When the writ is quashed by the trial court the lien is dissolved and the garnishee may transfer the property that had been subject to the garnishment. See Palmer v. McClelland, 123 A.2d 357 (D.C. 1956). However, where an appeal has been filed from the trial court's ruling quashing the attachment, "'pending the appeal the garnishee [is] bound to retain the money in his hands.'"
As the garnishee is one of its agencies, the United States would be liable "for the . . . credits admitted or found." Id. ยง 16-556(a); see also Palmer v. McClelland, 123 A.2d 357, 357 (D.C. 1956). The appellants are thus seeking monetary relief against the United States, but "[t]he judiciary may not impose monetary relief against the United States without its consent."
This is not a case where the relief sought by the plaintiff in the trial court or on appeal necessarily must operate against an absent entity not joined by the plaintiff. Cf, e.g., Capital City Corp. v. Johnson, 646 A.2d 325, 329 (D.C. 1994) (plaintiff suit to set aside foreclosure against absent purchaser); Palmer v. McClelland, 123 A.2d 357 (D.C. 1956) (judgment of condemnation by attaching creditor against absent garnishee). On the contrary, the Lender as plaintiff in the case before us sought simply to obtain possession of the property from the defendant, and our ruling goes no further than the issue of their possessory rights to the property vis-a-vis each other.
Clearly, the garnishee is a necessary party to this appeal. Palmer v. McClelland, 123 A.2d 357 (D.C. Mun. App. 1956). Kansas has a statutory equivalent of the Virginia rule that garnishment is an independent suit in which the garnishee is a party defendant.
It thus may be argued that this appeal is moot because a reversal of the trial court's order would be of no benefit to appellant. See Palmer v. McClelland, D.C.Mun.App., 123 A.2d 357. We are also told that appellee has made no instalment payments and therefore the stay of execution may be readily set aside.