This case presents the question whether in a suit nominally against a liability insurer under the Louisiana Direct Action Statute, the plaintiff may call the assured as an adverse witness under F.R.Civ.P. 43(b). As we did in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Kador, 5 Cir., 1955, 225 F.2d 120, we hold that the assured is, and may be called as, an adverse party. Pan American Casualty Co. v. Reed, 5 Cir., 1957, 240 F.2d 336, was not, as apparently supposed, a retreat. By our present decision, we hold fast.
In these circumstances the failure of the defense to seek to limit the evidence during the trial in accordance with the pretrial order establishes consent to the trial of these issues. See Pan-American Casualty Co. v. Reed, 5 Cir. 1957, 240 F.2d 336; 3 J. Moore, ยถ 15.13[2] at 994; 6 C. Wright A. Miller, ยง 1493 at 463-65.
LSA-R.S. 22:655. The question as to whether the Rule should be restricted to instances where it appeared that the person sought to be called as an adverse party was cooperating with the named defendant was raised in Pan-American Casualty Co. v. Reed, 5th Cir. 1957, 240 F.2d 336, cert. den., 355 U.S. 819, 78 S.Ct. 24, 2 L.Ed.2d 35, but found it unnecessary to pass upon the point. In that case, the person called was the mother of the plaintiff and grandmother of the decedent.
Can be expected to identify himself with the interests of his principal rather than those of the other party." Element No. 3 was regarded as a probable factor of relevance in Pan-American Casualty Co. v. Reed, 5 Cir., 1957, 240 F.2d 336, 340 in applying the principle announced in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Kador, 5 Cir., 1955, 225 F.2d 120. Many cases cited in Newark indicate that the managing agent relates to management of the field of activity concerned in the litigation.
That there may be a recovery for prenatal injury was also recognized in Mitchell v. Couch, Ky. 1955, 285 S.W.2d 901 and Valence v. Louisiana Power Light Co., La.App. 1951, 50 So.2d 847. See Pan-American Casualty Co. v. Reed, 5 Cir., 1957, 240 F.2d 336, certiorari denied, 1957, 355 U.S. 819, 78 S.Ct. 24, 2 L.Ed. 2d 35. The Supreme Courts of Wisconsin and Michigan have both apparently abandoned their previous rule denying recovery.
Here, we note that trauma is known to be capable of causing premature labor. See Pan-American Cas.Co. v. Reed, 240 F.2d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 1957) (stating that "there is evidence that trauma frequently induces premature labor"). Thus, as recognized in Carlson, supra, 675 N.W.2d at 107, Dr. Zarghami's "reliance upon the temporal factor is entitled to greater weight."
While premature birth in itself is no injury, attendant respiratory conditions in premature infants are potentially life-threatening. (See, e.g., Pan-American Casualty Co. v. Reed (5th Cir. 1957) 240 F.2d 336; see also generally, 5 Lawyer's Medical Cyclopedia, supra, ยงยง 37.16-37.17 at pp. 79-82.) Moreover, such injuries are often permanent or may require lengthy treatment or surgery to remedy.
More importantly, there is no showing as to how this omission might result in prejudice to plaintiffs. See Pan-American Casualty Company v. Reed (CA 5, 1957), 240 F.2d 336. "The admission in evidence of exhibits which were not referred to and included in a pretrial order was a matter within the discretion of the trial court."