Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Super. Ct. No. 07CC01060, Frederick Paul Horn, Judge. Request for judicial notice.
E. Thomas Dunn, Jr., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Alicia M.B. Fowler, Assistant Attorney General, Elizabeth Hong and Ernesto J. Fong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
FYBEL, J.
Introduction
Mee Young Park filed a petition for a writ of mandate, challenging the one-year suspension of her driving privileges by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). The trial court denied Park’s petition, and Park appealed from the judgment. We affirm.
The issue before us is whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings. We conclude it does. The arresting officer’s statement and Park’s own testimony at the administrative hearing (both of which were before the trial court) establish (1) the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe Park was driving a motor vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a); (2) Park was lawfully arrested; (3) Park was properly admonished regarding the suspension or revocation of her driving privileges if she refused to submit to, or failed to complete, a chemical test to determine the alcohol content of her blood; and (4) Park refused to submit to a blood test after failing to correctly perform the breath test six times.
Statement of Facts and Procedural History
Park was involved in a traffic accident on January 3, 2007. Garden Grove Police Officer Han, who arrived at the accident scene, detected the odor of alcohol on Park’s breath and person. Park denied consuming any alcohol, and stated she had used mouthwash. Park’s eyes were moderately bloodshot and watery, her speech was slow, and Officer Han had to ask his questions many times before eliciting responses. Park’s gait was unsteady, there was a lack of “smooth pursuit” in her eyes, and she had difficulty following the directions for and was uncooperative during the field sobriety test. Park failed the field sobriety test. Officer Han offered a preliminary alcohol screening test; Park did not blow correctly into the device, and no results could be obtained.
The reference to “smooth pursuit” indicates Officer Han performed an eye-gaze nystagmus test on Park, in which the subject holds his or her head steady, while following with his or her eyes a pen the officer moves back and forth. (People v. Ojeda (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 404, 406-407.) The officer watches to see if the subject’s eyes move smoothly while tracking the pen or “‘bounce’” as they move from side to side. (Id. at p. 407.)
Park was arrested and transported to the city jail. Officer Han attempted to give Park another breath test. Park did not blow correctly into the machine. After six unsuccessful attempts to get a reading, Officer Han told Park she would not be permitted any further attempts at the breath test. Officer Han then offered to let Park take a blood test, but Park declined. An admonition regarding her failure to take an alcohol test was read to Park in English, and communicated to her in Korean. Park also read the admonition aloud in English in the presence of Officers Han and Wardle. Park was personally served with an administrative per se order of suspension or revocation of her driving privileges.
Park appealed her suspension, and a hearing was held February 15. Park admitted at the hearing she had refused to take a blood test. The DMV hearing officer made the following factual findings: (1) the police officer had reasonable cause to believe Park had been driving under the influence; (2) Park was placed under lawful arrest; (3) Park was told her driving privileges would be suspended or revoked if she refused to complete the required testing; and (4) Park refused or failed to complete the chemical test after being requested to do so by a police officer. A one-year suspension of Park’s driving privileges was imposed. The hearing officer’s decision was affirmed following a departmental review.
Park then filed a petition for a writ of mandate to challenge the DMV’s suspension of her driving privileges. The trial court denied Park’s petition, and entered judgment in favor of the DMV. Park timely appealed.
Discussion
We review a judgment denying a petition for a writ of mandate challenging an administrative suspension of driving privileges for substantial evidence. “In ruling on an application for a writ of mandate following an order of suspension or revocation, a trial court is required to determine, based on its independent judgment, ‘“whether the weight of the evidence supported the administrative decision.”’ [Citation.] Here, as noted above, the trial court denied the petition. On appeal, we ‘need only review the record to determine whether the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘“We must resolve all evidentiary conflicts and draw all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court’s decision. [Citations.] Where the evidence supports more than one inference, we may not substitute our deductions for the trial court’s. [Citation.] We may overturn the trial court’s factual findings only if the evidence before the trial court is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain those findings. [Citation.]”’ [Citation.]” (Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 456-457.)
Park’s appeal asks this court to reweigh and reinterpret the evidence before the DMV hearing officer. We cannot do so. The single issue before us is whether the trial court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. We conclude they were.
No statement of decision was requested or prepared. We therefore infer the trial court made all factual findings necessary to support the judgment. (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58.) In this case, the doctrine of implied findings requires us to infer the trial court found Officer Han had reasonable cause to believe Park had been driving under the influence, the arrest was lawful, Park was given a proper admonition, and Park refused to take or failed a chemical test after being asked to do so. With respect to Park’s arrest for violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a), there was more than sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings. Officer Han’s physical observations of Park, as well as the statements of witnesses identifying Park as the driver of the car involved in the traffic accident, constituted reasonable cause for Officer Han to suspect Park of driving under the influence of alcohol. (Park raises no challenge to the lawfulness of her arrest, other than the lack of reasonable cause for it.) With respect to the admonition, the trial court had before it a copy of Officer Han’s sworn statement; this statement in itself was substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding. With respect to Park’s refusal to take or failure of a chemical test, in addition to Officer Han’s statement, the trial court also had before it Park’s own testimony from the DMV administrative hearing, at which Park admitted she had refused to take the blood test. Park might have subjectively believed she had passed the breath test and did not need to take the blood test when Officer Han asked her to do so; her belief does not, however, eliminate the substantial evidence of Park’s failure of the breath test and refusal to take the blood test.
Park requested that this court take judicial notice of the superior court docket showing the criminal charge of driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) was dismissed when she pleaded guilty to a charge of reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 23103, subd. (a)). We may take judicial notice of a trial court’s docket sheet (Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 755). However, we exercise our discretion not to do so in this case (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1)) because the resolution of Park’s criminal case by means of a plea is irrelevant to our determination of the single issue in this case – whether there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s judgment.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent to recover costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: O’LEARY, ACTING P. J., MOORE, J.