dr. Womack's opinion, the ALJ found:
I find the medical source statements of claimant's treating physician, John Womack, M.D. not persuasive (21F; 23F). On June 29, 2020, Dr. Womack opined the claimant could walk one block without rest or severe pain, she could stand for 30 minutes at one time, stand/walk less than 2 hours in an 8-hour workday, she requires a position that requires the ability to change positions at will, she needs a 15 minute break every one hour, she should elevate her feet with prolonged sitting, she requires the use of an assistive device, she can never lift less or more than ten pounds, and never twist, crouch or squat, never stoop, and never climb stairs.
[]
However, this opinion is not persuasive because it is not supported by Dr. Womack's own treatment records. For example, on May 18, 2020, Dr. Womack noted the claimant continued to heal well with no complications and no documentation of significant pain (20F/1). At that visit, she was continued in her walking boot and there is no documentation of significant treatment for pain (20F/1). In September 2020, after her second surgery, she reported improved ankle pain with only “some” burning sensation in the top of the foot and there is no evidence of significant ankle pain reported thereafter. Dr. Womack's treatment records show no objective documentation of significantly limited right ankle/foot strength, diminished sensation, or absent reflexes, supporting such restrictive limitations and the severity. Furthermore, his opinion was rendered shortly before the claimant's July 2020 surgery to remove hardware that was causing pain at the locking screws, which appears to have relieved this issue.
[]
Lastly, Dr. Womack's opinion is not consistent with the opinions of the two state agency medical consultants and it is also internally inconsistent with Dr. Womack's own May 18, 2020 documentation that the claimant would like to return to work, as well as his own May 20, 2020 return to work note (20F/1; 21F/1). Additionally, Dr. Womack opined that her symptoms would constantly interfere with her concentration and attention (23F/2). However, this is internally inconsistent with his report that her pain was only at a 3/10 and it is not supported by her longitudinal records for reasons discussed herein (23F/1). Furthermore, Dr. Womack is not a mental health specialist and his opinion is not consistent with the medical findings of the state agency psychological consultants. Therefore, Dr. Womack's medical opinion is not persuasive.
[]
Additionally, his return to work note (21F) is not persuasive as it is also shortly after her initial surgery, intended to be temporary and specific to her treatment at that snapshot in time, and it is largely a statement on an issue reserved to the
Commissioner, making it inherently neither valuable nor persuasive to the issue of whether the claimant is disabled (CFR 404.1527(e)(1)(3)).R.p. 35 (paragraph breaks added for ease of reading).
Upon review of the ALJ's persuasiveness evaluation, the undersigned finds no error. A plain reading of the above reveals that the ALJ considered the supportability and consistency factors, as required by the new regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), (b)(2), 416.920c(a), (b)(2).
The Court turns to Parker's contentions of error. Although Parker mentions the ALJ's consideration of the supportability and consistency factors, much of Parker's arguments focus on the other factors an ALJ considers under the new regulations. Specifically, she makes arguments that touch on the “specialization” factor and the “relationship with the claimant” factor. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b), (c), 416.920c(b), (c). Further, she argues the ALJ cherry-picked evidence.
1. Specialization factor
First, Parker takes issue with the ALJ's finding that Dr. Womack's opinion was not consistent with the opinions of the two state agency medical consultants and suggests that the state agency doctors were not sufficiently specialized. ECF No. 9 at 15-16. She appears to suggest that because Dr. Womack is a specialist, the ALJ erred in evaluating Dr. Womack's opinion against the opinions of the two state agency medical consultants who both have a differing specialty. Parker cites to no case law that supports this position. It is unclear what error Parker believes occurred here, as the consistency factor directs the ALJ to consider “the extent to which the opinion is consistent with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim.” Revisions to Rules, 82 Fed.Reg. at 5853 (emphasis added); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2). This is proper under the regulations, and the regulations do not suggest that an ALJ may not consider opinions from doctors in varying specialties while assessing the consistency factor during a persuasiveness evaluation. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(4), 416.920c(c)(4) (noting “a specialist may be more persuasive about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty” than a non-specialist opinion (emphasis added)). Moreover, Parker does not argue that the ALJ's persuasiveness evaluation of the two state agency medical consultants was done in error. To the extent Parker suggests the ALJ did not adequately articulate his consideration of this factor, the new regulations do not require an ALJ to explain how the other factors, such as specialization, are considered. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), (c), 416.920c(b)(2), (c).
The new regulations now define “findings . . . about a medical issue made by Federal and State agency medical and psychological consultants at a prior level of review” as “prior administrative medical finding[s],” instead of “medical opinions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(5). This is because Federal and State agency medical and psychological consultants are “highly qualified and experts in Social Security disability evaluation,” who often make “administrative findings about the medical issues” on behalf the Commissioner (including, for example, the claimant's residual functional capacity) at the initial and reconsideration levels of administrative review. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513a(a)(1), (b)(1). Regardless, as ALJs must consider this evidence in the same manner as medical opinions, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c, the undersigned will refer to the prior administrative findings as “opinions” in this decision.
2. Relationship factor
Second, Parker contends that the ALJ did not acknowledge or consider that Dr. Womack was a treating provider with a longitudinal treatment history. ECF No. 9 at 16-17. The Court is unpersuaded. Again, the new regulations do not require an ALJ to explain how the “relationship with the claimant” factor was considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), (c), 416.920c(b)(2), (c). In any event, the ALJ's review of Dr. Womack's treatment records and the June 2020 opinion shows that he recognized the nature and length of Dr. Womack's treatment. See R.pp. 30-31. Indeed, the ALJ specifically noted-in first sentence of the persuasiveness evaluation-that Dr. Womack was Parker's treating physician. See R.p. 35. Thus, Parker's assertion that “it is apparent the ALJ did not evaluate these factors” is unpersuasive. ECF No. 9 at 17. To the extent Parker seems to suggest the ALJ owed any sort of deference to Dr. Womack's opinion because he had a treating relationship with Parker, the new regulations have done away with the idea of deferring or giving specific weight to medical opinions-including those opinions of a treating physician. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a) (providing that ALJs “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from [a claimant's] medical sources”); Revisions to Rules, 82 Fed.Reg. at 5853 (noting the rules “do not create an automatic hierarchy for treating sources, examining sources, then nonexamining sources to which [an ALJ] must mechanically adhere”).
The first question in the June 2020 opinion asks for Dr. Womack to state the frequency and length of contact with Parker. R.p. 692. Dr. Womack noted that he treated Parker from February 7, 2020, to June 24, 2020-approximately four and a half months. R.p. 692.
3. Discussion of Evidence
Finally, Parker argues that the ALJ cherry-picked evidence “to favor his preferred conclusion.” ECF No. 9 at 14-15. Parker points to other evidence to show that she continued to experience ankle pain, including Dr. Krakowiak's April 2020 note (written two months after her surgery) that she had chronic ankle pain that had required extra oxycodone (R.pp. 630-31); that she required additional surgery for hardware removal because of pain (R.pp. 704-06); and that, in September 2020, she reported a burning sensation on the top of her foot, at which time Dr. Krakowiak increased her medication and noted that her surgeon had referred her for pain management (R.p. 904). ECF No. 9 at 15. Parker further appears to accuse the ALJ of misstating evidence and suggests, in her Reply, that the ALJ “played doctor” in assessing Dr. Womack's opinion. ECF No. 9 at 14, 17-19; ECF No. 13 at 1-2.
A review of the ALJ's entire decision reveals that the ALJ cited and discussed the evidence that Parker relies on. See R.pp. 29-33. Consequently, the ALJ did not disregard or ignore this evidence. See Hobbs v. Saul, No. 2:20CV00004, 2021 WL 1574421, at *10 (W.D. Va. Apr. 22, 2021) (noting, “where an ALJ analyzes evidence in one part of his decision, there is no requirement that he rehash that discussion in other parts of his analysis” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Smith v. Colvin, No. 6:15-CV-1750-PMD-KFM, 2016 WL 2619474, at *3 (D.S.C. May 9, 2016) (“[T]he ALJ's decision shows he carefully considered all the evidence in the record and, where appropriate, even made findings that favored [the claimant].”). Thus, the ALJ did not selectively rely on some evidence to the exclusion of evidence favorable to Parker, but instead carefully considered the relevant evidence in the context of the entire record when assessing the persuasiveness of Dr. Womack's opinion. See R.p. 35; see also Smith, 2016 WL 2619474, at *3 (rejecting the claimant's argument that the ALJ cherry-picked the evidence where the ALJ did not rely on some evidence to the exclusion of evidence favorable to claimant). In essence, Parker asks the Court to accept her interpretation of the evidence over the ALJ's and read the evidence differently. That is not the role of this Court. See Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472 (noting a reviewing court does not reweigh conflicts in evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ). Furthermore, to the extent Parker appears to suggest that the ALJ “played doctor” by merely discussing how Dr. Womack's treatment notes did not support the limitations he opined Parker to have, the Court finds no error. See Edwards v. Saul, No. 1:20-CV-2280-SVH, 2021 WL 210852, at *14 (D.S.C. Jan. 20, 2021) (finding an ALJ did not impermissibly “play doctor” where the ALJ “considered the findings Dr. Early cited to support his opinion, but also considered other evidence from his exam and the other evidence of record that did not support his opinion”).
For example, the ALJ discounted Dr. Womack's opinion that Parker's pain and other symptoms would constantly interfere with the concentration and attention needed to perform even simple work, reasoning that this opinion was internally inconsistent with Dr. Womack's report that Parker's pain was only at a 3/10. See R.pp. 692-93; ECF No. 9 at 18. Parker argues that just because “Parker's pain was a ‘3' does not render Dr. Womack's opinion that her pain was ‘severe enough to interfere with attention and concentration' inconsistent.” ECF No. 9 at 18. Parker's argument misses the mark: this Court is tasked with determining whether the ALJ's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ's conclusions here certainly pass this low bar. See Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154 (noting substantial evidence is an evidentiary standard that is not high: it is “more than a mere scintilla” and means only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”). That is, a reasonable mind can certainly accept that a pain level of 3/10 is inconsistent with an opinion that this pain would constantly interfere (i.e., the highest level of interference) with concentration and attention needed to perform simple work.
In sum, the undersigned finds that the ALJ's persuasiveness evaluation of Dr. Womack's opinion was sufficiently thorough and subject to meaningful review. To the extent Parker argues other evidence in the record supports her position, this Court may not overturn a decision that is supported by substantial evidence just because the record may contain conflicting evidence. See Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1996) (“We must sustain the ALJ's decision, even if we disagree with it, provided the determination is supported by substantial evidence . . . [t]he duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence rests with the ALJ, not with a reviewing court.”). It is the job of the ALJ to weigh evidence and resolve any evidentiary conflicts, not this Court. See Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (“In reviewing for substantial evidence, we do not undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute our judgment for that of the [ALJ].” (citation omitted)). Parker merely presents a disagreement with the ALJ's persuasiveness evaluation and fails to show reversible error. Consequently, the undersigned finds that the ALJ's persuasiveness evaluation of Dr. Womack's opinion was proper.
C. Failure to account for mild limitations in RFC
Parker argues that the ALJ failed to properly account for her limitations in mental functioning when formulating the RFC. The Court disagrees.
An ALJ must follow a “special technique” to determine the severity of a claimant's mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(a), 416.920a(a). First, the ALJ evaluates the claimant's pertinent symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings to determine if she has a medically determinable mental impairment. Id. §§ 404.1520a(b)(1), 416.920a(b)(1). Second, assuming the claimant does have a medically determinable mental impairment, the ALJ rates the claimant's degree of functional limitation resulting from the impairment(s). Id. §§ 404.1520a(b)(2), 416.920a(b)(2).
To rate a claimant's degree of functional limitation, the ALJ determines the degree to which the impairment interferes with the claimant's overall “ability to function independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis” in four broad areas of mental functioning: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or managing oneself. Id. §§ 404.1520a(c)(3), 416.920a(c)(3). The functional areas are rated on a five-point scale: none, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme. Id. §§ 404.1520a(c)(4), 416.920a(c)(4).
The ratings of these four broad areas of mental functioning affect whether the claimant's mental impairment will be considered severe or not severe. Id. §§ 404.1520a(d), 416.920a(d). The ALJ will generally find that a claimant's mental impairment is non-severe if the limitations are rated as “none” or “mild.” See id. §§ 404.1520a(d)(1), 416.920a(d)(1). If the ALJ determines the impairment is severe, he then determines “whether it qualifies as a listed impairment.” Patterson v. Comm r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 846 F.3d 656, 659 (4th Cir. 2017); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(d)(2), 416.920a(d)(2).
Finally, even when a mental impairment is found to be non-severe, the ALJ must nevertheless consider it in determining the claimant's RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(e), 416.945(e); see also SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5 (“In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must consider limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an individual's impairments, even those that are not ‘severe.'”).
Here, the ALJ properly applied the special technique in determining that Parker's mental impairments (social anxiety disorder and opioid disorder in remission) were non-severe. R.pp. 2427. The ALJ explained that Parker's “medically determinable mental impairments, considered singly and in combination, do not cause more than minimal limitation in the claimant's ability to perform basic mental work activities and are therefore non-severe.” R.p. 25. After discussing the limited evidence related to Parker's mental impairments depression-which included treatment records, state agency medical opinions, and mental exams-the ALJ determined Parker's limitations in all four areas of mental functioning. R.pp. 25-26. Specifically, that ALJ found that Parker had no limitation in the two broad areas of (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; and (2) in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. The ALJ further determined that Parker had only mild limitations in the other two broad areas of (1) interacting with others; and (2) adapting or managing oneself. R.pp 25-26.
In reaching these findings, the ALJ noted that Parker received minimal mental health treatment, her mental status examination findings were predominately normal, and Parker engaged in a range of daily activities. R.pp. 25-26. The ALJ concluded that, because Parker's medically determinable mental impairments “cause no more than ‘mild' limitation in any of the functional areas and the evidence does not otherwise indicate that there is more than a minimal limitation in the claimant's ability to do basic work activities, they are non-severe.” R.p. 26 (underline in original). Later, when formulating the RFC, the ALJ did not include any mental limitations corresponding to Parker's non-severe mental impairments. R.p. 28.
Parker does not challenge the ALJ's finding that her mental impairments were non-severe. See ECF No. 9 at 19-22. Instead, Parker appears to argue that the ALJ's finding of a “mild” limitation in (1) interacting with others and (2) adapting or managing oneself necessitated a corresponding limitation in her RFC. Alternatively, she argues that the ALJ was required to explain why a corresponding limitation was not needed in the RFC assessment. ECF No. 9 at 21-22. Based on the cases upon which Parker relies, it appears she is arguing that the ALJ here committed a similar error as the ALJ in Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015), but in a situation where the impairments at issue were found to be non-severe and the limitations found were only “mild.” Cf. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635-38. The undersigned is unpersuaded for three reasons.
1. The ALJ did not err under Mascio.
First, Mascio is materially distinguishable from Parker's case, and, in any event, its reasoning does not extend as far as Parker appears to advocate. In Mascio, the claimant's mental impairments were determined to be severe, and the claimant had “moderate” difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded that an ALJ who determines that a claimant has a “moderate” limitation in the functional area of concentration, persistence, or pace must either account for that limitation or explain why he declined to do so. Id. at 638; see also Shinaberry v. Saul, 952 F.3d 113, 121-22 (4th Cir. 2020). Here, however, Parker's mental impairments were determined to be non-severe, and she only had “mild” limitations in the two categories of (1) interacting with others and (2) adapting or managing oneself. Notably, a “moderate” limitation is greater than a “mild” limitation, and the Fourth Circuit has not extended Mascio to those instances in which an ALJ identifies only “mild” mental limitations when performing the “special technique.” See Britt v. Saul, 860 Fed.Appx. 256, 262 n.3 (4th Cir. 2021). Additionally, the Fourth Circuit has not extended Mascio's reasoning to the categories of interacting with others and/or adapting or managing oneself. See Lemon v. Kijakazi, No. 4:20-CV-02310-TER, 2021 WL 3661151, at *8 (D.S.C. Aug. 18, 2021) (noting Mascio has not been expanded). That is, “[t]here is no ‘conversion' rule/required accommodation in the RFC when a ‘moderate' social limitation is found at an earlier step; the normal RFC regulations still apply- that the ALJ must support the RFC findings with substantial evidence.” Id. Thus, as a practical matter, not only is Parker's case materially distinguishable from the situation in Mascio, but Parker has also not shown error here based on the Fourth Circuit's application of Mascio.
Parker argues that the ALJ “should have accounted for a limitation in [the] RFC assessment for interacting with the general public, coworkers, and supervisors.” ECF No. 9 at 21. The Court notes that other District Courts within the Fourth Circuit have extended the holding in Mascio to require an ALJ to either (1) include restrictions in the RFC when the ALJ has found a moderate limitation at step three or (2) justify the omission of any such restriction. See, e.g., Dennis v. Berryhill, 362 F.Supp.3d 303, 309 (W.D. N.C. 2019) (“Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff has a ‘moderate limitation' with ‘interacting with others.' This finding necessitates the ALJ include either a corresponding limitation in the RFC assessment or an explanation as to why one was not necessary.” (internal citation omitted)); Smith v. Berryhill, No. CV CBD-18-0381, 2018 WL 6249692, at *9 (D. Md. Nov. 29, 2018) (same). However, even those courts which have extended the reach of Mascio have held that it is “not required that a corresponding RFC restriction specifically address interactions with each category of individuals-coworkers, supervisors, and the public.” Smith, 2018 WL 6249692, at *8 (emphasis added). Those courts have fallen back on the overarching requirement that an ALJ must provide a narrative discussion that builds an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to their conclusion. See id.; Dennis, 362 F.Supp.3d at 309; Linares v. Saul, No. 5:19-CV-00129-FDW, 2020 WL 5878448, at *5 (W.D. N.C. Oct. 2, 2020) (“While the Court recognizes it is not necessary for an ALJ to address interactions with each category of individuals[-i.e., coworkers, supervisors, and the public-]in his RFC determination, the Court should not be left to guess about how the ALJ arrived at his conclusions.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Thus, even assuming Mascio applies to the category of interacting with others and imposes the same requirements on an ALJ if a mild limitation were found, the undersigned is unpersuaded Parker has shown that the ALJ needed to also address Parker's ability to interact with the general public, coworkers, and supervisors. See Dennis, 362 F.Supp.3d at 308 (noting “the ALJ is not required to include a corresponding restriction to address interactions with each category of individuals-coworkers, supervisors, and the public-in her RFC determination,” assuming there is an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to the ALJ's conclusion).
2. “Mild” difficulties are materially different from “moderate” difficulties.
Second, Parker's position ignores what the regulations contemplate regarding non-severe impairments. To reiterate: the ALJ here only found mild limitations in the two broad areas of (1) interacting with others; and (2) adapting or managing oneself; and no limitation in the other two broad areas of (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; and (2) in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, which resulted in the non-severe classification of her mental impairments. See R.pp 25-26. Under the regulations, “mild” difficulties are materially different from “moderate” difficulties, in that mild difficulties have little to no effect on a claimant's ability to function independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis in the four areas of mental functioning-which corresponds to a finding that the difficulties do not significantly limit the claimant's mental ability to do basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(d)(1), 416.920a(d)(1); see also Sanford v. Saul, No. 5:18-CV-2886-KDW, 2020 WL 633743, at *20 (D.S.C. Feb. 11, 2020) (“Under the regulations, mild difficulties are materially different from moderate difficulties, in that mild difficulties have little to no effect on a claimant's concentration, persistence, or pace and correspond to a finding that the difficulties do not significantly limit the claimant's mental abilities to do basic work activities.” ((cleaned up) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)). Consequently, as these mild difficulties have little to no effect on Parker's ability to do basic work activities, the Court does not find the ALJ erred by not specifically accounting for them in the RFC determination. See Morgan v. Saul, No. 1:19-CV-00003-FDW, 2020 WL 290870, at *4 (W.D. N.C. Jan. 21, 2020) (“[A] mild incapacity is not required to become an RFC requirement. It is only required that the ALJ discuss the incapacity and determine whether it is severe enough to affect the functioning of the claimant. Here the ALJ did exactly that.”).
3. The ALJ did not need to further explain his reasoning.
Third, related to this idea, Parker's argument that the ALJ needed to further explain his decision is unpersuasive. Notably, Parker does not challenge the ALJ's non-severity finding that resulted from the “mild” and “no limitations” findings in the four broad areas of mental functioning. If an impairment is non-severe, it, by definition, does not significantly limit a claimant's ability to do basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1522(a), 416.922(a). Thus, the need for a more thorough explanation as to why the ALJ omitted corresponding restrictions related to Parker's non-severe impairments is significantly diminished. See Sprague v. Colvin, No. 8:13-CV-576-T-TGW, 2014 WL 2579629, at *6 (M.D. Fla. June 9, 2014) (noting, “in many, if not most cases, there will be no functional limitations from a non[-]severe impairment”). That is, the ALJ's decision to omit limitations in the RFC makes logical sense, and the Court is not “left to guess” at why the ALJ did so here. See Perry v. Colvin, No. 2:15-CV-01145, 2016 WL 1183155, at *4 (S.D. W.Va. Mar. 28, 2016) (“The less functional limitation the ALJ determines a given mental impairment to impose on an individual's ability to work at step two, the less will be the need for the ALJ to consider such impairments in the ultimate RFC assessment.”). Although the ALJ could have, perhaps, been more explicit, the undersigned is able to cross the logical bridge from the evidence to the ALJ's ultimate conclusion. See Britt, 860 Fed.Appx. at 262 (“Meaningful review is frustrated-and remand necessary-only where we are unable to fathom the rationale in relation to evidence in the record.” (cleaned up) (emphasis added)). This is especially true where, as here, there is “limited documentation regarding [Parker's] mental impairments.” R.p. 25. Thus, the undersigned finds the ALJ's RFC assessment is subject to meaningful review and free from legal error. See Britt, 860 Fed.Appx. at 262; Brown, 873 F.3d at 267 (noting, to warrant remand, a claimant must either show the ALJ has incorrectly applied a legal standard or show the ALJ's factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence).
In sum, the undersigned finds the ALJ properly applied the special technique in assessing Parker's mental impairments. The ALJ summarized and thoroughly considered the record evidence relating to Parker's mental impairments, which included treatment records, state agency medical opinions, and mental exams. See R.pp. 25-26. The ALJ discussed the relevant evidence in thorough detail and explained the reasoning which supported his determination that Parker's mental impairments were non-severe (a finding that Parker does not challenge). Upon reading the ALJ's opinion as a whole, the ALJ's decision to omit limitations in the RFC related to Parker's mental impairments makes logical sense and does not require remand for further explanation. See Carol H. v. Kijakazi, No. 5:20-CV-00035, 2021 WL 3561241, at *13 (W.D. Va. Aug. 12, 2021) (“Read as a whole, ALJ Knight's analysis shows that she acknowledged [the claimant] had some ‘mild' mental limitations, but concluded, based on the evidence in the record, that they did not more than minimally impact her ability to perform basic work activities.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:20-CV-00035, 2021 WL 4027199 (W.D. Va. Sept. 3, 2021); Morgan v. Saul, No. 1:19-CV-00003-FDW, 2020 WL 290870, at *4 (W.D. N.C. Jan. 21, 2020) (finding the ALJ did not err by not including mental RFC limitations corresponding with the claimant's credited “mild” mental limitations where the ALJ “clearly examined all the available evidence and found [the claimant] had not successfully shown” that RFC limitations were warranted); Pavlic v. Saul, No. 1:19CV146, 2020 WL 1326217, at *2-3 (M.D. N.C. Jan. 14, 2020) (finding no error where ALJ identified “mild” mental limitations in each of the four functional areas, but included no corresponding limitations in the RFC because ALJ sufficiently explained that “the record as a whole,” including claimant's treatment, examination findings, and medical opinions, did not support any mental functional limitations), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:19CV146, 2020 WL 1322854 (M.D. N.C. Mar. 20, 2020).
V. CONCLUSION
It is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED.
The parties are directed to the next page for their rights to file objections to this recommendation.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).