Opinion
WMN-00-850.
March 19, 2001.
MEMORANDUM
Before the Court are Defendant's Motions to Dismiss (Paper No. 5 and Paper No. 10). Both motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for decision. Upon a review of the pleadings and the applicable case law, the Court determines that no hearing is necessary (Local Rule 105.6) and that Defendant's motions will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Robert T. Parker, Jr., has been an employee of the Anne Arundel County Fire Department since August 29, 1980, and currently holds the position of "Fire Inspector." Amended Compliant at ¶¶ 7-8. Plaintiff desires to be considered for either a promotion or employment in a different classification. A prerequisite to either of these requires that Plaintiff first attain the rank of First Lieutenant, which is accomplished by passing a written examination prepared and administered by Defendant. Id. at ¶¶ 9-10. Between 1986 and 1997, Plaintiff has taken, and failed, this examination on at least six occasions. Plaintiff alleges that his inability to pass the exam is due to a learning disability which makes "learning and the expression of knowledge extremely difficult." According to Plaintiff, his disability is exacerbated by the stress and pressure associated with testing conditions. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.
In anticipation of the April 1999 exam, Plaintiff was evaluated by psychologist Lawrence G. Iacarino. Dr. Iacarino confirmed Plaintiffs learning disability and made several suggestions which, if adopted, would "provide Plaintiff with an equal chance of passing" the exam. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14. These recommendations included: that Plaintiff have unlimited time in which to complete the exam; that Plaintiff be assigned a tutor to help him prepare for the exam; and, that Plaintiff be afforded the opportunity to take practice exams. Id. at ¶ 15. In March, 1999, Plaintiff made a formal request of Defendant that Dr. Iacarino's recommendations be implemented. Alternatively, Plaintiff asked that he not be required to take the written examination at all but, instead, that he be evaluated by some other criteria. Id. at ¶ 16. Plaintiff based his alternative requests on his belief that he is disabled and, therefore, entitled to reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Defendant disagreed and denied Plaintiff's request on April 7, 1999, on the ground that Plaintiff did not qualify for protection under the ADA. Id. at ¶ 17. Plaintiff sat for, and failed, the April 1999 exam.
Plaintiff subsequently filed this action alleging violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. On June 5, 2000, Plaintiff amended his complaint to include allegations that Defendant also violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief requiring that his evaluation be by some means other than a written examination, or, alternatively, that Dr. Iacarino's recommendations be implemented. In addition, Plaintiff seeks an award of interest, costs, and attorneys' fees, as well as other relief the Court may deem appropriate.
Defendant responded by filing a motion to dismiss. A second motion to dismiss was filed on June 27, 2000, in response to Plaintiff's amended complaint. The motions are nearly identical and both assert that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Plaintiff has failed to state a claim or cause of action upon which relief can be granted as Defendant is immune from suit in federal court by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiff opposes the motions on the ground that, as a county, the Eleventh Amendment does not shield Defendant from liability.
The parties also raise the issue of whether the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, which purport to abrogate State immunity, are valid exercises of Congressional authority. This issue was recently decided by the Supreme Court in Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 2001 WL 173556 (Feb. 21, 2001), with the Court holding that suits in federal court by state employees to recover money damages by reason of the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. This ruling, however, has no bearing on this case as the Court finds that Defendant is neither a "state" nor an "arm of the state" and, therefore, is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
When reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must presume all of the allegations to be true, must resolve all doubts and inferences in favor of plaintiff and must view the allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999). The complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).III. DISCUSSION
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Cons. amend. XI. The "[a]doption of the Amendment responded most immediately to the States' fears that `federal courts would force them to pay their Revolutionary War debts, leading to their financial ruin.'" Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39 (1994) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 151 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence also "emphasizes the integrity retained by each State in our federal system," Hess, 513 U.S. at 39; i.e., "that the States, although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign immunity." Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).
Although by its terms the Eleventh Amendment applies only to suits brought against a state by "Citizens of another State," it is well established that "`an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.'" Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d 426, 430 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)). This immunity extends as well to state agencies and other government entities properly characterized as "arm[s] of the State," Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977), but does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations. See Garrett, 2001 WL 173556, *8; Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890); Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 337 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1120 (1997).
Since Anne Arundel County is not a "state," Eleventh Amendment immunity is available only if Defendant can properly be characterized as an "arm of the state." The Fourth Circuit has specified the following framework for determining whether an entity is an arm of the state. The first, and key, question is whether the state treasury will be affected. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 338 (citing Hess, 513 U.S. at 48). If the answer to this question is yes, then the entity is immune under the Eleventh Amendment. If the answer to this critical question is no, then three additional factors must be considered: "`[w]hether the entity exercises a significant degree of autonomy from the state, whether it is involved with local versus statewide concerns, and how it is treated as a matter of State law.'" Harter, 101 F.3d at 340 (quoting Ram Ditta v. Maryland Nat'l Capital Park and Planning Comm'n, 822 F.2d 456, 457-58 (4th Cir. 1987)). In evaluating these additional factors, the impact on the state treasury is paramount.
There is no dispute that the state treasury will not be impacted by the judgment in this case. This undisputed fact weighs against a finding of immunity. Hess, 513 U.S. at 48. This directs the Court's focus to the three subsidiary factors.
As to the degree of Defendant's autonomy, Defendant argues that the state exercises considerable control over county fire departments which, in turn, weighs in favor of a finding of immunity. In support of this position, Defendant contends that its autonomy is limited because it must adhere to the comprehensive State Fire Prevention Code, Md. Ann. Code, art. 38A, § 3(b) (1997 repl. vol.), as well as numerous other statewide regulations contained in Article 38A.
Defendant is correct in asserting that the state exercises considerable regulatory authority over local fire departments. This regulatory authority is not, however, absolute, as state regulations "shall be held to be the minimum requirements" and local regulations may be "more stringent or impose higher standards." Id. at art. 38A § 3(c). Autonomy must be anayzed in a broader context than the laws under which an entity is formed or those which it must uphold. Autonomy also encompasses areas such as control over personnel decisions, daily operations, and budgetary matters. Defendant has provided no evidence that it is without autonomy in these areas. Although Defendant is required to abide by and enforce certain minimum state standards, it is also free to supplement these regulations and make independent decisions affecting other aspects of the operation the county fire department. The Court concludes that autonomy is not a dispositive factor in the context of this case.
Defendant concedes that the "local versus statewide concerns" factor weighs against a finding that it is an arm of the state. See Reply dated June 13, 2000, at 16-17.
The last factor involves how the entity is treated as a matter of state law. See Ram Ditta, 822 F.2d at 458. Under this factor, "[a]s a matter of federal law, a court may consider both the relevant state statutes, regulations, and constitutional provisions which characterize the entity, and the holdings of state courts on the question." Harter, 101 F.3d at 342 (citations omitted). Defendant provides no statutory, regulatory, or constitutional support for immunity based on this factor. Nor does Defendant provide any federal or state court precedent for its contention that county fire departments are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Instead, Defendant relies solely on the contention that county fire departments are similar to county school boards and, because county school boards have been held to be arms of the state, this Court should find that county fire departments are also arms of the state. See Reply dated June 13, 2000, at 12-17. In support of this assertion, Defendant offers numerous federal and Maryland state court cases.
The Court, however, finds the proffered cases unpersuasive. First, many of the cases do not provide any reasoning for the conclusion that county school boards are "arms of the state." Instead, they simply reiterate the conclusion drawn by other courts in other cases. See e.g., Rosenfeld v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 41 F. Supp.2d 581, 586 (D.Md. 1999); Chi v. Board of Educ. of Harford County, 1995 WL 131288, *3 (D.Md. Feb. 6, 1995); Board of Educ. of Prince George's County v. Mayor of Riverdale, 320 Md. 384, 388-89 (1990). Other cases actually contradict Defendant's position by highlighting the differences between county boards of education and county fire departments, making a finding as to one not necessarily applicable to the other. See Jones v. Frederick County Bd. of Educ., 689 F. Supp. 535, 537-38 (D.Md. 1988) (finding that county boards of education are state entities based on: previous decisions of the Maryland Court of Appeals; creation and government of boards of education under Maryland law; requirement that boards of education obtain state approval regarding establishment of schools, acquisition or disposal of property, construction or renovation of buildings, and curriculum; and state appropriation of substantial funds to support county boards of education); McCarthy v. Board of Educ. of Anne Arundel County, 28 Md. 634, 650-51 (1977) (asserting that board of education is an arm of the state due to the fact that state has "preempted the field" in education). Conversely, state law, while heavily influencing fire code regulation, has not preempted the field. See Md. Ann. Code, art. 38A, § 3(c) (permitting local regulations to be more stringent or impose higher standards than state regulations). Finally, no evidence has been offered to show that county fire departments are subject to state control in regards to personnel, operational or budgetary matters, or that they receive "substantial funds" from the state.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motions to dismiss will be denied. A separate order will issue.
ORDER
Pursuant to the foregoing memorandum, and for the reasons stated therein, IT IS this 19th day of March 2001, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, hereby ORDERED:
1. That Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Paper No. 5) is hereby DENIED;
2. That Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Paper No. 10) is hereby DENIED;
3. That the Clerk of the Court shall mail or transmit copies of the foregoing memorandum and this order to all counsel of record.