Opinion
C. A. 6:23-cv-06112-DCC-KFM
03-06-2024
Roberto Padillas, Plaintiff, v. Greenville County Detention Center, Scotty Bodiford, Mr. Hollister, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald, United States Magistrate Judge.
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, filed this action seeking damages and injunctive relief from the defendants on November 29, 2023 (docs. 1; 1-3). By orders filed December 19, 2023, January 25, 2024, and February 15, 2024, the plaintiff was given a specific time frame in which to bring his case into proper form for judicial screening (docs. 4; 11; 18). The plaintiff submitted the necessary documents to bring his case into proper form. Nevertheless, upon review of the plaintiff's complaint, the undersigned recommends that it be dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Greenville County Detention Center (“the Detention Center”), filed this action seeking damages and injunctive relief from the defendants (docs. 1; 1-3). Of note, some of the plaintiff's allegations (based on his requested relief) may involve the plaintiff's pending charges for two counts of criminal sexual conduct in the Greenville County General Sessions Court. See Greenville County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (enter the plaintiff's name and 2020A2320500873, 2020A2320500874) (last visited March 6, 2024).
Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice . . . is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
The plaintiff alleges violations of his federal and state constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments (doc. 1-3 at 4). The plaintiff contends that an invalid hold from United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) was added to his Detention Center status in April 2022 (id. at 5, 13). The hold has prevented the plaintiff from being returned to the home incarceration program (“HIP”) (id.). This has resulted in the plaintiff being falsely imprisoned (id. at 5-6). He further contends that Judge Simmons in the Greenville County Circuit Court directed the invalid ICE hold be removed, but it has not happened (id. at 14).
The plaintiff's injuries include stress, grief, and anxiety (id. at 6). For relief, the plaintiff seeks an order from the court removing the ICE hold and reinstating the plaintiff on HIP as well as money damages (id. at 6, 13-14).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages and injunctive relief from the defendants. For the reasons that follow, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
Release from Custody Request
To the extent the plaintiff alleges that his rights have been violated by the alleged improper ICE hold, which prevents him from returning to HIP, his request is subject to dismissal. Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment for pretrial detainees: a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and a complaint under the Civil Rights Act, § 1983. Muhammadv. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004); see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, (1973) (an application seeking release from custody is an application for habeas corpus and is not an available remedy under the Civil Rights Act). “Habeas corpus, and not § 1983, is the exclusive federal remedy for state prisoners seeking actual release from confinement,” Griffin v. Baltimore Police Dep't, 804 F.3d 692, 694-95 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. 475, 487-90), and “requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 action,” Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 750. Here, in seeking to have his ICE hold removed so he can be released from pretrial detention, the plaintiff seeks to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement, which cannot be pursued in this civil rights action. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (noting that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”). Indeed, after filing this action, the plaintiff also filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Padillas v. Bodiford, C/A No. 6:24-cv-00902-DCC-KFM (D.S.C.). As such, the plaintiff's complaint, seeking release to HIP, is subject to summary dismissal.
Greenville County Detention Center
The Detention Center is subject to dismissal because it is not a “person” as defined by § 1983. It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law; thus, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” As noted, this defendant is not a person; hence, it is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001); Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., C/A No. 8:10-cv-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that a building-the detention center-is not amenable to suit under § 1983). Accordingly, the Detention Center is entitled to summary dismissal.
No Personal Allegations
The plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants, Warden Bodiford and Dir. Holister, are subject to dismissal because the plaintiff's complaint makes no personal allegations of wrongdoing against them. Indeed, it is unclear in what capacity these defendants were involved in the plaintiff's alleged constitutional deprivations. Although the plaintiff's allegations must be liberally construed, the plaintiff must provide more than general and conclusory statements to allege a plausible claim for relief. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1022 (1995); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (noting that liability under § 1983 “requires personal involvement”). Moreover, as recently reiterated by the Fourth Circuit, general, conclusory, and collective allegations against groups of defendants fail to allege a plausible claim. See Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 125 (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 2023) (recognizing that the plaintiff's complaint failed to meet the plausibility standard when it did not set forth who the defendants were beyond being employees where he was incarcerated or in what capacity the defendants interacted with the plaintiff).
Even construing the plaintiff's claims against these defendants as based upon supervisory liability, his claims are still subject to summary dismissal because the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior are generally not applicable to § 1983 suits. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability” (emphasis in original)). Indeed, to allege a plausible claim requires a showing that the supervisor (1) had actual or constructive knowledge that his/her subordinates engaged in conduct posing a pervasive or unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; (2) the supervisor's response to the knowledge was “so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices;” and (3) an affirmative causal link between the inaction by the supervisor and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Green v. Beck, 539 Fed.Appx. 78, 80 (4th Cir. 2013). Here, beyond conclusory allegations that these defendants are responsible for the plaintiff's continued incarceration, the plaintiff has not alleged how these defendants are responsible for complying with the ICE hold or that they are authorized to remove or ignore the ICE hold (see doc. 1-3). The plaintiff has also failed to allege a causal link between knowledge these defendants may have of the complained-of ICE hold and the plaintiff's continued incarceration. As such, the plaintiff's complaint also fails to state a supervisory liability claim against these defendants. See Ford v. Stirling, C/A No. 2:17-02390-MGL, 2017 WL 4803648, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2017); London v. Maier, C/A No. 0:10-00434-RBH, 2010 WL 1428832, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2010).
Additionally, here, the plaintiff seeks eligibility to return to HIP, which is a form of bail; however, “the United States Constitution does not establish an absolute right to bail, nor does federal statutory law provide a right to bail in state criminal cases.” Odom v. Smalls, C/A No. 3:09-cv-00629-PMD, 2009 WL 3805594, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 12, 2009). Moreover, to the extent the plaintiff seeks an order requiring the Detention Center to remove his ICE hold so he can be released on HIP, such a request cannot be granted by this court because “federal courts do not sit to supervise state prisons.” Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976). As such, as outlined above, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending the complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 49 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
The plaintiff is warned that if the United States District Judge assigned to this matter adopts this report and recommendation, the dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim could later be deemed a strike under the three-strikes rule. See Pitts v. South Carolina, 65 F.4th 141 (4th Cir. 2023).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Room 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).