Opinion
C23-5356 BHS
09-14-2023
MARCA OUIDA, Plaintiff, v. HARBORS HOME HEALTH AND HOSPICE, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
BENJAMIN H. SETTLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Marca Ouida's motions for leave to file a second amended complaint, Dkt. 49, and to strike the answers and affirmative defenses of Defendants Harbors Home Health & Hospice, Darlene Greenwalt, Melissa Dhooghe, and Juliette Erickson, Dkts. 43, 44.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 24, 2023, Ouida sued Defendants, alleging, generally, that they terminated her employment at Harbors Home Health & Hospice after she declined to receive vaccinations to protect against COVID-19. Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 8-13. Ouida asserted that Defendants (1) terminated her employment based on religious discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (2) violated the First Amendment; (3) engaged in negligence by “abid[ing] by the unlawful order presented in the proclamation by Governor Inslee”; (4) engaged in “Willful Misconduct” “by demanding that their employees be administered with the non-FDA approved COVID-19 mRNA vaccine while having full knowledge of the harm it could cause”; (5) falsely imprisoned her by “plac[ing] a demand limiting [her] entry into the office to return to work”; (6) violated the Fourth Amendment by “forc[ing] [her] to submit to a search of her bodily fluids”; (7) breached the employment contract “by demanding that Plaintiff . . . must be vaccinated in order to continue employment”; and (8) engaged in “Civil Conspiracy.” Id. ¶¶ 62-113. On May 31, 2023, Defendants answered, Dkt. 17.
On June 29, 2023, Ouida filed an amended complaint as a matter of course, Dkt. 39. This amended complaint contains six causes of action, all of which are labeled, “Unlawful Employment Practices.” Id. ¶¶ 34-51. These causes of action allege violations of the Bill of Rights, violations of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, violations of Article I, Sections 3, 7, and 11 of the Washington State Constitution, violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and breach of the employment contract. See id. ¶¶ 35, 38, 41, 44, 47, 48, 50. On July 17, 2023, Defendants filed answers to the amended complaint. Dkts. 40, 41.
On August 7, 2023, Ouida moved to strike Defendants' answers and affirmative defenses.Dkts. 43, 44. On August 14, the Court entered a scheduling order, Dkt. 47, pursuant to the parties' joint status report, Dkt. 46. The scheduling order sets a deadline for amending any pleadings of September 25, 2023. Dkt. 47 at 1.
Defendants oppose these motions. Dkts. 50, 51.
On August 17, 2023, Ouida moved for leave to file a second amended complaint. Dkt. 49. The motion contains a proposed second amended complaint, with the added language highlighted and the deleted language stricken. See id. at 49 at 9-25. Ouida seeks to add two defendants, Cynthia Minzey and Joel Stephens. Id. at 1. Oudia alleges that Minzey is the current chief operating officer (CEO) of Harbors Home Health & Hospice, id. ¶ 6, and that Stephens served as its former CEO “during the time material to this lawsuit.” Id. ¶ 7. Defendants oppose Ouida's motion for leave to amend. Dkt. 57. The Court addresses Defendants' arguments in turn.
II. DISCUSSION
At this stage of the litigation, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). “This policy is ‘to be applied with extreme liberality.'” Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001)). In determining whether to grant leave under Rule 15, courts consider five factors: “bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011). Among these factors, prejudice to the opposing party carries the greatest weight. Eminence Cap., 316 F.3d at 1052. Furthermore, “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed'” and “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Defendants assert that the Court should deny Ouida's motion for leave to amend because it does not comply with Local Civil Rule 15. They assert that “Ouida's proposed Second Amended Complaint does not clearly show how it differs from her Amended Complaint.” Dkt. 54 at 4. Under this local rule,
[a] party who moves for leave to amend a pleading . . . must attach a copy of the proposed amended pleading as an exhibit to the motion .... The party must indicate on the proposed amended pleading how it differs from the pleading that it amends by bracketing or striking through the text to be deleted and underlining or highlighting the text to be added.
Local Rules, W.D. Wash. LCR 15.
In her proposed second amended complaint, Ouida highlighted the text to be added and struck through the text to be deleted. See generally Dkt. 49 at 9-25. This satisfies the requirements of LCR 15.
Defendants next contend that the Court should deny the motion for leave to amend both because it is the result of undue delay and because it will prejudice them. Dkt. 54 at 1, 4-6. Although it is not clear when Ouida was able to learn the facts to support proposed second amended complaint, her motion for leave to amend is timely under the Court's scheduling order. See Dkt. 47 at 1 (setting a deadline for amending pleadings of September 25, 2023). In any event, “[u]ndue delay by itself . . . is insufficient to justify denying a motion to amend.” Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1999).
The Court is also not persuaded that Defendants will be prejudiced much, if at all, by granting Ouida leave to amend. Defendants assert that “Ouida's proposed revisions add nothing to her allegations and only serve to further confuse this already confusing litigation” and “[a]llowing her to amend her Complaint again would prejudice Defendants and compound the baselessness of this case.” Dkt. 54 at 1. Such arguments are better suited for a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) or (c). Defendants also contend that they “will have to spend more resources than should be necessary simply to discern the nature of Ouida's amorphous causes of action” and that “adding more Defendants will unnecessarily increase the costs of litigation since Ouida has failed to explain their involvement in the alleged unlawful employment practices at issue.” Id. at 5. The Court will not deny Ouida's motion simply because Defendants are concerned that the further amendment might increase their litigation costs. And Defendants' other concerns are, again, better suited for a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) or (c).
Defendants finally contend that the Court should not apply Rule 15's policy of favoring amendments to pleadings with “extreme liberality” because, although Ouida quotes this standard, she does not provide a citation in support of it:
Ouida argues that “the Ninth Circuit has emphasized that this policy is ‘to be applied with extreme liberality,' barring substantive evidence of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory intent, or undue prejudice to the Opposing Party.” Dkt. No. 49, p. 4. But Ouida fails to provide a citation for this argument. As such, the Court should disregard it.Dkt. 54 at 5-6.
The Court will not disregard this standard. Ninth Circuit precedent establishes beyond debate that the policy of favoring amendments “is ‘to be applied with extreme liberality.'” Eminence Cap., 316 F.3d at 1051 (quoting Owens, 244 F.3d at 712); accord Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Arnold, 283 F.2d 406, 406 (9th Cir. 1960). The Court will not ignore this established policy simply because Ouida, who is pro se, does not support it with a citation. Ouida correctly describes the applicable standard and, even if she did not, the Court would be obligated to apply it. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[C]aselaw on point is the law” and “[b]inding authority must be followed unless and until overruled by a body competent to do so”).
III. ORDER
Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that Ouida's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, Dkt. 49, is GRANTED. Ouida shall file her second amended complaint within 10 days of this order.
Because Ouida is granted leave to file an amended complaint, her motions to strike Defendants' answers, Dkts. 43, 44, are DENIED as moot. The Court cautions Ouida that it would likely deny any similar motion or motions to strike Defendants' answers.