Evidence of bias is subject to balancing under the provisions of section 90.403, and a trial court's determination of how far an inquiry into bias may proceed is within the trial court's discretion. See Coolen v. State, 696 So.2d 738, 743 (Fla. 1997); Pandula v. Fonesca, 199 So. 358, 360 (Fla. 1941); Langston v. King, 410 So.2d 179, 180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Although attorneys should be given wide latitude when cross-examining witnesses to demonstrate bias or prejudice, see Purcell v. State, 735 So.2d 579, 581 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), that latitude is not without its limits.

See Niemeyer v. McCarty, 221 Ind. 688, 51 N.E.2d 365 (1943). However, our supreme court appears to have foreclosed this result in Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358 (1940), which was a civil case for assault and batter. In affirming the refusal to charge the jury that in reaching its verdict it could consider evidence which the defendant had introduced concerning his good reputation for truth and veracity and as a law abiding citizen, the court said that "evidence of good character or reputation is not relevant in the first instance in a civil action or where the reputation of the party has not first been attacked by evidence of bad character."

As the government correctly states in its brief, the taxpayers could not offer evidence of good character at this civil trial to prove or disprove the doing of an act. 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 64 (3d ed. 1940), Pandula v. Fonseca, 1940, 145 Fla. 395, 400, 199 So. 358, 360. However the testimony was offered by the taxpayers not to prove their personal reputation but to rebut the assertion, one of the allegations in the affidavit for search warrant, that Mike's News Sundries had a reputation as a gambling establishment. The proffered testimony would have been material and proper in support of a motion to suppress the evidence obtained under the search warrant. It would tend to show lack of probable cause.

For impeachment purposes the only proper inquiry into a witness' character goes to reputation for truth and veracity. Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358 (1940). The excluded testimony could have been relevant only to show Richard Hitchcock's alleged bad acts and violent propensities and, thus, was properly excluded for impeachment purposes.

But it is not proper to engage in a general attack on the character of the witness. Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358 (1940); Taylor v. State, 139 Fla. 542, 190 So. 69 (1939); Nelson v. State, 99 Fla. 1032, 128 So. 1 (1930). While the defense had the right to question Capo as to the whole of the conversation he spoke of on direct examination, Louette v. State; Haager v. State, and as to the factual background of the conversation, to question him generally about his role in the marijuana smuggling operation would have been to engage in a general attack on his character.

The court properly instructed the jury that provocation could not be shown to bar the action, but could be considered in mitigation of damages. The following authorities justify the verdict and judgment: Vol. 4, Amer.Jur., Sec. 164, pg. 203; Seaver v. Stratton, supra [ 133 Fla. 183, 183 So. 335]; Vanvaks v. Chantly, 107 Fla. 647, 145 So. 838; Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358; Adler et al. v. Saffran, 147 Fla. 549, 3 So.2d 364."

It has been held that the prospective amount of compensation may be inquired into, even though not presently agreed upon. Grutski v. Kline, 43 A.2d 142 (Pa.). But there is authority to the contrary. Pandula v. Fonseca, 199 So. 358 (Fla.). In the instant case, if we assume that the trial court was in error in sustaining the objection, we think it was not so prejudicial as to constitute reversible error.

The court properly instructed the jury that provocation could not be shown to bar the action, but could be considered in mitigation of damages. The following authorities justify the verdict and judgment: Vol. 4, Amer. Jur., Sec. 164, pg. 203; Seaver v. Statton, supra; Albert v. Miami Transit Co., supra; Vanvaks v. Chantly, 107 Fla. 647, 145 So. 838; Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358; Adler, et al., v. Saffran, 147 Fla. 549, 3 So.2d 364. The judgment is affirmed.

The evidence is sufficient to show such conduct on the part of the defendant resulting in such injury to the plaintiff as would make the defendant liable to plaintiff in damages for the injury sustained. In the case of Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358, we affirmed the judgment in the sum of $3500.00 for damages resulting from assault and battery and, while the injury suffered in the instant case was not as severe as that which was shown to have been suffered in the Pandula case, we cannot say that the verdict and judgment are so excessive as to require a remittitur or reversal of the judgment. See also Winn Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 126 Fla. 308, 171 So. 214.

For impeachment purposes the only proper inquiry into a witness' character goes to reputation for truth and veracity. Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358 (1940). The excluded testimony could have been relevant only to show Richard Hitchcock's alleged bad acts and violent propensities and, thus, was properly excluded for impeachment purposes.