Pan-American Casualty Company v. Reed

8 Citing cases

  1. Degelos v. Fidelity and Cas. Co. of New York

    313 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1963)   Cited 30 times
    In Degelos v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 313 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1963), the Fifth Circuit faced the issue of whether an insured could be called as an adverse witness in a direct action suit where the insured was not a party.

    This case presents the question whether in a suit nominally against a liability insurer under the Louisiana Direct Action Statute, the plaintiff may call the assured as an adverse witness under F.R.Civ.P. 43(b). As we did in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Kador, 5 Cir., 1955, 225 F.2d 120, we hold that the assured is, and may be called as, an adverse party. Pan American Casualty Co. v. Reed, 5 Cir., 1957, 240 F.2d 336, was not, as apparently supposed, a retreat. By our present decision, we hold fast.

  2. Wallin v. Fuller

    476 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1973)   Cited 53 times
    Holding that the district court should have allowed amendment of a pretrial order to account for new theories developed from facts presented at trial

    In these circumstances the failure of the defense to seek to limit the evidence during the trial in accordance with the pretrial order establishes consent to the trial of these issues. See Pan-American Casualty Co. v. Reed, 5 Cir. 1957, 240 F.2d 336; 3 J. Moore, ยถ 15.13[2] at 994; 6 C. Wright A. Miller, ยง 1493 at 463-65.

  3. Chumbler v. Alabama Power Company

    362 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1966)   Cited 9 times

    LSA-R.S. 22:655. The question as to whether the Rule should be restricted to instances where it appeared that the person sought to be called as an adverse party was cooperating with the named defendant was raised in Pan-American Casualty Co. v. Reed, 5th Cir. 1957, 240 F.2d 336, cert. den., 355 U.S. 819, 78 S.Ct. 24, 2 L.Ed.2d 35, but found it unnecessary to pass upon the point. In that case, the person called was the mother of the plaintiff and grandmother of the decedent.

  4. June T., Inc. v. King

    290 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1961)   Cited 58 times

    Can be expected to identify himself with the interests of his principal rather than those of the other party." Element No. 3 was regarded as a probable factor of relevance in Pan-American Casualty Co. v. Reed, 5 Cir., 1957, 240 F.2d 336, 340 in applying the principle announced in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Kador, 5 Cir., 1955, 225 F.2d 120. Many cases cited in Newark indicate that the managing agent relates to management of the field of activity concerned in the litigation.

  5. Wendt v. Lillo

    182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960)   Cited 28 times
    Applying Iowa law

    That there may be a recovery for prenatal injury was also recognized in Mitchell v. Couch, Ky. 1955, 285 S.W.2d 901 and Valence v. Louisiana Power Light Co., La.App. 1951, 50 So.2d 847. See Pan-American Casualty Co. v. Reed, 5 Cir., 1957, 240 F.2d 336, certiorari denied, 1957, 355 U.S. 819, 78 S.Ct. 24, 2 L.Ed. 2d 35. The Supreme Courts of Wisconsin and Michigan have both apparently abandoned their previous rule denying recovery.

  6. Creanga v. Jardal

    185 N.J. 345 (N.J. 2005)   Cited 119 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding that plaintiffs expert testimony, which consisted of a differential diagnosis that eliminated other potential causes for premature labor, was admissible on element of proximate cause

    Here, we note that trauma is known to be capable of causing premature labor. See Pan-American Cas.Co. v. Reed, 240 F.2d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 1957) (stating that "there is evidence that trauma frequently induces premature labor"). Thus, as recognized in Carlson, supra, 675 N.W.2d at 107, Dr. Zarghami's "reliance upon the temporal factor is entitled to greater weight."

  7. Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc.

    234 Cal.App.3d 1103 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 39 times
    Recognizing that "'[t]he great majority of respiratory infections [in children] occur' in premature infants" and that "there is a corresponding increase in the rate of serious complications in such infants who survive premature birth. . . ."

    While premature birth in itself is no injury, attendant respiratory conditions in premature infants are potentially life-threatening. (See, e.g., Pan-American Casualty Co. v. Reed (5th Cir. 1957) 240 F.2d 336; see also generally, 5 Lawyer's Medical Cyclopedia, supra, ยงยง 37.16-37.17 at pp. 79-82.) Moreover, such injuries are often permanent or may require lengthy treatment or surgery to remedy.

  8. Jackson v. Sabuco

    175 N.W.2d 532 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970)   Cited 13 times
    In Jackson, plaintiff suffered an injury caused by defendant's negligence and subsequently sold her business allegedly because she was unable to effectively manage the concern.

    More importantly, there is no showing as to how this omission might result in prejudice to plaintiffs. See Pan-American Casualty Company v. Reed (CA 5, 1957), 240 F.2d 336. "The admission in evidence of exhibits which were not referred to and included in a pretrial order was a matter within the discretion of the trial court."