Because the jurisprudence has not changed, only the "reiteration of the repealed" language, we will still reverse only where the evidence is "so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the facts were as the alien alleged." Yu, 364 F.3d at 703; see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992); Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2003). This Court, in Yu, explained the evolution of the standard:

'" Marku v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 982, 986 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992)). "Under this deferential standard, the court may not reverse the Board's determination simply because we would have decided the matter differently." Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Unless "any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary," the BIA's findings of fact are "conclusive."

Thus, the IJ's determination should be upheld unless evidence "not only supports a contrary conclusion, but indeed compels it." Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). This standard equates with the substantial evidence test.

Under that standard, "findings of fact are `conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.'" Yu v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 700, 702 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)); see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (requiring that the evidence "compel" an alternate conclusion before reversing the BIA); Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he petitioner must show that the evidence presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite persecution or fear of persecution."). The trier of fact can base a credibility determination on "all relevant factors" including the applicant's demeanor and the consistency and plausibility of the various statements.

An alien who satisfies the burden of showing past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(a) and 208.13(b)(1)(i); see also Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 455 (6th Cir. 2003). The fear of persecution must be both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.

Resolution of a request for asylum, therefore, involves a two-step inquiry: first, whether the petitioner is a "refugee" under § 1101(a)(42)(A), and second, whether the petitioner merits a favorable exercise of discretion by the IJ. Id. (citing Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Chen v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 468, 472 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir.1994)). 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) defines "refugee" as "any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."

`Persistent death threats and assaults on one's life, family, and business rise to the level of persecution within the meaning of the [INA].'" Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999)). If an applicant for asylum provides proof of past persecution, a rebuttable presumption of refugee status attaches.

Thus, fielding a request for asylum "involves a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the applicant qualifies as a `refugee' as defined in § 1101(a)(42)(A), and (2) whether the applicant merits a favorable exercise of discretion by the [IJ]." Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The statute refers to the Attorney General. Since the Attorney General has delegated his immigration authority to the BIA and IJ, we will refer to the IJ rather than the Attorney General.

Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). That is, we may reverse only if the decision was "manifestly contrary to law," 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(C), such that "the evidence 'not only supports a contrary conclusion, but indeed compels it,'" Haider v. Holder, 595 F.3d 276, 281 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2003)).

(quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). That is, we may reverse only if the decision was "manifestly contrary to law," 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(C), such that "the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but indeed compels it," Haider v. Holder, 595 F.3d 276, 281 (6th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up) (quoting Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2003)).