Pacific Indem. Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.

11 Citing cases

  1. Lotte Glob. Logistics Co. v. One Way Only Trans, Inc.

    2:23-cv-03558-ODW (ASx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2024)

    The Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706 et seq., is part of the Interstate Commerce Act and “provides the exclusive cause of action for interstate shipping contract claims.” Pac. Indem. Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 642 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting White v. Mayflower Transit, L.L.C., 543 F.3d 581, 584 (9th Cir. 2008)). The Carmack Amendment “subjects common carriers and freight forwarders transporting cargo in interstate commerce to absolute liability for actual loss or injury to property.”

  2. AGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. Kool Pak LLC

    669 F. Supp. 3d 933 (C.D. Cal. 2023)

    The Carmack Amendment, presently codified at 49 U.S.C. § 14706 et seq., is a part of the Interstate Commerce Act and "provides the exclusive cause of action for interstate shipping contract claims." Pac. Indem. Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 642 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting White v. Mayflower Transit, L.L.C., 543 F.3d 581, 584 (9th Cir. 2008)). It limits a carrier's liability under an interstate bill of lading to "the actual loss or injury to the property caused by" the carrier.

  3. Sunteck Transp. Co. v. TCSL, Inc.

    No. 2:19-cv-02364-TLN-JDP (E.D. Cal. Jun. 8, 2021)

    As for damages, the Carmack Amendment establishes that the carrier “providing transportation or service” is “liable to the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading.” 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1); see also Pac. Indem. Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 642 F.3d 702, 710 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The Carmack Amendment imposes strict liability upon receiving carriers and delivering carriers.”)

  4. Traffic Tech v. Velox Grp.

    Case No. 2:19-cv-01793-KJM-JDP (E.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2020)

    The Carmack Amendment makes clear that the carrier "providing transportation or service" is "liable to the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading." 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1); see also Pac. Indem. Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 642 F.3d 702, 710 (9th Cir. 2011) ("The Carmack Amendment imposes strict liability upon receiving carriers and delivering carriers."). The amount requested in judgment—$36,706.85—appears reasonably to reflect the sum of damages, interest, costs, and attorney's fees.

  5. U.S. Truck, Inc. v. Jugan Express Inc.

    Case No. 1:20-cv-00158-DAD-JDP (E.D. Cal. May. 4, 2020)   Cited 9 times

    The Carmack Amendment makes clear that the carrier "providing transportation or service" is "liable to the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading." 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1); see also Pac. Indem. Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 642 F.3d 702, 710 (9th Cir. 2011) ("The Carmack Amendment imposes strict liability upon receiving carriers and delivering carriers."). The amended amount requested in judgment—$40,131.23—appears to reasonably reflect the sum of damages, interest, costs, and attorney's fees.

  6. OHL N. Am. Transp. v. Chris Crossley's Trucking Adventures

    Case No. 3:12-cv-1130-AC (D. Or. Apr. 17, 2013)   Cited 2 times

    The Carmack Amendment imposes strict liability on all interstate carriers: "The Carmack Amendment imposes strict liability upon receiving carriers and delivering carriers in order to relieve cargo owners of the burden of searching out a particular negligent carrier from among the often numerous carriers handling an interstate shipment of goods." Pacific Indem. Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 642 F.3d 702, 711 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). To properly plead a Carmack Amendment claim, the plaintiff must show "that goods, which were dropped off in good condition, arrived in damaged condition (or not at all), and the amount of damages."

  7. B & S Holdings, LLC v. BNSF Railway Co.

    889 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (E.D. Wash. 2012)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that a plaintiff's state adverse possession claim against defendant railway was completely preempted because “not only [would the adverse possession claim] interfere with railroad operations, but [it] would divest the railroad of the very property with which it conducts its operations”

    ( quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2782).Pacific Indem. Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 642 F.3d 702, 708–09 (9th Cir.2011); see also Association of American Railroads v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., 622 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir.2010) (“We find further guidance on the scope of ICCTA preemption from the decisions of the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”), to which we owe Chevron deference, DHX, 501 F.3d at 1086, and from decisions of our sister circuits.”). The Surface Transportation Board recently clarified its position with respect to adverse possession causes of action.

  8. Ace USA v. Union Pac. Railroad Co.

    CIVIL ACTION No. 09-2194-KHV (D. Kan. Dec. 7, 2011)

    Insurance companies ACE USA and ACE European Group Limited, as subrogees of AGC Soda Corporation ("AG Soda"), bring suit against Union Pacific Railroad Company, Inc. Plaintiffs allege that defendant is liable under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11706, for water damage to soda ash that Union Pacific transported from Wyoming to Texas in June and July of 2007, for the cost of removing the damaged ash from the railcars and for the cost of remediating soil contamination caused by the damaged ash. The Carmack Amendment regulates the liability of receiving and delivering rail carriers and imposes something close to strict liability on them. Pac. Indem. Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 642 F.3d 702, 710 (9th Cir. 2011); Mitsui Sumitomo Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Evergreen Marine Corp., 621 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 2010); see 49 U.S.C. § 11706(a); see also Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 130 S. Ct. 2433, 2441 (2010). Section 10709, however, provides a mechanism for rail carriers and purchasers of rail services to contractually avoid the Carmack Amendment. 49 U.S.C. § 10709(a)-(c); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 557 F.3d 134, 138 (3d Cir. 2009); Dow Chem. Co. v. Union Pac. Corp., 8 F. Supp.2d 940, 941-42 (S.D. Tex. 1998). Under Section 10709, rail carriers and purchasers of rail services may enter into private contracts for specified services under specified rates and conditions. 49 U.S.C. § 10709(a).

  9. Ace USA v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.

    CIVIL ACTION No. 09-2194-KHV (D. Kan. Dec. 6, 2011)

    Insurance companies ACE USA and ACE European Group Limited, as subrogees of AGC Soda Corporation ("AG Soda"), bring suit against Union Pacific Railroad Company, Inc. Plaintiffs allege that defendant is liable under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11706, for water damage to soda ash that Union Pacific transported from Wyoming to Texas in June and July of 2007, for the cost of removing the damaged ash from the railcars and for the cost of remediating soil contamination caused by the damaged ash. The Carmack Amendment regulates the liability of receiving and delivering rail carriers and imposes something close to strict liability on them. Pac. Indem. Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 642 F.3d 702, 710 (9th Cir. 2011);Mitsui Sumitomo Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Evergreen Marine Corp., 621 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 2010); see 49 U.S.C. § 11706(a); see also Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 130 S. Ct. 2433, 2441 (2010). Section 10709, however, provides a mechanism for rail carriers and purchasers of rail services to contractually avoid the Carmack Amendment. 49 U.S.C. § 10709(a)-(c); Babcock Wilcox Co. v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 557 F.3d 134, 138 (3d Cir. 2009); Dow Chem. Co. v. Union Pac. Corp., 8 F. Supp.2d 940, 941-42 (S.D. Tex. 1998). Under Section 10709, rail carriers and purchasers of rail services may enter into private contracts for specified services under specified rates and conditions. 49 U.S.C. § 10709(a).

  10. Lewis v. Ayers

    CASE NO. CIV 02-13 KJM GGH DP (E.D. Cal. Jun. 7, 2011)   Cited 6 times
    Taking previously ordered evidentiary hearing off calendar and suggesting no discovery is available until after a petitioner survives the § 2254(d) analysis: "[H]ow could a district court ever find good cause for federal habeas discovery . . . if it could not be put to use in federal court at an evidentiary hearing or otherwise"

    See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1800, 1830 (2009) (Breyer dissenting) (observing that "American courts have followed a venerable legal tradition, stretching back at least to the days of Sir Edward Coke" that "discretion" be "limited and bound with the rule of reason and law" (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). See also Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 1486069 *5 (9th Cir. 2011) (if district court discretion is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, it cannot stand). Thus, while it is clear that ordering an evidentiary hearing is a task within the discretion of the court, Schiro v. Landrigan, that discretion is exercised within the constraints of statutory and case law.