Secondly, it must be recalled that it is our duty to give effect to the plain and manifest meaning of the language used by the legislature. Ott v. Johnson (1974), 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622. "It is only when the language of the statute is ambiguous that the courts should search for legislative intent."
As a result, though not specifically addressed by the parties, the Court must look to the tools of statutory construction to determine what import the statute shall be given. Ott v. Johnson, 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622, 624 (1974) (if statute is ambiguous, courts can search for legislative intent); Daugherty v. State, 466 N.E.2d 46, 52 (Ind.App. 1984) (same); Siddell v. Review Bd of Indiana Emp. Sec. Division, 428 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ind.App. 1981) (same). After considering the matter and invoking the relevant canons of construction, this Court determines that the county sheriffs do, in fact, have the power to hire and fire their chief deputies at will.
And, in cases where a statute is clear and unambiguous, we have no choice but to hold it to its plain meaning. E.g., Lindley v. State (1978) 268 Ind. 83, 373 N.E.2d 886; Ott v. Johnson (1974) 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622; Cheney v. State ex rel. Risk (1905) 165 Ind. 121, 74 N.E. 892. Moreover, even if we were to accept Plaintiffs' contention, we perceive the Legislature's amendment of Ind. Code § 34-4-16.5-3(7) as having a clarifying effect on the statute insofar as all acts of enforcement save false arrest and imprisonment now render the State immune.
It has been consistently held in Indiana that judicial construction of a statute is permissible only where the statute is ambiguous and of doubtful meaning. Bowen v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, (1977) [173] Ind. App. [166] 362 N.E.2d 1178; Ott v. Johnson, (1974) 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622; 26 I.L.E., Statutes, § 101. If the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, judicial interpretation is inappropriate and the courts will adopt the meaning clearly expressed. Bowen, supra; Town of Merrillville v. Lincoln Utilities, Inc., (1976) [171] Ind. App. [224] 355 N.E.2d 851. If however, a statute is ambiguous and its meaning is not clear from the words used, judicial construction is proper.
When statutory language admits of more than one interpretation, it is our duty to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Ott v. Johnson (1974), 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622; State ex rel. Bynum v. LaPorte Superior Court (1973), 259 Ind. 647, 291 N.E.2d 355; State v. Moles (1975), 166 Ind. App. 632, 337 N.E.2d 543. In determining legislative intent, we must examine the entire statute, prior versions, changes made, and the reasons for making them. Bowman v. State (1979), Ind. App., 398 N.E.2d 1306; Livingston v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis (1979), Ind. App., 398 N.E.2d 1302; Merimee v. Brumfield (1979), Ind. App., 397 N.E.2d 315.
It has been consistently held in Indiana that judicial construction of a statute is permissible only where the statute is ambiguous and of doubtful meaning. Bowen v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, (1977) Ind. App., 362 N.E.2d 1178; Ott v. Johnson, (1974) 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622; 26 I.L.E., Statutes, § 101. If the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, judicial interpretation is inappropriate and the courts will adopt the meaning clearly expressed. Bowen, supra; Town of Merrillville v. Lincoln Utilities, Inc., (1976) Ind. App., 355 N.E.2d 851. If however, a statute is ambiguous and its meaning is not clear from the words used, judicial construction is proper.