Opinion
No. 95-2478C
November 27, 1996
Memorandum of Decision and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Judicial Review Pursuant to G.L. 30A, § 14
The plaintiff, Gerald Panarelli, has appealed from a decision of the Board of Appeals on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds ("Board") which affirmed the decision of his insurer to impose a surcharge due to an accident in which he was involved. For the following reasons, the Board's decision to uphold the imposition of the surcharge is AFFIRMED .
Background
According to the record submitted in this case, on April 21, 1994, the plaintiff was involved in a collision with another motor vehicle at the intersection of Cherry and Maple Street in the Town of Spencer. The plaintiff testified before the Board that, when he reached the intersection, he stopped at the stop sign and looked to the left and the right, concentrating more on the right. The plaintiff saw no oncoming vehicles and proceeded through the intersection, at which time he was struck on the left side of his vehicle. The plaintiff claimed that he did not see the claimant's vehicle until it impacted with his vehicle. The plaintiff's vehicle sustained damages to the left door area and claimant's car was damaged on the right front portion.
The plaintiff's insurer, John Hancock Property Casualty Insurance Companies, made payment to him and to the claimant on account of the property damage each had incurred. Additionally, the insurer, having determined that the plaintiff was more than fifty percent at fault in the accident, assessed a merit rating surcharge against the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed the surcharge assessment to the Board which affirmed the decision made by the insurer. The case is presently before this court on the plaintiff's suit for review pursuant to G.L. 30A, § 14.
Discussion
Judicial review is afforded to cases such as the one at bar by the provisions of G.L.c. 30A, § 14 and G.L.c. 175, § 113P. The law does, however, impose some limitations upon that review. For example, review is confined to the administrative record, except in cases of irregularities. G.L.c. 30A, § 14(5). The court may set aside or modify the decision only if it determines that the substantial rights of a party have been prejudiced. A demonstration of prejudice must be based on an error of law, an absence of substantial evidence, or a showing that the decision is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. G.L.c. 30A, § 14(7). "Substantial evidence" is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. G.L.c. 30A, § 1(6);Deacon Transportation, Inc. v. Department of Public Utilities, 383 Mass. 390, 395 (1983). A court will not substitute its judgment for that of the agency when there is "substantial evidence." Seagram Distillers Co. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm'n, 401 Mass. 713, 721 (1988). Judicial review is not a trial de novo on the record before the administrative agency. Southern Worcester County Reg. Vocational School Dist. v. Labor Relations Commission, 386 Mass. 414, 420 (1982).
The party appealing an administrative decision bears the burden of demonstrating the decision's invalidity. Merisme v. Board of Appeals on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies Bonds, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 470, 474 (1989); Faith Assembly of God v. State Bldg. Code Comm'n, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 333, 334 (1981), citingAlmeida Bus Lines, Inc. v. Department of Public Utilities, 348 Mass. 331, 342 (1965). In reviewing the agency decision, the court is required to give due weight to the agency's experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and the discretionary authority conferred upon it by the state. Flint v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 412 Mass. 416, 420 (1992); Seagram, supra at 721 (1988). The plaintiff's task of upsetting the agency's determination is, therefore, one not easily accomplished.
At bar, plaintiff contends that the Board's decision failed the "substantial evidence" test. This court will, therefore, review the record to determine whether the Board's decision was based on "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Bournewood Hosp., Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 303, 317 (1976) (citing G.L.c. 30A, § 1(6)).
Pursuant to G.L.c. 175, § 113P, the Board has established "standards of fault" which include presumptions to be employed in determining whether a driver is more than fifty percent at fault in causing an accident. Those presumptions as to fault are determinative unless a showing to the contrary is demonstrated by the evidence presented at the hearing. 211 CMR 74.03. If the application of the presumption is supported by the evidence, the presumption will be held to satisfy the substantial evidence standard. DiLoreto v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 383 Mass. 243, 249 n. 5 (1981).
The Board had before it the police report, photographs taken of the intersection, the insurance company's file, as well as the statements, both oral and written, of the plaintiff. That evidence fully supports employment of the presumption contained in the particular standard of fault applicable to the instant case.
Failure to Proceed with Due Caution from a Traffic Control Signal or Sign. The operator of a vehicle subject to the Safe Driver Insurance Plan shall be presumed to be more than 50% at fault when the operator fails to obey a traffic control signal or sign, or fails to proceed with due caution therefrom, and whose vehicle is thereafter in a collision with another vehichicle. 211 CMR 74.04(08).
In order to rebut the presumption, plaintiff must submit some evidence to the contrary. There is nothing in the present record which is sufficient to undermine the presumption that the plaintiff was at fault. The court, in the absence of any evidence which would support the plaintiff's contention that he is less than fifty percent at fault, cannot conclude that the finding of the Board is not based upon substantial evidence. The plaintiff's assertion that the vehicle which impacted with the plaintiff's vehicle "must have been traveling at a high rate of speed" (R. 003) is wholly speculative and his further claim that he did not see the vehicle until the impact (id.) provides no reason to discount the presumption contained in 211 CMR 74.04 (08). Accordingly, the Board's decision upholding the surcharge is supported by the requisite "substantial evidence" and will not now be disturbed.
Order
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the defendant Board of Appeal on Motor Liability Policies and Bonds, is AFFIRMED .
________________________________ Daniel F. Toomey Justice of the Superior Court
Dated: November 27, 1996