The creditor later filed a legal-malpractice action against his attorneys, arguing, among other things, that his attorneys had failed to prove that the debtor did not actually own the property and that therefore the debtor had no standing to file an action alleging conversion. In Ott v. Smith, 413 So.2d 1129, 1131 (Ala. 1982), this Court found that the creditor's contentions were without merit: "Irrespective of who owned the [property], however, the law in Alabama is clear that to support an action for conversion, there must be a concurrence of the right of property, be it general or special, and possession or an immediate right of possession. Stathem v. Ferrell, 267 Ala. 333, 101 So.2d 546 (1958).

Although Mashburn does not identify this subclaim as one of the "Grounds Supporting . . . Relief" in his reply (doc. 40 at 10-11) (emphasis omitted), because he mentions cumulative and prejudicial photographs in the introduction (id. at 4), the Court considers whether the cases to which he refers within the petition satisfy § 2254(d)(1)'s unreasonable application standard. Mashburn cites Ott v. Smith, 413 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (Ala. 1982), for "the rule in Alabama that the trial court may exclude evidence, even though it is relevant, when it would serve little or no purpose except to arouse the passion, prejudice, or sympathy of the jury." (Doc. 24 at 15 ¶ 49.)

See, generally, Annot., 10 A.L.R.5th 828 (1993). See, e.g., Ott v. Smith, 413 So.2d 1129 (Ala.1982) ; W. Fiberglass v. Kirton, McConkie etc., 789 P.2d 34 (Utah App.1990). See, e.g., Boyd v. Brett–Major, 449 So.2d 952 (Fla.App.1984) ; Grenz v. Prezeau, 244 Mont. 419, 798 P.2d 112 (1990).

This determination was within the trial court's discretion. Ott v. Smith, 413 So.2d 1129 (Ala. 1982). Bryant limited his claim for damages to mental anguish and sought no recovery for injury to his reputation.

The refusal to give a requested charge is not error where the refused charge is substantially covered by another given charge. Ott v. Smith, 413 So.2d 1129 (Ala. 1982); Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Pate, 290 Ala. 110, 274 So.2d 291 (1973); Nashville Broom Supply Co. v. Alabama Broom Mattress Co., 211 Ala. 192, 100 So. 132 (1924). Therefore, in the instant case, since the refused charge was substantially covered in the given charge, the trial court did not commit reversible error in refusing the charge.

Lomax did not object to the trial court's instruction. In Ott v. Smith, 413 So.2d 1129, 1132 (Ala. 1982), this Court wrote: "It is a well settled rule that a party who fails to object to alleged errors at the trial level may not raise these alleged errors for the first time as the basis for an appeal. Holt v. Davidson, 388 So.2d 548 (Ala. 1980); Record Data International, Inc. v. Nichols, 381 So.2d 1 (Ala. 1979)."

Refusal of a written charge is proper when it is misleading or when it places undue emphasis on one phase of the evidence. Ott v. Smith, 413 So.2d 1129, 1134 (Ala. 1982); McCullough v. L N Railroad Co., 396 So.2d 683, 687 (Ala. 1981). It was not error for the trial court to refuse to give defendant's requested charges. B. Directed Verdict on Issue of Unseaworthiness

practice claim); Michigan, See Pontiac School District v. Miller, Canfield, Paddock, and Stone, 563 N.W.2d 693, 704 (Mich.App. 1997); Minnesota, See Bowen v. Arnold, 380 N.W.2d 531 (Minn.App. 1986); Missouri, See London v. Weitzman, 884 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Mo.App. 1994); New Jersey, See Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 678 A.2d 1060 (N.J. 1996); New York, See Cicorelli v. Capobianco, 453 N.Y.S.2d 21 (N.Y.App.Div. 1982); Estate of Nevelson v. Carro, Spanbock, Kaster Cuiffo, 686 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406 (N.Y.App.Div. 1999); Ohio, See Harrell v. Crystal, 611 N.E.2d 908, 909 (Ohio App. 1992); Oklahoma, See F.D.I.C. v. Ferguson, 982 F.2d 404, 406-407 (10th. Cir. 1991) (applying Oklahoma law and apportioning fault in legal malpractice case between plaintiff and defendant), Oregon, See Becker v. Port Dock Four, 752 P.2d 1235 (Ore.App. 1988); Texas, See Roberts v. Burkett, 802 S.W.2d 42 (Tex.App. 1990); and Utah, See Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein and Fielding, 37 P.3d 1130 (Ut. 2001). These states are Alabama, See Ott v. Smith, 413 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Ala. 1982); Arizona, See Reed, Mitchell Timbanard, 903 P.2d 621, 626 (Ariz.App. 1995) (implicitly recognizing defense of contributory negligence in legal malpractice action); California, See Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal.App.2d 147 (Cal.App. 1961); Illinois, See Nika v. Danz, 556 N.E.2d 873, 884 (Ill.App. 1990); Indiana, Hacker v. Holland, 570 N.E.2d 951, 958-959 (Ind.App. 1991); Louisiana, Corceller v. Brooks, 347 So.2d 264 (La.App. 1977); Maryland, Bagel Enterprises Inc. v. Baskin and Sears, 467 A.2d 533 (Md.App. 1983); North Carolina, See Hummer v. Pulley, Watson, King and Lischer, 536 S.E.2d 349 (N.C.App. 2000); North Dakota, Feil v. Wishek, 193 N.W.2d 218, 225-226 (N.D. 1971); Virginia, See Lyle, Siegel, Croshaw Beale, P.C. v. Tidewater Capital Corp., 457 S.E.2d 28 (Va. 1995). Wisconsin, See, Gustavson v. O'brien, 274 N.W.2d 627 (Wis. 1979), and Washington, See Hansen v. Wightman, 538 P.2d 1238, 1245 (Wash.

"Issues arising under Rule 403 are those about which much discretion continues to be vested in the trial judge. Ott v. Smith, 413 So.2d 1129 (Ala. 1982) (recognizing that such a decision is largely within the trial court's discretion). See W. Schroeder, J. Hoffman, R. Thigpen, Alabama Evidence § 4-3 (1987).

The question of prejudice rests within the trial court's discretion, and a ruling on that question will not be reversed except when the court has abused its discretion. Ott v. Smith, 413 So.2d 1129, 1132 (Ala. 1982). Williams's statements concerning the data were relevant to the element of intent in Zielke's counterclaim alleging civil conspiracy.