For impeachment purposes the only proper inquiry into a witness' character goes to reputation for truth and veracity. Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358 (1940). The excluded testimony could have been relevant only to show Richard Hitchcock's alleged bad acts and violent propensities and, thus, was properly excluded for impeachment purposes.

But it is not proper to engage in a general attack on the character of the witness. Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358 (1940); Taylor v. State, 139 Fla. 542, 190 So. 69 (1939); Nelson v. State, 99 Fla. 1032, 128 So. 1 (1930). While the defense had the right to question Capo as to the whole of the conversation he spoke of on direct examination, Louette v. State; Haager v. State, and as to the factual background of the conversation, to question him generally about his role in the marijuana smuggling operation would have been to engage in a general attack on his character.

For impeachment purposes the only proper inquiry into a witness' character goes to reputation for truth and veracity. Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358 (1940). The excluded testimony could have been relevant only to show Richard Hitchcock's alleged bad acts and violent propensities and, thus, was properly excluded for impeachment purposes.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358 (1940); Forte v. State, 662 So.2d 432 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); McCall v. State, 463 So.2d 425 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Hernandez v. State, 360 So.2d 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Oliva v. State, 354 So.2d 1264 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Broge v. State, 288 So.2d 280 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Schulkin v. State, 287 So.2d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM. The adjudication of delinquency under review is affirmed upon a holding that: (a) the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the adjudication of delinquency, D.S.H. v. State, 323 So.2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); and (b) no reversible error has been shown relative to the trial court's rulings regulating the cross examination of the state witness Frank Bates. Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358 (1940); § 59.041, Fla. Stat. (1979). SCHWARTZ, Judge (dissenting).

We hold that no abuse of discretion appears on this record, nor can it be said that the rulings of the court amounted to a denial of due process. Cf. Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358 (1940); and Welch v. State, 342 So.2d 1070 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Affirmed.

Thus, Welch contends his right to cross-examination was unduly restricted. The extent to which cross-examination should be permitted to show a witness' bias, interest, motives or animus rests largely within the sound discretion of the trial judge and his rulings will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of that discretion. Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358 (1940); Matera v. State, 218 So.2d 180 (Fla.3d DCA 1969); Maycock v. State, 284 So.2d 411 (Fla.3d DCA 1973). Linda had already been questioned by defense counsel as to whether her husband had told her he was going to seek revenge against the defendant and she denied he told her this.

It is within the reasonable discretion of the court to determine to what length it will go in permitting cross-examination of a witness for the purpose of showing interest, bias or prejudice of the witness. Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358. It was admitted that the witness was employed and being paid by the petitioner. More important than the amount of pay would have been the manner or method of pay or whether or not the witness was a full time employee.