Summary
holding that such actions "simply do not rise to the level of an ultimate employment action"
Summary of this case from Wang v. Formosa Plastics Corp., TexasOpinion
Civil Action No. 3:99-CV-0569-L.
May 17, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court are Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 13, 2000, and Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 17, 2000. The court has carefully considered the motions, responses, evidence submitted by the parties, and the applicable law. For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Patience Oyoyo ("Oyoyo") was employed as a Claims Analyst in the Claims Management Department of Defendant Baylor Healthcare Network, Inc. ("Baylor"). Oyoyo began her job at Baylor on May 29, 1997. Oyoyo is a black female of Nigerian national origin.
The facts contained herein are either undisputed or, where they are disputed, presented in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs as the nonmovants.
On March 30, 1998, Baylor's Claims Manager Debbie Outlaw ("Outlaw") met with Oyoyo to discuss Oyoyo's attendance. Oyoyo had been absent from February 27-March 2, 1998, and was also tardy on March 9, 25, and 30, 1998. Baylor's policies provide for up to three absences and five tardies in a six-month period. On April 30, 1998, Oyoyo was further counseled by Outlaw that she needed to improve her attendance and the quality of her work. Outlaw specifically discussed with Oyoyo that she had been absent or tardy on the above dates, and had an additional absence on April 20, 1998. As of April 30, 1998, Oyoyo's working hours were changed to 8:00 a.m.-4:30 p.m., with a 30-minute lunch period and a 15-minute break. At the April 30th meeting, Outlaw also told Oyoyo that there had been continuing issues with the quality of her performance. Outlaw advised Oyoyo that "[i]mmediate and sustained improvement in [the] quality of [her] work" was required, and that failure to improve would lead to termination of her employment.
Defendant's Appendix to its Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's App.") at Exh. B-1.
At this same meeting, Oyoyo's local and long distance personal phone calls were also discussed. Outlaw reviewed with Oyoyo the previous meetings they had regarding this issue. Specifically, the issue of personal phone calls was first discussed with Oyoyo on June 13, 1997. On January 30 and April 10, 1998, Outlaw and Oyoyo again discussed the issue of personal phone calls. At these meetings, Outlaw advised Oyoyo that she could call home to check on her family, but that excessive personal phone calls would not be permitted. Outlaw continued to monitor Oyoyo's phone usage, noting lengthy outgoing calls on several occasions, including some long distance calls. At the April 30, 1998 meeting, Outlaw reminded Oyoyo that she had been counseled on three previous occasions regarding excessive personal phone calls. Outlaw informed Oyoyo that personal phone calls should be restricted to break and lunch periods, and that she should inform her manager if an emergency call needed to be made. Oyoyo was also told that if excessive personal phone calls continued, her employment would be terminated. Although Oyoyo disagreed with Outlaw's criticisms; however, she stated that she understood what Outlaw was telling her, and what the consequences would be if the situation did not improve.
After the April 30, 1998 meeting, Oyoyo had unscheduled absences on May 14-19, 1998 and June 5, 1998. Outlaw met with Oyoyo again on June 8, 1998 to discuss her attendance. At that meeting, Oyoyo was given her final formal warning and was informed that one more unscheduled absence would result in Outlaw's recommending that she be terminated. Oyoyo stated that she understood what had been discussed, and signed the memorandum documenting the meeting.
On May 14, 1998, Oyoyo filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), complaining that the written warning she received on Apri 30th was given due to her Nigerian national origin and that because of her national origin she had been treated differently than her similarly situated co-workers. Oyoyo had another unscheduled absence on June 23, 1998. Outlaw terminated Oyoyo's employment with Baylor the next day, June 24, 1998.
Following her discharge, Oyoyo filed a second EEOC charge on July 7, 1998, alleging that she had been terminated in retaliation for having filed the discrimination charge. Oyoyo received her right to sue letter from the EEOC on both charges on December 17, 1998, and she filed this action against Baylor on March 16, 1999. In her First Amended Original Complaint ("Complaint"), Oyoyo asserts claims for discrimination based on race, sex, age, and national origin, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Oyoyo also alleges state law claims for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finally, Oyoyo's husband, Dr. Kevin Oyoyo ("Dr. Oyoyo"), brings a state law claim for loss of consortium. Baylor has moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' claims.
To some extent, both Oyoyo and Baylor have discussed the retaliation issue in their summary judgment briefing. On May 5, 2000, the court denied Oyoyo's motion to amend her First Amended Complaint to add a retaliation claim. Oyoyo's First Amended Complaint, which is the live pleading at issue, does not include a retaliation claim; therefore, this claim is not before the court and will not be addressed herein.
Although Oyoyo has pleaded her age discrimination claim pursuant to Title VII, the court will construe her pleadings liberally and treat her age discrimination claim as one brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to Interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). A dispute regarding a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all inferences drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458.
Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994). The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his claim. Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to "sift through the record in search of evidence "to support the nonmovant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id., Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 n. 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing laws will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Disputed fact issues which are "irrelevant and unnecessary" will not be considered by a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
III. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Baylor contends that there is no genuine issue of material fact present in the summary judgment record with respect to any of Plaintiffs' claims, so that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Each of Plaintiffs' claims will be addressed separately below.