Opinion
99 Civ. 12319 (CM).
January 4, 2001.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Carlos Pagan sues defendants H. Frank Bigger, Sheriff of Orange County, and ten unidentified deputies of the Sheriff of Orange County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Pagan alleges that the defendants failed to protect him from being assaulted by a fellow prisoner in the Orange County Jail. Pagan also joins a common law negligence claim against Bigger in his official capacity as Sheriff of Orange County.
Plaintiff has withdrawn his claims against defendant County of Orange.
FACTS PERTINENT TO THE MOTION
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts most favorably to the non-moving party — in this case, the plaintiffs.
On October 1, 1998, a fight occurred in Dorm 6, the Special Housing Unit for Medical/Mental Health placement at the Orange County Correctional Facility ("the Jail"). At the dinner hour, inmate Jay Moulton walked over to plaintiff Pagan, struck him in the face with a chair, and then began punching him in the face. Correction Officer Figueroa, assigned to Dorm 6 for dinner, radioed for backup and pulled Moulton away from Pagan. Pagan was taken to the hospital. He suffered a malar complex fracture with multiple fragments, left nasal fracture, and a zygomatic arch fracture in two places.
Moulton had a history of violent acts. He engaged in fights with other inmates in May 1997, September 1997, October 1997 and January 1998. Moulton had been classified as "Subject to Special Watch" in his Classification Point Sheet, dated January 6, 1998, and officials noted his "hostile relationships with other inmates," in a December 9, 1997 "Initial Risk Assessment.
Approximately ten days before the attack on Pagan, on or about September 20, 1998, Moulton had sent two handwritten messages to prison doctors. The first stated:
I have been taking psychiatric meds forever over 10 years. I haven't had any meds for my O.L.D. and Schizophrenia for over 7 days. I need to see you tonight. I am paranoid, hearing voices, and a total wreck. Please see me tonight. I deserve to be seen. Even if I'm not quote on quote list I should be. I keep going down to see my counselor Tom Nelson at Mental Health and he says he is putting me on the list. This has been going on for days. What's going on. What do I have to do to be seen.
The second stated:
My name is Jay B. Moulton. I have been taking Psychiatric Meds for over 10 years. I have not been getting any for a week here. I need to see the psychiatrist today.
(Isseks Aff. at Bates 451-52.)
Dorm 6 is utilized as a special Medical/Mental Health housing unit at the Jail. The dorm has a maximum bed count of 28, and there is no double bunking. A Housing Unit Officer ("HUO") for Dorm 6 is responsible for the security, safety and cleanliness of the assigned housing unit.
The Sheriff is mandated by state law to have custody of the Jail and is responsible for the care, custody and control of inmates who are lawfully committed to his custody. Plaintiff claims that Sheriff Bigger deprived him of his right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment secured by the Eighth Amendment by failing (1) to carry out necessary and adequate procedures to protect him from assault and injury inflicted by inmate Jay Moulton, who was known, or should have been known, by the Sheriff, to have violent propensities and mental disorders; (2) to take necessary precautions for maintaining the safety and well-being of plaintiff; and (3) to take appropriate action with respect to the screening and placement of plaintiff and Jay Moulton, so that plaintiff would not be unreasonably exposed to danger. (Pl. Brief in Opp. To Summary Judgment at 3.)
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-50 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists if, based on the record as a whole, a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-movant. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248. In making its determination, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. See id. at 255. To defeat summary judgment, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). When opposing a motion for summary judgment, it is not sufficient for the non-moving party to present evidence that is conclusory or speculative, with no basis in fact. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
A. Eighth Amendment
1. Bigger
Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Bigger deprived him of his Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, by failing to protect him from other prisoners at the Jail.
Defendants claim that summary judgment is warranted here because there is no question of material fact as to whether Bigger acted with "deliberate indifference" to a substantial risk of serious harm to Pagan to establish an Eighth Amendment claim. The Eighth Amendment represents a general constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. It is well established that the conditions under which a prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509, U.S. 25, 35(1993)). The Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates. See id. at 832 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-527, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984)). In particular, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. See id. at 833 (quoting Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842, F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988)); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (describing "the protection an inmate is afforded against other inmates" as a condition of confinement "subject to the strictures of the Eighth Amendment").
However, a prison official is not liable for every injury imposed by a prisoner upon a fellow inmate. The test to determine liability under the Eighth Amendment contains both an objective and subjective element: a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when the alleged deprivation is objectively sufficiently serious and when the prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). In order to prevail in demonstrating a culpable state of mind, the plaintiff must show both: (1) that the defendant had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to the plaintiff; and (2) that the defendant disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate the harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Candelaria v. Coughlin, 1997 WL 171256, *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.10, 1997).
With respect to the objective component of the deliberate indifference test, a "sufficiently serious" deprivation occurs when a "prison official's acts or omission . . . result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)). In the instant case, Pagan suffered from a malar complex fracture with multiple fragments, left nasal fracture, and a zygomatic arch fracture in two places. The parties do not dispute that the assault on Pagan was a sufficiently serious deprivation satisfying the objective component of the two-part test.
With respect to the subjective element, the "sufficiently culpable" state of mind in an Eighth Amendment claim against a prison official is one of "deliberate indifference" to an inmate's health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 294). Deliberate indifference may be found when a prison official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. The official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference can be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. It is undisputed that there was no history of tension or hostility between Pagan and Moulton, and that Pagan therefore did not notify any officer of a threat to his safety. However, an inmate need not show that he faced an excessive risk of attack for reasons unique to him; an inmate's Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference may also rest on an assertion that the inmate faced an excessive risk of attack shared by other inmates in his situation. Id. at 843.
In a similar case, Byrd v. Abate, No. CIV.A. 93-1489, 1998 WL 67665 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1998), an inmate attacked plaintiff Byrd, another inmate, in a section of the prison treating prisoners with mental illnesses. Byrd alleged that prison officials had acted with deliberate indifference in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from harm. See id. at *4. Prison officials were on notice that as a result of psychiatric evaluations, every prisoner in this section "posed a clear danger of injury to himself or to others." Id. at *5. The court denied summary judgment because officials were aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that there was an identifiable group of prisoners who were at risk of substantial harm. Whether they drew that inference was a question of fact that was to be resolved by a jury. See id. at *6.
In Warren v. Keane, 937 F. Supp. 301, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), plaintiff inmates alleged that they had been subjected to environmental tobacco smoke ("ETS") in smoking and non-smoking areas throughout the facility and within their own cell blocks. The court found that, because the defendants had made reference in their motion to a 1986 report by the U.S. Surgeon General warning of the dangers of ETS, a rational fact finder could infer that the defendants were on notice as to the dangers of ETS.
In the instant action, given the mental health of the inmates at Dorm 6, Bigger and the deputies were aware of facts from which the inference can be drawn that a failure to observe the inmates presented a substantial risk of harm. Specifically, prison officials were on notice that Moulton had a history of violent acts — in May 1997, September 1997, October 1997 and January 1998 — in which he engaged in fights with other inmates. See Warren, 937 F. Supp. at 305. Moulton had been classified as "Subject to Special Watch" in his Classification Point Sheet, dated January 6, 1998, and officials noted his "hostile relationships with other inmates," in a December 9, 1997 "Initial Risk Assessment." Also, the two letters written by Moulton approximately ten days before the attack suggest that prison officials were on notice that Moulton may have not been receiving his medication to treat his mental illnesses. Those letters were presented to Officer Galanakis, but what happened after they were received is unclear.
While there is no allegation that Sheriff Bigger knew of the particular circumstances of Moulton's problems, a supervisory official such as Bigger may be found to be personally involved by evidence of (1) direct participation in the alleged constitutional violation; (2) failure to remedy a wrong after learning of it; (3) creation or maintenance of a policy under which unconstitutional violations occurred; (4) gross negligence in managing subordinates who committed unconstitutional acts; or (5) deliberate indifference by failing to act on information indicating that constitutional violations were occurring. See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995). Bigger could be liable if he failed to remedy established problems of prisoners not getting their medications; acted with gross negligence in managing his deputies; or knew of constitutional violations and acted with deliberate indifference by failing to correct them.
There exist disputed facts as to whether prison officials failed to provide Moulton with needed medication; whether Bigger knew of such problems at the Jail and failed to remedy the situation; and if he did, whether Bigger drew the inference that there was a risk of substantial harm to Pagan or the other prisoners. Accordingly, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied.
B. Negligence
Pagan's second claim against Bigger, a claim of common law negligence, is premised on substantially the same contentions as his federal claims: namely, that Bigger's deputies breached their duty of care to Pagan and other prisoners by failing to protect them from a known risk of harm. Because the negligence claim based on Pagan's injuries is part of the same case or controversy as his Section 1983 claims, this court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990); Benyi v. Broome Cty, 887 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
The State has a duty to use reasonable care to protect its inmates from foreseeable risks of harm, including risks of attack from other prisoners, see Littlejohn v. New York, 218 A.D.2d 833, 834, 630 N.Y.S.2d 407, 408 (N.Y. A.D. 1995) (citing Colon v. New York, 209 A.D.2d 842, 843, 620 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1994)), and "a known dangerous prisoner may place the State on notice of an increased likelihood of assault and impose a heightened duty to take special precautions." Id. (holding the state liable for negligence for failing to supervise an inmate who attacked a fellow prisoner). Because Section 500-c of the Corrections Law makes the sheriff ultimately responsible for an inmate's safekeeping, the sheriff can be liable for negligence for failure to segregate a dangerous prisoner from other inmates. See Kemp v. Waldron, 125 Misc.2d 197, 479 N.Y.S.2d 440 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1984). Moreover, delegation of a statutory duty to lawfully appointed deputies does not allow a sheriff to absolve himself of responsibility for their actions. See Wilson v. Sponable, 81 A.D.2d 1, 5, 439 N.Y.S.2d 549, 551 (N.Y. A.D. 198 1). Plaintiff here contends that the incident was foreseeable and that the prison officials breached their duty of care to Pagan.
The record reveals that Moulton had a history of assaultive behavior, and that there may have been a time in the preceding days in which Moulton was denied prescribed medication. There exist disputed facts as to whether Moulton's attack on Pagan was foreseeable and whether prison officials' failure to provide medications to Moulton could have contributed to his volatility. Because "[t]he very question of whether the defendant's conduct amounts to negligence is inherently a question for the fact-trier in all but the most egregious instances," Wilson v. Sponable, 81 A.D.2d 1, 5, 439, N.Y.S.2d 549, 552 (N.Y. A.D. 1981), defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.