Opinion
Case No. 2:03-CV-560 TS.
July 27, 2004
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), filed January 14, 2004. Plaintiff filed his response on February 13, 2004. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this matter.
On July 3, 2003, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this case, alleging "firing — loss of income and insurance," and "discredit of `good work performance.'" Plaintiff applied for, and was granted in forma pauperis status. Therefore, after the Court screened this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court ordered the U.S. Marshall's office to effect service of process upon Defendant on December 23, 2003. The instant Motion followed.
DISCUSSION
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) provides that, "[i]f, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56."In considering this Motion, the Court looks only to the Complaint itself to determine whether Plaintiff has stated grounds upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, as no extraneous documentation has been weighed by the Court, the Court will proceed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
The standard for considering a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion is as follows:
[A]ll well-pleaded factual allegations in the . . . complaint are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997) "A 12(b)(6) motion should not be granted `unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). "The court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted." Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991).Sutton v. Utah State School for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999). These rules do not, however, allow the Court to assume that a plaintiff "can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendant[has] violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed his Complaint alleging what amounts to a wrongful termination claim. However, to prevail on a federal wrongful termination claim, Plaintiff must allege that he is a member of a protected class, that he was subject to some sort of discrimination based upon that designation, and that he was wrongfully terminated. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Plaintiff has alleged nothing of the sort. He has only alleged that: "I am innocent of any wrong-doing that may merit the pain and suffering that I've been subjected too. [sic] Honestly my dignity, honor and future are at stake." Complaint at 4. In his memorandum in opposition to the instant Motion, Plaintiff further alleges that "[t]he working environment that Mr. Pacheco was subjected to became undesirable. Then the mistake of inexperi[enced] management caused an illegal firing (again) with undue process from corporate office." Plaintiff's memorandum at 2.
Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated, but there is no allegation to suggest that his termination was anything other than an "ordinary business decision" such as those "made every day by employers across the nation." Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 461, 464 (D. Kansas 1996). Such a wrongful termination claim is a state law claim, and is not within the jurisdiction of this Court.
Even construing this pro se Complaint liberally, there are no facts alleged that could show Defendant terminated Plaintiff for a discriminatory motive, vesting jurisdiction in this court. Therefore, even accepting all factual allegations in the Complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court finds that, beyond doubt, Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Plaintiff's Complaint is insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted by this Court.
Further, because of the legally fatal flaw in Plaintiff's Complaint, the Court finds that allowing Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his Complaint would be futile.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the above, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED; it is further
ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case forthwith.
SO ORDERED.