Great Plains, 45 F.3d at 965. Palmer v. Lares, 42 F.3d 975, 979 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Hinojosa, 958 F.2d 624, 632 (5th Cir. 1992)). Great Plains, 45 F.3d at 964 (citation omitted).

Likewise unavailing is Covarrubias's claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986), as the record shows no abuse of discretion in connection with the rejection of this claim, which was grounded in the judge's own assessment of the venire person at issue. See Palmer v. Lares, 42 F.3d 975, 979-80 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1995); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 474 (2008). In the same vein, Covarrubias's argument that the trial court erred by denying his challenge for cause to a certain venire member lacks merit because this individual was rehabilitated, thus leading us to conclude that the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion by denying the challenge.

See United States v. Abou–Kassem, 78 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir.1996). Cf. Palmer v. Lares, 42 F.3d 975, 979–80 & n. 6 (5th Cir.1995) (affirming magistrate judge's findings on a Batson challenge when the attorney justified the strike on the basis of, among other things, the prospective juror's demeanor appearing to be “hostile” to the court and the magistrate judge's agreement that, based on the judge's own interaction with the prospective juror, the judge “felt the hostility that [the attorney] had pointed out”); Durant v. Stack, 151 F.Supp.2d 226, 231–32 (E.D.N.Y.2001). These determinations must be apparent on the face of the record and they may not be presumed.