Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:04-CV-0346-P.
July 29, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court for consideration is Defendant's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, filed June 3, 2004. After a thorough review of the evidence, the pleadings, the brief, and applicable law, for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings.
Plaintiff did not file a response.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff, Curtis Owens, is a former employee of Defendant, Federal Express Corporation. Plaintiff was discharged from Defendant's Addison, Texas office on May 2, 2003. Def.'s Ex. "A" at 1. Plaintiff claims he was discharged because he did not meet the goal of the typing test and because the facility could not place him in a position within 90 days of his return from leave. Id.; Pl.'s Compl. at 4. On October 17, 2003, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination ("Charge") with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging discrimination solely due to his alleged disability in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1990. Id. The Charge was dismissed the same day. Id. at 2.
On or about October 18, 2000, Plaintiff sustained an on-the-job injury and subsequently filed a claim with the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission ("TWCC"). Pl.'s Compl. at 2. He received benefits from TWCC from October 25, 2000 until October 2002. Id. On October 27, 2000, Plaintiff returned to work with restrictions imposed by his physician. Id. He was able to work until January 29, 2001, at which time his physician ordered that Plaintiff be released off work due to his deteriorated condition. Id. It was during this release that Plaintiff was terminated. Id.
On January 18, 2004, Plaintiff filed a civil action in Texas state court alleging discrimination on account of both race and disability and wrongful termination by Defendant. See Pl.'s Compl. at 2-4. Plaintiff attached the Charge to his complaint. Pl.'s Compl. at 7-8. Plaintiff requested $1,000,000 in compensatory damages and $2,000,000 in punitive damages. Pl.'s Compl. at 6. Defendant removed the case to this Court on February 18, 2004. Defendant filed this motion on June 3, 2004.
II. Discussion
a. Legal Standard
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows any party to move for judgment on the pleadings "after the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings "is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts." Herbert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Props., Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1367, at 509-10 (1990)). "The central issue is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief." Hughes v. Tobacco Inst., Inc., 278 F.3d 417, 420 (5th Cir. 2001) ( quoting St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.2d 425, 440 n. 8 (5th Cir. 2000)).
"Pleadings should be construed liberally, and judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only if there are no disputed issues of fact and only questions of law remain." Id. (citing Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998)). The court is permitted to take into account documents attached to the pleadings and to the motion to dismiss in making its inquiry. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000). The standard to be applied when analyzing a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as the standard used for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Lee v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 3:01-CV-1179-P, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12029, at *5-6 (N.D. Tex. July 2, 2002) (Solis, J.). In construing a motion to dismiss, a court must presume all factual allegations in the complaint to be true and resolve any ambiguities or doubts regarding the sufficiency of the claim in favor of the plaintiff. See Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993).
The complaint should not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957); see also Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990). "However, `the complaint must contain either direct allegations on every material point necessary to sustain a recovery . . . or contain allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material points will be introduced at trial.'" Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Moreover, "conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss." Fernandez-Montes, 987 F.2d at 284. With these standards in mind, the Court now turns to analyze the pleadings in this case.
b. Legal Analysis
The filing of an administrative complaint is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a Title VII action. Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Ray v. Freeman, 626 F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 1980)). Likewise, to be permitted to file a civil action under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"), the plaintiff must first exhaust administrative remedies by filing a complaint with the Texas Commission on Human Rights. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 21.201(a) 21.202(a) (West 1996); see also Schroeder v. Texan Iron Works, 813 S.W.2d 483, 488 (Tex. 1991).
The Court must examine the complaint in light of the charges filed in the administrative complaint. See Dollis, 77 F.3d at 781. The scope of the Court's inquiry is limited to the scope of the EEOC's investigation. Young v. Houston, 906 F.2d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 1990). However, the scope is not limited to the exact charge brought to the EEOC, but rather to the scope of the investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the initial charges of discrimination. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Dollis, 77 F.3d at 781 (citing Fine v. GAF Chem. Corp., 995 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted)); Dean v. Xereox Corp., No. 3:96-CV-2409-D, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19448 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 1997) (Fitzwater, J.) (dismissing claim of race discrimination when the plaintiff only claimed "retaliation" in the initial charge).
The Charge was attached to Plaintiff's original complaint and to Defendant's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, and therefore the Court is permitted to consider the Charge as part of the pleadings. On the Charge, Plaintiff indicated that he was discriminated against solely with respect to his disability, with no mention of discrimination on account of race or color. See Def.'s Ex. "A" at 1. Thus, the scope of the EEOC's reasonably expected investigation would focus on the Plaintiff's injuries and disabilities, not on his race.
As a result, Plaintiff's claim of discrimination on account of race is outside the scope of inquiry the Court is permitted to make. Furthermore, Plaintiff failed to exhaust the jurisdictional prerequisite of filing an administrative claim with respect to discrimination on account of race. In addition, Plaintiff made only generalized allegations regarding race discrimination so that the Court cannot fairly draw inferences that evidence on this point will be admitted at trial.
Because Plaintiff did not meet the jurisdictional prerequisite and because the claim of discrimination on account of race is outside the Court's scope of inquiry, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings and DISMISSES Plaintiff's claim of race discrimination WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. Plaintiff's claim of race discrimination is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.