Opinion
01 C 4730
December 14, 2001
This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1988 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff Manuel Paredes alleges that following his arrest for disorderly conduct, he was severely and unjustifiably beaten by two defendant officers while in custody. Defendants have moved to dismiss Mr. Paredes' complaint, which I am denying for the reasons stated below.
Central to defendants' motion is ¶ 16 of Mr. Paredes complaint which states that "[f]ollowing the events described in the preceding paragraphs, Officers Dekiel, Acevez, Lewandowski, Patnaude and Brantley wrote false police reports to protect themselves and their colleagues." Defendants argue that this paragraph challenges the validity of Mr. Paredes' assault conviction (which has not been invalidated or challenged) and thus the claim must be dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). The cases cited by defendants state that an assault conviction would not necessarily preclude a suit under § 1983, but when the entire account of the events leading up to arrest is challenged, the suit cannot proceed. See, e.g., Jayne v. Kozak, 10 F. Supp.2d 1032, 1035 (C.D.Ill. 1998). Mr. Paredes responds with the contention that his complaint targets the officers' conduct subsequent to his arrest, not the events leading up to it; therefore, no challenge to his assault conviction is posed.
The complaint is subject to multiple interpretations, and I find the parties' interpretations to be equally plausible. "[E]vents described in the preceding paragraphs" could refer to the preceding two paragraphs describing the alleged beating or to the entire section of the complaint which includes mention of the arrest. Since nothing in the complaint unequivocally indicates a direct challenge to the arrest itself, it is feasible to read the complaint as alleging that the officers lied only about the alleged beating in their report. In deciding a motion to dismiss, I must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff and thus accept Mr. Paredes' interpretation for the purposes of this motion.
Defendants also challenge Mr.Paredes' municipal policy claim against the Town of Cicero for failure to plead an adequate municipal policy or custom. Although Mr. Paredes' allegations are not extremely detailed, he does allege that because the Town of Cicero and Chief of Police Rowan failed to instruct, supervise, control, and discipline its police officers, there was consequent failure to prevent or aid the alleged wrongs. Additionally, Mr. Paredes alleges that the Town of Cicero maintains a de facto code of silence under which officers will not testify against each other. Such pleadings, even if guilty of paucity, are adequate to overcome this motion. See Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel Crest, 10 F.3d 467, 479-80 (7th Cir. 1997). Defendants cite the statement, "[t]he allegations in this paragraph are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery," as an admission of Mr. Paredes' lack of factual support for this claim. However, in Lanigan, the court found that despite the plaintiffs failure to allege any factual support for his municipal policy claim, it had been adequately pleaded. 10 F.3d at 480.
With regard to the official capacity claims against Chief of Police Rowan, defendants argue that there are no facts stated to show his liability in an official supervisory capacity. However, Mr. Paredes directs his allegations of failure to instruct, supervise, control, and discipline police officers and maintenance of a de facto code of silence to Mr. Rowan as well as the Town of Cicero. I do not find a legal basis for defendants' arguments here. With respect to Mr. Paredes' respondeat superior claim against the Town of Cicero, while I agree with defendants that it is poorly pled in that it does not specify liability solely on the state law claims, I do not feel that dismissal of the claim is necessary.
Finally, defendants ask me to dismiss Mr. Paredes' state law claims should his § 1983 claims be dismissed. Since I am not dismissing the § 1983 claim and find no other reason to dismiss the state law claims, I will allow those to stand as well.
Defendants' motion is denied for the reasons stated above.