Opinion
No. NHSP-094698
June 29, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Plaintiff Oxford House at Yale brought this summary process action against defendant resident Vincent Gilligan by complaint dated August 7, 2008. The parties engaged in significant motion practice, after which trial was held on February 5, 2009 and February 10, 2009. Plaintiff and defendant filed post-trial briefs on April 8, 2009 and April 9, 2009, respectively.
I Findings of Fact
1. Plaintiff Oxford House at Yale (hereinafter "Oxford House") is a self-supporting, self-governing residential community populated by people recovering from drug and alcohol addictions, commonly known as a "sober house."
2. Oxford House is one of numerous therapeutic communities affiliated with Oxford House International.
3. Oxford House operates under the premise that people recovering from drug and alcohol addictions are more likely to remain sober if they live in supportive, self-governing environments.
4. The day-to-day affairs of Oxford Houses are governed democratically by the residents of each house without the guidance of a medical or therapeutic professional.
5. According to the Oxford House rules, any resident can be expelled by a majority vote of the residents.
6. Oxford House is located in a large house at 531 Whitney Avenue, New Haven, Connecticut, where as many as 15 residents live at any one time.
7. The house is leased to Oxford House by third parties.
8. Defendant Vincent Gilligan has resided at Oxford House since February 19, 2002.
9. On April 1, 2005, Mr. Gilligan signed a lease for the premises in his role as a representative of Oxford House, not in his individual capacity.
10. On April 20, 2008, the residents of Oxford House held an emergency meeting to consider whether to expel Mr. Gilligan for violation of Oxford House rules.
11. Mr. Gilligan was afforded an opportunity to attend the meeting as required by Oxford House rules, but he declined to do so.
12. The vote to expel Mr. Gilligan was procedurally proper; it was carried out in accordance with Oxford House rules, with eleven of the fifteen residents voting in favor of expulsion.
13. Subsequent to the vote to expel Mr. Gilligan, he declined to leave Oxford House.
II Discussion of Law
The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that plaintiff Oxford House is a self-supporting, self-governing residential community populated by people recovering from drug and alcohol addictions, commonly known as a "sober house." Oxford House brought this summary process action after the residents voted to expel Mr. Gilligan, rather than simply attempting to remove him from the residence. The threshold issue before the court, which appears to be one of first impression in this state, is whether sober houses must comply with the summary process statutes when expelling residents. Specifically, the question is whether it is necessary for Oxford House to evict Mr. Gilligan in order to expel him.
This summary process case has something of a "Through the Looking Glass" quality because if the court finds that Mr. Gilligan may be removed from Oxford House without being evicted, judgment will enter in his favor.
Pursuant to § 47a-2(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes, the following living arrangements are exempt from the summary process statutes provided they are not "created to avoid" the application of the summary process statutes: "(1) Residence at an institution, public or private, if incidental to detention or the provision of medical, geriatric, educational, counseling or religious service, or any similar service; . . .;" and "(3) occupancy by a member of a fraternal or social organization. . . ."
The seminal case on the issue of whether sober houses are required to evict residents is Burke v. Oxford House of Oregon Chapter V, 341 Or. 82 (2006). In Burke, the Appellate Court overturned the trial court decision that eviction was required, instead holding that the sober house living arrangement was exempt from the summary process statutes because it fell within both the "service-providing institution" and the "social organization" exceptions cited above. Burke v. Oxford House of Oregon Chapter V, 196 Or. App. 726 (2004). The Oregon Supreme Court overturned the Appellate Court decision, but withheld judgment on the issue of whether the sober house fell within either exemption, instead finding that, because the sober house arrangement was created to avoid the application of the summary process statutes, it could not be found exempt from their application. Burke v. Oxford House of Oregon Chapter V, 341 Or. 82, 91 (2006). In order to find that the summary process statutes do not apply in this case, the court must find that Oxford House fits within one or both of the cited exemptions to the summary process statutes and that Oxford House was not created to avoid the application of the summary process statutes.
The applicable Oregon summary process statutes are virtually indistinguishable from the applicable Connecticut statutes.
A) Does Oxford House Fit Within Any of the Statutory Exemptions to the Summary Process Statutes?
1) Is Oxford House Exempt as a Service-Providing Institution?
Does Oxford House qualify as an "institution" providing "service" under the exemption to the summary process statutes contained in § 47a-2(a)(1)? The word "institution," despite its unfortunate Dickensian overtones, has traditionally been held to refer to a broad range of organizations, including "established societies and corporations." Cochran v. McLaughlin, 128 Conn. 638, 642 (1942). "Black's Law Dictionary (6 Ed. 1990) 800, defines `institution' as: `An establishment, especially one of eleemosynary or public character or one affecting a community. An established or organized society or corporation. It may be private in its character, designed for profit to those composing the organization, or public and charitable in its purposes, or educational ( e.g. college or university).'" Highland Park Owners, Inc. v. Tracy, 71 Ohio St. 3d 405, 407, 644 N.E.2d 284 (1994) (finding a homeowners' association to be an "institution").
Assuming that Oxford House qualifies as an "institution," can it be said to provide "medical, geriatric, educational, counseling or religious service, or any similar service" to its residents given that it has no on-site supervisory medical or therapeutic professional? Congregate living arrangements similar to Oxford House have been found to be service-providing institutions as they relate to the applicability of the summary process statutes. In Sunrise Group Homes v. Ferguson, 55 Wn. App. 285, 289 (1989), the court found that a group home for developmentally disabled individuals qualified as an "institution," in spite of the fact that it was created in an effort at "deinstitutionalization," while in Thomas v. Cohen, 453 F.3d 657, 661-62 (6th Cir. 2006) the court found that a supportive living arrangement for homeless women located in a residential setting was a service-providing institution. By way of contrast, supervised apartment arrangements that supply services to residents on an individual basis are not exempt as service-providing institutions under § 47a-2(a)(l). Forbotnick v. Kalinowski, Judicial District of Hartford-Housing Session, Docket No. CVH 5967 (January 11, 2000, Tanzer, J.).
As relates to Oxford House, the court concurs with the Oregon Appellate Court's finding in Burke that its self-supporting environment provides a form of "milieu therapy" that allows it to fit within the "similar service" portion of the exemption contained in § 47a-2(a)(1): "[T]he environment of self-policing and mutual support at Oxford House combines with zero tolerance principles to amount to services similar to counseling; that is, Oxford House provides peer supervision, support and counseling. The record is replete with support for the conclusion that the services members of an Oxford House provide to one another are similar to counseling services." Burke v. Oxford House of Oregon Chapter V, 196 Or. App. 726, 739 (2004), reversed on other grounds 341 Or. 82 (2006). As a result, the court finds that a communal therapeutic community like Oxford House qualifies as a "institution" providing "service" under the exemption to the summary process statutes contained in § 47a-2(a)(l).
"Milieu therapy" is a form of psychiatric treatment founded in control of the patient's environment for therapeutic purposes.
2) Is Oxford House Exempt as a Social Organization?
The next issue is whether Oxford House qualifies under the "social organization" exemption to the summary process statutes contained in § CT Page 9849 47a-2(a)(3). In YMCA of Stamford v. Bentley, Judicial District of Stamford/Norwalk-Housing Session, Docket No. 5794 (February 27, 2004, Cocco, J.), the court found that the YMCA fit within this exemption as a "social organization" and, as a result, its rental of rooms was not subject to the summary process statutes: "The term `social organization' is not defined by § 47a-2(a)(3). It is appropriate, therefore, to consider the dictionary definition of the terms `organization' and `social.' . . . The commonly approved meaning of the term "organization" encompasses an entity like the [YMCA] because it is a formal, hierarchal structure that has been established to coordinate and execute the activities of the [YMCA]. The term "social" is defined as "of or relating to human society, the interaction of the individual and the group, or the welfare of human beings as members of society." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed. 1993)." In fact, the YMCA of Stamford holding was relied on by the Appellate Court in Burke in finding that Oxford House qualified as a "social organization" because of its goal of improving the welfare of human beings as members of society.
By promoting sobriety and self-reliance, Oxford House is clearly an entity that is organized for the mutual benefit of its members. The critical question is whether its role as a service-providing institution created to serve the therapeutic needs of its members takes it outside the realm of a "social organization." There are radical differences between the societal goals of an outwardly-focused organization like the YMCA and the inwardly-focused, therapeutic goals of an organization like Oxford House. Essentially, the court finds that the "service-providing institution" exemption contained in § 47a-2(a)(1) and the "social organization" exemption contained in § 47a-2(a)(3) are mutually exclusive; an organization can be either or none, but not both. As a result, Oxford House is not entitled to an exemption from the summary process statutes as a "social organization" pursuant to § 47a-2(a)(3).
B) Was Oxford House Created to Avoid Application of the Summary Process Statutes?
Pursuant to § 47a-2(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes, even if a living arrangement falls into one of the enumerated exemptions to the summary process statutes, it will not be exempt if "created to avoid [their] application." In finding that this exception applied to Oxford House, the Oregon Supreme Court in Burke reasoned that because a memorandum from Oxford House International provided residences with advice on how to structure their agreements to avoid the summary process laws, the Oxford House in question was created to avoid the application of such laws. Burke v. Oxford House of Oregon Chapter V, 341 Or. 82, 91(2006).
This court interprets the statute's use of the term "created to avoid" less expansively than did the Oregon Supreme Court in Burke. Clearly, the primary reason Oxford House was created was not to avoid the summary process statutes, but rather to provide a self-governing living environment designed to assist persons in recovery. Oxford House understandably wishes to avoid application of the summary process statutes, as such a result would interfere with its goals of self-determination. However, this situation is very different from the evil the statute is designed to avoid, specifically instances where the overriding purpose of the living arrangement is to avoid to the summary process statutes. In Thomas v. Lenhart, 38 Conn Sup. 1, 7 (Super.Ct. 1982), for example, the court found that the summary process statutes applied to a room rental agreement, "the overriding purpose [of which] was to avoid the substantial expenses and time-consuming procedures associated with summary process proceedings."
An example of a situation where the summary process statutes would appropriately apply would be a faux sober house, where the landlord required tenants to sign statements indicating they were in recovery and receiving treatment in an effort to avoid the application of the summary process statutes.
As a result, the court finds that Oxford House was not "created to avoid" the summary process statutes and is therefore exempt from their application as a service-providing institution. In reaching this conclusion, the court is not unmindful of the fact that to rule otherwise would be to ignore the important public policy considerations that serve as the underpinnings of the Oxford House model: if the residents are to be empowered with the right to expel residents who do not obey the rules, the application of the summary process statutes will seriously undercut those therapeutic goals.
To this end, while the court finds that the vote to expel Mr. Gilligan from Oxford House was procedurally proper, it declines to review the substantive merits of the residents' decision to expel Mr. Gilligan.
III Conclusion
Based on the court's finding that the summary process statutes do not apply to the relationship between plaintiff and defendant, the court enters judgment in favor of the defendant.