Opinion
Case No. 4:02CV3146
February 14, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 45) and the Defendant's Motion to Return the Trial to Lincoln, Nebraska (Filing No. 51). The Defendant, The Goodyear Tire Rubber Company ("Goodyear"), has submitted evidence in support of its motion (Filing No. 46), and both parties have submitted briefs in support of their positions which the Court has considered (Filing Nos. 47 and 50). Because I find that there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining to be decided, and because I find that Goodyear is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted. The Defendant's Motion to Return the Trial to Lincoln will be denied as moot.
Factual Background
Plaintiff Jaltheaus Palmer, who is also known as Jay Palmer, has been employed at the Goodyear plant in Lincoln, Nebraska, under a collective bargaining agreement since 1988, and has continued to be employed there at least through the date of Goodyear's brief. Three incidents form the factual basis for Palmer's Complaint. The first incident occurred in mid-2000. Palmer had stopped in an area where he was not assigned to work to visit with a coworker, Linda Gonzalez. Palmer's direct supervisor at the time, Area Manager Mitch Taylor, observed Palmer talking to Gonzalez and believed that Palmer was distracting her from her work. The conversation occurred, according to Taylor, for about 10 minutes after a break had concluded. Taylor told Palmer that Gonzalez had work to do and he needed to let her do it. Palmer was not disciplined for this incident. Neither Taylor nor Palmer could recall any other occasion when Taylor directed Palmer not to speak with another employee. Taylor Dec. At ¶ 3; Palmer Dep. at 76; 111-13.
All the evidence offered in connection with the motion is at the Defendant's Index to Evidence, Filing No. 46. All evidence can be found at that filing number, and it will be identified in the text according to the witness who provides the testimony.
The second incident occurred on November 8, 2000, when one of Goodyear's Area Managers, Sue Wood, observed Palmer riding on a scooter in an area that she was responsible for supervising. At the time, Wood was not Palmer's direct supervisor. Palmer was in the area to ask another employee, Marshall Vigus, with whom Palmer carpooled, for his keys because Palmer needed to retrieve his wallet out of Vigus' car to buy lunch. Palmer Dep. at 34. Wood states that she "caught Palmer's eye and signaled for him to leave" the area. Wood Dec. at ¶ 3. Palmer states that Wood came "running up to me, Jay, what are you doing over here, you need to get out of here, hollering and screaming at me." Palmer Dep. at 34:13-15.
Both Palmer and Wood recollect that Palmer turned and went away. Wood Dec. at 3-4; Palmer Dep. at 35:9-16. Palmer states that he walked away and Wood recalls that Palmer drove off in his scooter after yelling something like "what about the white boy." Wood believed that Palmer was referring to Brad Memming who, at the time, was walking to the time clock to clock-out after having worked overtime. Palmer recalls that there were several white people waiting by the time clock. Palmer Dep. at 65-66. Shortly after Palmer had driven away from Woods' area on his scooter, he returned, still on the scooter. Id. Wood claims that she asked him to stop, but he did not stop, and, instead, he drove away again. Palmer does not deny that she asked him to remain and talk with her but he refused. Palmer Dep. at 67:15-68:5. Wood considered that conduct to be insubordinate, and she reported the incident to Ron Johnson who was the Night Shift coordinator responsible for the entire second shift. Wood Dec. at ¶ 5. Insubordination violates Goodyear's rules and regulations for employment. Konneker Dec. at ¶ 5 and Ex. 2, no. 21, dated 9/1/99.
Later that same evening, Palmer, Johnson, and Palmer's area manager, Mitch Taylor, met. Palmer was offered, but declined, union representation. Johnson heard Palmer explain his version of the incident. Johnson explained to Palmer that he was not allowed to walk away from an area manager — any area manager, when the manager was addressing him. Johnson described Palmer as acting belligerent throughout the meeting. Because of this belligerency and because he walked away from Wood, Johnson decided to suspend Palmer. Johnson Dec. at ¶¶ 3-5.
Gary Marschman was the Belt Center Operations Manager on November 8, 2000, and he had the authority to determine the length of Palmer's suspension. He and Palmer met on November 10, 2000, at which time Marschman decided to suspend Palmer for the 45 minutes of work he had missed on November 8, and the entirety of Palmer's shift on November 9. During this meeting, Palmer expressed his understanding that he was not allowed to disregard the directions and questions of area managers. Marschman Dec. At ¶¶ 1-3.
Wood had supervised Palmer in the past and stated that she never had any problems with his performance other than some attendance issues. Wood Dec. at ¶ 6. She has stated, and Johnson confirmed, that she has disciplined other employees, some of whom are Caucasian, for being in her work area without authorization and for ignoring her directives. Wood Dec. at ¶ 7; Johnson Dec. at ¶ 6. See also Konneker Dec. at ¶ 5.
After his suspension was finished, in mid-November 2000, Palmer went to the Goodyear plant dispensary to get some medical attention for his shoulder. The nurse who was then on duty believed that Palmer was on a disciplinary suspension, and was not entitled, therefore, to see the company physician. Palmer told her that his suspension was finished; the nurse made a phone call to confirm this; and Palmer was allowed to see the physician. Palmer Dep. at 58-60; Konneker Dec. at ¶ 6.
Summary Judgment Standard
With respect to summary judgment, the Court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, in this case Palmer. U.S. ex rel. Quirk v. Madonna Towers, Inc., 278 F.3d 765, 767(8th Cir. 2001). However, summary judgment is "properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
The proponent of a motion for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 322 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The proponent need not, however, negate the opponent's claims or defenses. Id. at 324-25.
In response to the proponent's showing, the opponent's burden is to "come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). A "genuine" issue of material fact is more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. "[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
"If the evidence is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted." Id. (citations omitted). In addition, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties is not sufficient by itself to deny summary judgment. . . . Instead, `the dispute must be outcome determinative under prevailing law.'" Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted) (quoting Holloway v. Pigman, 884 F.2d 365, 366 (8th Cir. 1989)).
Discrimination on the Basis of Race and Color
Palmer alleges that Goodyear unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of his race and color and retaliated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ("Title VII") and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Complaint at ¶ 21. Title VII provides in pertinent part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer — `(1) . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . .'" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Under Title VII, a plaintiff can establish the existence of intentional discrimination by presenting either direct or indirect evidence of employment discrimination. Lang v. Star Herald, 107 F.3d 1308, 1311 (8th Cir. 1997). Palmer relies on indirect, circumstantial evidence to show that Goodyear unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of his race. In "indirect" evidence cases under Title VII, the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), governs the burden of production and order of proof. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993); and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).
Under McDonnell Douglas, "[e]stablishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. The presumption shifts the burden of production to the employer to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. If the employer successfully rebuts the prima facie case, the presumption of discrimination is eliminated and the court must proceed to the ultimate issue of discrimination. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). In the summary judgment context, the court must determine whether "the evidence considered in its entirety (1) creates a fact issue as to whether the employer's proffered reasons are pretextual and (2) creates a reasonable inference that [race] was a determinative factor in the adverse employment decision." Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1336-67 (8th Cir. 1996).
To make a prima facie showing of race or color discrimination, Palmer must show that he was a member of a protected group, that he was performing his job at a level that met Goodyear's legitimate expectations, that he suffered an adverse employment action, and that there are facts that permit an inference of discrimination. Taylor v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 251 F.3d 735, 740 (8th Cir. 2001), citing Ghane v. West, 148 F.3d 979, 981 n. 3 (8th Cir. 1998).
There is no dispute that Plaintiff, as a Black man, is a member of a protected class. There is also no dispute that Goodyear took some adverse employment action against him when Marschman approved Palmer's suspension from work based on his allegedly insubordinate conduct toward Wood. With respect to the second prong of the prima facie case, while it appears that the parties agree that Palmer was qualified for the job, Goodyear contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because Palmer cannot show that he was performing his job at a level that satisfied Goodyear's legitimate expectations. The company also contends that with regard to the fourth prong, Palmer can demonstrate no facts that permit an inference of discrimination.
This Court must be very careful in considering Goodyear's argument that Palmer did not satisfy its legitimate expectations and not permit this analysis to short-circuit the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. See Mathews v. Trilogy Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1160, 1164 (8th Cir. 1998), discussing Miners v. Cargill Communications, Inc., 113 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 1997) and MacDonald v. Eastern Wyoming Mental Health Ctr., 941 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1991). As one court framed the issue:
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the Court must be careful not to focus prematurely on the defendant's articulated reason for the termination. See MacDonald v. Eastern Wyoming Mental Health Center, 941 F.2d 1115, 1119 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a court should not "consider a defendant's proffered reasons for discharge in assessing the existence of a prima facie case"). Short-circuiting the analysis of the defendant's articulated reason at the prima facie stage frustrates a plaintiff's ability to establish that this reason was a pretext for discrimination.
Toone v. Federal Express Corp., 1997 WL 446257, *4 (D.D.C. 1997). Thus, even though the Court is inclined to agree that a showing of insubordination is evidence that the employee did not satisfy the employer's legitimate expectations, the Court will assume at this stage of the analysis that Palmer satisfied Goodyear's legitimate expectations in performing his job, and consider the fourth prong, that is, whether there exist facts from which an inference of discrimination on the basis of race or color could be made.
Palmer asserts that there is evidence from which race or color discrimination can be inferred. First, Palmer stated that during the time in question, the year 2000, Goodyear was in the midst of a lawsuit brought by 13 employees who were alleging that Goodyear discriminated against them on the basis of their race. While this may be an interesting backdrop against which to consider Plaintiff's allegations, the Court rejects the notion that the existence of this lawsuit is evidence from which discrimination against Palmer can be inferred. Palmer has demonstrated no nexus between the then-pending lawsuit and Palmer's claims of discrimination or between his suspension and Marschman's and Wood's views or interests in the lawsuit.
Second, Palmer contends that as a black person he was treated less favorably than similarly situated white employees. Palmer states that, on one occasion, he observed a white employee talking with another white employee for approximately 40 minutes without being told by a supervisor to stop talking. Palmer asks the Court to compare that to the two incidents when he was not allowed to speak to other employees who are members of protected classes, specifically Linda Gonzalez and Marshall Vigus. The Court finds that there is insufficient evidence about the incident involving the white employees to establish that the plaintiff was treated less favorably than other similarly situated white employees. For instance, Palmer knew the name of only one of the two employees, he did not know what they were discussing, he did not report it to management, and it is unknown whether any area supervisor even observed the conversation, or condoned it. The fact that a conversation occurred between two white employees and that it occurred for approximately 40 minutes and perhaps that they did not get "caught" by a supervisor is simply insufficient to raise an inference of racial discrimination toward Palmer. See Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1156 (8th Cir. 1999).
Third, and lastly, Palmer contends that Wood changed her story regarding the November 8, 2000, incident, and that she did not treat black employees as favorably as white employees. While Wood's recollection of some of the facts of her confrontation with Palmer may not be crystal clear, her recollection of Palmer turning and leaving the scene without speaking to her is clear. These facts are undisputed. Whether Woods heard what Palmer said about other white employees, or whether she did not hear Palmer's words at all, is not material to the fact that she asked him to stop and talk to her and Palmer refused to do so. There is uncontroverted evidence in the record that Wood was known for her strict compliance with Goodyear's rules, and that she disciplined white and black employees alike for similar infractions. See Konneker Dec. at ¶ 5 and Exs.1 and 2; Wood Dec. at ¶ 7; and Johnson Dec. at ¶ 6. Based on this analysis, the Court cannot conclude that there are facts that permit an inference of discrimination. Because Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence of the fourth element of his prima facie case, the Court concludes that Goodyear is entitled to summary judgment on the claims of race and color discrimination as a matter of law.
Palmer also alleges in his Complaint that he was require to take the most direct route to lunch. In Johnson's Declaration, he explained that during their November 8, 2000, meeting, Palmer asked whether he was allowed to go through the hose department on his way to lunch. Johnson explained that there was a plant rule that required employees to take the most direct route to their destination when they traveled through the plant. Johnson Dec. at ¶ 5. I find Johnson's statement consistent with the company's rules and regulations. Konneker Dec. at Ex. 2, at no. 9. None of these facts, however, are the kind of facts from which an inference of discrimination based on color or race can be drawn.
Even if the facts could be construed as providing an inference of racial discrimination, the Court would still conclude that the Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the discrimination claims because Goodyear has provided proof of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Palmer's suspension, and Palmer is unable to proffer any evidence of discriminatory animus. Goodyear states that Palmer was suspended based on his insubordination to Wood. The material facts are not in dispute. Wood had asked Palmer, or at least indicated to Palmer, to leave the area that she was supervising on November 8, 2000. Palmer made a remark that Wood either did not hear or wanted to address. In either event, Wood asked Palmer to stop and talk to her. Palmer heard her ask him to stop. He does not dispute that she asked him to stop. Palmer ignored her request and went on his way. That was the act of insubordination that Wood reported, that Johnson preliminarily found worthy of suspension (together with Palmer's belligerence toward Johnson himself), and that Marschman also believed warranted a suspension of a little more than one day. See Palmer Dep at 35, 67-68.; Wood Dec. at ¶¶ 2-5; Johnson Dec. at ¶ 5; and Marschman Dec. at ¶¶ 3-4. This is clear and uncontroverted evidence of a legitimate and nondiscriminatory basis for the suspension.
The burden then shifts back to Palmer to show that the stated reason for his suspension is simply a pretext for racial discrimination. Palmer simply has no evidence of pretext. The same evidence that he relies upon to show an inference of discrimination, which I have already found is insufficient even to demonstrate the requisite inference, lacks the strength required to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. The Court concludes that no reasonable juror could return a verdict for Palmer based on all the evidence in the record, because there simply is no evidence of racial animus.
Retaliation
The Plaintiff also alleges a claim of retaliation in his Complaint. To make a prima facie case of retaliation, Palmer must show that he engaged in some form of protected activity, that he was subject to adverse employment action, and that the adverse action was causally connected to the protected activity. Woodland v. Joseph T. Ryerson Son, Inc., 302 F.3d 839, 845 (8th Cir. 2002), citing Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1060 (8th Cir. 1997). Though not artfully alleged, the gist of Palmer's retaliation claim is that after Wood asked Palmer to leave the area, Palmer made a remark that he perceived as going to the difference between the treatment of white employees and black employees at Goodyear. Palmer apparently contends that he was suspended because he made the remark.
The Court will assume for the sake of this analysis that Wood actually heard the remark, and that the remark is what Palmer claims it was: "I told her I seen other white people over there getting ready to clock out for lunch, why couldn't he [referring to Vigus who is also black] go over there?" Palmer Dep. at 67:16-18. Cf. Wood Dec. at ¶ 3 ("What about the white boy?") Even if the Court assumes that Palmer's remark could be considered "protected activity" as required in a prima facie case of retaliation, the Court finds absolutely no evidence causally connecting the protected activity to his suspension. Every level of supervisor, from Wood to Marschman, viewed Palmer's decision to ignore Wood's request to stop and talk to her as insubordination. There is no dispute about the characterization of his conduct, and there is no proof to indicate that the suspension was levied based on Palmer's remark. See also, Marschman Dec. at Ex. 1. Without some facts showing a genuine issue relative to causation, the Court finds that Goodyear is entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiff's retaliation claim as a matter of law.
For all theses reasons,
IT IS ORDERED:
1) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 45) is granted in all respects; and
2) Defendant's Motion to Return the Trial to Lincoln, Nebraska (Filing No. 51) is denied as moot.