Opinion
No. 1D20-1467
08-31-2021
Charles OWENS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Nathan Robert Prince of the Law Office of Nathan Prince, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Robert "Charlie" Lee, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Nathan Robert Prince of the Law Office of Nathan Prince, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Robert "Charlie" Lee, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Long, J.
Charles Owens appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for postconviction relief. At issue is his trial counsel's choice not to pursue a competency evaluation and not to present mental health mitigation evidence at Owens's sentencing. Owens argues these acts or omissions by his trial counsel "were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance" to the point that counsel "was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Below, trial counsel testified that he did not pursue a competency evaluation because, despite Owens's mental illness, he demonstrated competence and understanding of the legal proceeding against him and was able to assist in his defense. And regarding sentencing, trial counsel considered and rejected mental illness evidence in favor of having Owens take full responsibility for his actions to set him in contrast to his co-defendant.
"Not every manifestation of mental illness demonstrates incompetence to stand trial; rather, the evidence must indicate a present inability to assist counsel or understand the charges." Card v. Singletary , 981 F. 2d 481, 487–88 (11th Cir. 1992). The defense witnesses offered no evidence of Owens's legal incompetence and instead conflated the presence of mental illness with legal competence. The unchallenged evidence below was that, although suffering from manifestations of his mental illness, Owens was legally competent at the time of trial because he had the ability to assist his counsel and understand the charges against him.
Regarding trial counsel's representation at sentencing, if an action taken by trial counsel "might be considered sound trial strategy," there is no deficient performance. Michel v. Louisiana , 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955). Here, trial counsel's strategy was decided after considering other relevant options, including the one now argued by Owens. That strategy was reasonable. We reject Owens's attempt to second-guess his counsel's strategy after an adverse result.
AFFIRMED.
B.L. Thomas and Roberts, JJ., concur.